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no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

10/22/2009

NCPC

HEATHER

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Relief

Cheri Copsey

HEATHER

Filing: H10 - Post-conviction act proceedings
Paid by: Larry Severson Receipt number:
0216192 Dated: 11/10/2009 Amount: $.00
(Cash) For: State of Idaho (defendant)

Cheri Copsey

PETN

HEATHER

Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief

Cheri Copsey

AFFD

HEATHER

Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction
Petition

Cheri Copsey

MOTN

HEATHER

Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of Cheri Copsey
Counsel

12/11/2009

NOTC

HEATHER

Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Cheri Copsey
Order Appointing Counsel

1/7/2010

CHJG

HEATHER

Change Assigned Judge

Michael E. Wetherell

1/27/2010

MISC

HEATHER

Renewed Order Appointing Conflicts Counsel

Michael E. Wetherell

1/29/2010

ORPD

HEATHER

Plaintiff: Severson, Larry Order Appointing Public Michael E. Wetherell
Defender Public defender David J. Smethers

ORPD

HEATHER

Order Appointing Conflict Public Defender

Michael E. Wetherell

3/15/2010

MOTN

HEATHER

Motion to Stay Proceedings, Request for
Scheduling Order

Michael E. Wetherell

3/18/2010

ORDR

HEATHER

Order Staying Proceedings

Michael E. Wetherell

6/16/2010

MISC

HEATHER

Request for Extnesion to File Petition and
Supporting Documents

Michael E. Wetherell

AFFD

HEATHER

Affidavit of Counsel

Michael E. Wetherell

ORDR

HEATHER

Order

Michael E. Wetherell

MISC

HEATHER

Second Request for Extension to File Petition and Michael E. Wetherell
Supporting Documents, Stipulation of the Parties

STIP

HEATHER

Stipulation for Extension to File Petition and
Supporting Documents

Michael E. Wetherell

12/20/2010

ORDR

HEATHER

Order

George D. Carey

4/18/2011

AMEN

HEATHER

Amended Verified Petititon for Post-Conviction
Relief

Michael E. Wetherell

MISC

HEATHER

Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial
Notice

Michael E. Wetherell

MISC

HEATHER

Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed
Material

Michael E. Wetherell

STIP

HEATHER

Stipulation to Enlarge Time

Richard Greenwood

CHJG

HEATHER

Change Assigned Judge

Richard Greenwood

5/16/2011

ORDR

HEATHER

Order for Stipulation to Enlarge Time

Richard Greenwood

8/5/2011

ANSW

HEATHER

Answer to Amended Verified Petititon for Post
Conviction Relief

Richard Greenwood

1/12/2012

CHJG

HEATHER

Change Assigned Judge

Lynn G Norton

1/13/2012

ORDR

HEATHER

Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling Order

Lynn G Norton

12/14/2010

5/9/2011

Fou

Date: 3/14/2013
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Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

1/19/2012

AMEN

HEATHER

Amended Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling Lynn G Norton
Order

2/8/2012

OBJC

HEATHER

Objection to Scheduling Order; Motion to Enlarge Lynn G Norton
Time to be Heard on Scheduling Order; Request
for An Extension to File Motions, Affidavits, and
Supporting Briefs; Request for Scheduling
Conference

AFFD

HEATHER

Affidavit of Counsel in Support to Objection,
Motion to Enlarge, Requests for Extension and
Scheduling Conference

Lynn G Norton

HRSC

HEATHER

Hearing Scheduled (Scheduling Conference
02/24/2012 01 :30 PM)

Lynn G Norton

NOTH

HEATHER

Notice Of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

MOTN

HEATHER

Motion to Take Judicial Notice of All Exhibits
Introduced in the Underlying Criminal Case

Lynn G Norton

BREF

HEATHER

Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Partial
Summary Dismissal

Lynn G Norton

MOTN

HEATHER

Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary
Dismissal

Lynn G Norton

2/24/2012

DCHH

HEATHER

Hearing result for Scheduling Conference
scheduled on 02/24/2012 01:30 PM: District
Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: R. Patchell
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: 4

Lynn G Norton

3/23/2012

HRSC

HEATHER

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 04/13/2012 09:00
AM) *State's Motion for Partial Summary
Dismissal*

Lynn G Norton

NOTH

HEATHER

Notice Of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

3/26/2012

MISC

HEATHER

Response to Motion for Partial Summary
Dismissal

Lynn G Norton

3/30/2012

REPL

HEATHER

Reply Brief in Support of the State's Motion for
Partial Summary Dismissal

Lynn G Norton

4/5/2012

CONT

HEATHER

Continued (Motion 05/11/2012 09:00 AM)
*State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal*

Lynn G Norton

AMEN

HEATHER

Amended Notice of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

CONT

HEATHER

Continued (Motion 05/09/2012 03:00 PM)
*State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal*

Lynn G Norton

AMEN

HEATHER

2nd Amended Notice of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

5/9/2012

DCHH

HEATHER

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Lynn G Norton
05/09/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hel(
Court Reporter: P. Tardiff
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: 59 *State's Motion for Partial
Summary Dismissal*

5/14/2012

HRSC

MELISSA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 07/16/2016 02:30
PM) Dispositive Motions

2/9/2012

2/13/2012

5/2/2012

Judge

Lynn G Norton

Date: 3/14/2013
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Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

6/8/2012

BREF

DONNA

Brief In Support Of The States Second Motion For Lynn G Norton
Partial Summary Dismissal

MOTN

DONNA

Second Motion For Order Granting Summary
Dismissal

Lynn G Norton

HRSC

HEATHER

Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 08/06/2012
03:00 PM) *First Cause of Action*

Lynn G Norton

CONT

HEATHER

Continued (Motion 07/16/2012 02:30 PM)
Dispositive Motions

Lynn G Norton

MISC

HEATHER

Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims Related to
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Lynn G Norton

NOTH
NOTH
CONT

HEATHER

Notice Of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Notice Of Hearing

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Continued (Evidentiary 09/07/2012 03:00 PM)
*First Cause of Action*

Lynn G Norton

DCHH

HEATHER

Lynn G Norton
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
07/16/2012 02:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter:
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: Dispositive Motions

7/27/2012

MISC

HEATHER

Second Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims

Lynn G Norton

8/8/2012

OTT

HEATHER

Order To Transport

Lynn G Norton

9/7/2012

DCHH

HEATHER

Lynn G Norton
Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on
09/07/2012 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: S. Wolfe
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: *First Cause of Action*

HRSC

HEATHER

Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 09/19/2012
01:30 PM)

Lynn G Norton

EXMN
MOTN

HEATHER

Ex-parte Motion for Transcript

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Motion to Take Judicial Notice

Lynn G Norton

OTT

HEATHER

Order To Transport

Lynn G Norton

ORDR

HEATHER

Order for Transcript

Lynn G Norton

9/18/2012

WITN

HEATHER

Witness Disclosure

Lynn G Norton

9/19/2012

HRSC

HEATHER

Hearing Scheduled (Evidentiary 10/05/2012
09:00 AM)

Lynn G Norton

DCHH

HEATHER

Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on
Lynn G Norton
09/19/2012 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hele
Court Reporter: M. Martorelli
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: 168

OTT

DONNA

Order To Transport

6/29/2012

7/3/2012

7/16/2012

9/10/2012

9/11/2012

9/20/2012

Judge

Lynn G Norton

Date: 3/14/2013

Fou

User: HEATHER
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Case: CV-2009-0001408 Current Judge: Lynn G Norton
no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

no subject, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

10/5/2012

DCHH

HEATHER

Hearing result for Evidentiary scheduled on
Lynn G Norton
10/05/2012 09:00 AM: District Court Hearing Hel<
Court Reporter: M. Martorelli
Number of Transcript Pages for this Hearing
estimated: 175

HEATHER

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Of Tape Paid by:
David Smethers Receipt number: 0010577
Dated: 10/15/2012 Amount: $70.00 (Check)

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Plaintiffs Closing Argument

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Memorandum

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Motion for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Order Extending Time to File Reply Brief

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Appellant's Reply Memorandum

Lynn G Norton

HEATHER

Memorandum Decision Dismissing Post
Conviction Action After Evidentiary Hearing

Lynn G Norton

JDMT

HEATHER

Judgment

Lynn G Norton

CDIS

HEATHER

Civil Disposition Entered entered for: State of
Idaho, State Tax Commission, Defendant;
Severson, Larry, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/22/2013

Lynn G Norton

STAT

HEATHER

STATUS CHANGED: Closed pending clerk
action

Lynn G Norton

STAT

HEATHER

STATUS CHANGED: closed

Lynn G Norton

NTOA

HEATHER

Notice Of Appeal

Lynn G Norton

APSC

HEATHER

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Lynn G Norton

APDC

HEATHER

Appeal Filed In District Court

Lynn G Norton

STAT

HEATHER

STATUS CHANGED: Reopened

Lynn G Norton

MOTN

HEATHER

Motion for Appointment of State Appellate Public
Defender and Waiver of Fees Based on
Indigence

Lynn G Norton

ORDR

HEATHER

Order Appointing State Public Defender, Order
Waiving Fees

Lynn G Norton

10/15/2012

11/14/2012
12/3/2012
12/11/2012

12/18/2012
1/22/2013

2/28/2013

3/1/2013

MISC
MEMO
MOTN
ORDR
MEMO
MEMO

Judge
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HARSA PLUHHER

CLERK_,.f~~URT

ri1,urv <(;'//t: :!(~

Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE:±os.. c::\:\...

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE. STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF

\...a.;. ~

is ~"

"-M.o C.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,

vs.

Respondent.

t \ :tt:> 0 c: g.,

c~v~
·~~-~~
PETITION AND
AVIT
FOR POST CONVICTION

RELIEF

The Petitioner alleges:
l.

·2:

Place of detention if in custody :~

Name and location of the Court which imposed judgement/sentence:
~ \ ro<,~

3.

do,..bo tc, ~:C~~A; ,oT\-Q.R g ::o'\tr

Co . . ..,.,:\'\Cnu<-:\~ov\x» . f1\:\
t

-~--

~

The case number and the offense or offenses for which sentence was imposed:
(a)
.. (b)

Case Number:

C \( - dOO'd _.;. \ 1:>~

Offense Con~icte d:5\

K:.:t ~"ee \'\\u..."' cl.~
~?o-.5;p,y :a':)~
.=r oc>~ o <' f<\<t cl_
l

4.

The date upon which sentence was imposed and the terms of sentence:
a.

Date of Sentence:

b.

Terms of Sentence:

3

<-J\.

n

Q.

0 "S

S:·.1,.e.~ \ -~ !L

PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF -1

Revised: 10/13105

,"::c \::>.

w\\ Q Qc..r:o\ \?.

•••
3.

5.

Check whether a finding of guilty was made after a plea:

l'<1 Of not guilty

[ ] Of guilty
6.

Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction or the imposition of sentence?

IX1

Yes [ ] No

· If SO, what was the DocketNumber of the Appeal?_~.-.Ja....,._,'-"A.........,23
_ _ _ _ __

7.

State concisely all the gr(?unds on which you base your application for post
;onviction relief: (Use additi~nal sheets if necessary.)

(a)

:::t inS.:i~g,~\~ CX'r.>s·.dem.ccc ~ Co .... -~>;~\.

(b)'::S,

1:n

~ 611)~ e, C:

2 J'-:c,l' t Cl

IA :M

CL 1'

~ ~ e'• \

Y..

-d) \

Q

te '>

kk\ iSb

'1-'r-!: Co" ~s \)9,\,~·...
(c) ll '1,9, ~~\A<, ,~Y>ct <\ ::\g,.',,\_', n:, ~
. · Q..o :0.\ \ ){'\) 9,0
4

· 8.

I

.

. Prior to this petition, have you filed with respect to this conviction:

a.

Petitions in State or Federal Court for habeas corpus?_ __.(\)
..............
o._____

b.

Any other petitions, motions, or applications in any ~ther court? ~ e:;:,

C.

If you answered yes to a or b above, state the name and court in which each

petition, motion or· appli_cation was filed:

t;- \

Ch

('.)f'.N

Ca ...."' \"3 .-

PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF - 2
Revised: I0113105

ffil' . b\oY'f'JZ ::t:_

a_·

'

,

.'

~'\ °'"(\! Coo=s ,b<?. \ ~ 9,, \ \ :\'h..o %" C)<A n c\~ CY) \..) b .,s.h
'1 OL.i b9~ ~C)lA. c Of¢~t:0i.'\-'\"A'\:>C: ~o'!>:\:Co{\l)~,::\~on 'I'-'~~.\~~:£\
{'Pj~9'~ \'6. c-~:\o
Ce') '\CA~\ \Ad.

Qt~f'y.. Q_~\I~ ~Qf\C:~ ~ac:

o 0u \\

ffi \ ~ :'\ "' ; o.. \ (

c\~~~ ciliS~

dcl<locR.Cov. o?R\j
(~) ~c..~\'"'-,e \o ~c... \ \ fu~~" ~°'\ (Co~"\:~
CN AQ~ \\°'~ Co,,,_N>q V\c.'.\q.~ :\o ~~ ~1 h,~h
-\.

Qou.. ":\; .

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ -pg._

Revised I 0/24/05

9.

If your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you,
state .concisely and in detail what counsel failed to do in representing your interests:
(a)~C,:J..,., clw ~o

.aj\ ow S,§\·,\ 1.QV'v\\c:

.:\ o

ks, l

\"' ':\\

~~o-\~ ·
\a. ok=se f!:\.

·,'O ~ - . ~ Q4u ...

(b)S9'.\\ ..,..cR
l}..:e ~\:(\is, °' '° ~
0u. <''.lno, \j ast,"°) .a.~%\• v:o.e ." \~.

10.

Are you seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis, that is, requesting the
proceeding be at county expense? (If your answer is ''yes", you must fill out a
Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis and supporting affidavit.)
[ ] Yes

11.

~

[ ] No

Are you requesting. the appointment of counsel to repre~nt you in this case? (If your

answer is ''yes", you must fill out a Motion for the Appointn)en~ o~ Counsel and supporting
affidavit, as well as a Motion to Proceed In Fomia Pauperis and supporting affidavit.)

D<J Yes
12.

[ ] No

State specifically the relief you seek:

6) '::1~~'> \\e:,:no1::~~ ~owA P)l'<An·\ ~\l-,~9.'1'.\~{\~~-,)1.~

~-~~~~<;. \\c,r..o~ °'\ol 0. QO~~-~ COY"''"°::\~~ ~o '(r>O~IA~
o..~ 'V',QtAtf, t: t t'o "'d

C:• '(\

~ ()..,.. ~'{\g., f\.S (! ('l I p\6.

(~)~ \4~.\o k4:~,C:a t ~"'~9,.\~~ -\:. ~S\.\.~
(~) ~c..·.\v..~ :\:o ~~°'-\ \ ~ I \ "'-~3~)

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _-pg._

Revised I 0/24/05

~v-<'~'\ ~~)

13.

This Petition may be accompanied by affidavits in support of the petition. (Forms
· for this are available.)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRY SEVERSON,

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408

NOTICE OF INTENT OF
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
AND ORDER APPOINTING
COUNSEL

Currently before this Court is Petitioner's application for post-conviction relief.

In conjunction with this motion, Petitioner requests counsel appointed at public expense.

BACKGROUND
After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was
found guilty of First Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim in both
counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole.
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and
conviction, which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court.

State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009).

1 Additional

1

facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that decision and incorporated herein by

reference.

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in
nature. It is distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State,
136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373,
375 (1991). Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief
must bear the burden of proving the allegations upon which the petition for postconviction relief is based by a preponderance of evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State,
134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition
differ from those of a civil action, in that "[t]he application must contain much more than
a short and plain statement of the claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437, 180 P.2d 476,
482 (S. Ct. 2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct.
App 2002).
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his or her claims. Berg v. State,
131 Idaho 517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); LC. § 19-4903. Facts within the
personal knowledge of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits
included in or attached to the application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and
correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902.

"The applicant's factual showing must be based upon

evidence that would be admissible at hearing." Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 875
P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551
(Ct.App.1982).
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and
must rely on substantial, even if conflicting, evidence in the record. Martinez v. State,
125 Idaho 844, 875 P.2d 941 (Ct. App. 1994); Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312, 658 P.2d
NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 2

983 (1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible
evidence, need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 873 P.2d 898
(Ct. App. 1994); Drapeau, supra. If the allegations fail to frame a genuine issue of
material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a claim for
relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its
reasons for so doing." LC. § 19-4906(b); LC.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrott, 117 Idaho
272, 787 P .2d 25 8 ( 1990). However, if the application raises a material issue of fact, the
district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific findings of fact on
each such issue. LC.§ 19-4907(a); Martinez, at 844.
DISCUSSION

Petitioner's Application is based on the following claims: (1) corpus delecti; (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence;
(4) due process: State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State
use of perjured testimony; (6) Court error in failure to declare mistrial; and (7) ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts.
In further support of his second claim, ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner

alleges counsel erred in the following ways: (a) facilitation of involuntary and unknowing
waiver of Petitioner's right to testify; (b) failure to object to prosecutor misconduct; (c)
failure to move for mistrial ( for introduction of inadmissible evidence); (d) failure to call
witnesses; and ( e) cumulative error by trial counsel.
I.

Appointment of Counsel

In conjunction with his application, Petitioner requests court-appointed counsel.

"The Court of Appeals has ruled that when a district court is presented with a request for

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 3

appointed counsel, the court must address this request before ruling on the substantive
issues in the case," or "before denying the post-conviction relief on its merits."
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (S. Ct. 2004).

A.

Standards for Appointment of Counsel

Idaho Code § 19-4904 provides "a court-appointed attorney may be made
available to the applicant." Id. (emphasis added); see Quinlan v. Idaho, 138 Idaho 726,
730, 69 P.3d 146, 150 (S. Ct. 2003). Thus, the decision whether to grant or deny a
request for court-appointed counsel is in the discretion of the court. Plant v. State, 143
Idaho 758, 152 P.3d 629 (Ct. App. 2006), citing Charboneau, supra.
However, without addressing the merits or substance of a petitioner's allegations,
a court must obviously perform a cursory review to evaluate the form of the claims. The
factors a court must consider in making this decision are somewhat convoluted. For
example, in Warren v. State, the court recognized that LC. § 19-4904 applied, and held
that the court could "deny a motion for appointment of counsel in post-conviction
proceedings if the court concludes that the claims are :frivolous." Id. 135 Idaho 836, 25
P.3d 859 (Ct. App. 2001); see also Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 683-84, 978 P.2d
241, 243-44 (Ct. App. 1999).

In determining whether a claim was ":frivolous," the

Warren Court turned to I.C. § 19-853, which asks whether a reasonable person would

proceed with the action at his/her own expense. Id.
Subsequent cases have not specifically overruled Warren, but have refused to
apply § 19-853 in the analysis. 2 Charboneau requires a court to consider whether the
claims filed by a pro se applicant are conclusory and incomplete. See id. at 792-93, 102

2

The Court finds this particularly puzzling, given the specific reference to post-conviction proceedings contained in
LC. 19-852(b)(3).

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 4

l

P.3d at 1111-12. In this determination, a court must be lenient If an applicant alleges
facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district court should appoint counsel in
order to give the applicant an opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the
necessary supporting facts. Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112. On the
other hand, if claims are so patently frivolous that they could not be developed into viable
claims even with the assistance of counsel, the court may decline to appoint counsel.

Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491,493, 95 P.3d 642,644 (Ct. App. 2004).

B.

Analysis of "Possibility of Valid Claim"

Petitioner makes multiple claims of misconduct or insufficiencies on the part of
the State. Although each of these claims will be discussed as to the sufficiency of the
allegations and possibility of a valid claim, the Court finds that each of these claims
appears to be categorically invalid a post-conviction claim. The types of claims allowed
in a post-conviction relief action are limited. Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b) states that "[ a]ny
issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not
be considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" See also Watkins v. State, 101 Idaho
758, 620 P.2d 792 (1980); Henderson v. State 123 Idaho 138, 139, 844 P.2d 1388, 1389
(Ct. App. 1992).

In addition, mere trial errors are not properly raised in the post-

conviction setting; rather, only fundamental errors are valid claims, which may be raised
even though they could have been raised on appeal. LC. § 19-4901; Smith v. State, 94
Idaho 469,491 P.2d 733 (S. Ct. 1971).
For instance, the sufficiency of a charging Information, correctness of jury
instructions, disputed motion to suppress, or a jeopardy challenge are all unrecognized as
claims in support of post-conviction relief. Roman v. State, 1994, 125 Idaho 644, 873
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P.2d 898 (S.

1994); Cootz v. State, 924 P.2d 622, 129 Idaho 360 (1996); Nelson v.

State, 1993, 124 Idaho 596, 861 P.2d 1261 (1993); Hedger v. State, 124 Idaho 49, 855
P.2d 886 (1993). Particularly relevant to this action, "prosecutorial misconduct, which
could and should have been raised on direct appeal, [cannot] be raised in a post
conviction proceeding[.]" Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (S. Ct. 1986).
Petitioner litigated multiple claims and allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in his
underlying appeal (this Court counts five different types of alleged misconduct and error,
each consisting of multiple, specific allegations). See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,
215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Each of Petitioner's claims related to prosecutor misconduct
should have been brought on direct appeal, and does not constitute the "possibility of a
valid claim" in this post-conviction setting.
Moving on to each individual claim, Petitioner's first claim is the doctrine of

corpus delicti, which specifically pertains to the State's burden to prove the first two
elements of the crime of First Degree Murder. A petitioner may not relitigate the same
factual questions in his post-conviction application which he has previously presented in
a direct appeal. Gilpin-Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863, 908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct.
App. 1995); Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 835 P.2d 661 (S. Ct. 1992). In his direct
appeal Petitioner presented this exact same argument before the Supreme Court, and it
was unanimously rejected. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d 414, 433 (S. Ct.
2009). Accordingly, these specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do
not give rise to the possibility of a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment
of counsel.

NoticeDismissAnd.ApptCounsel 6

Petitioner also claims that the State failed to preserve evidence of poisoning.
Specifically, Petitioner alleges the Hydroxycut was tested only by the State, which testing
methods Petitioner describes as "questionable." Petitioner further supports this claim
with an undocumented assertion that "Hydroxycut is know [sic] to have caused over 250
female deaths." The Court finds this claim is incompletely pied, and that any assertions
made by the Petitioner (none of which support a claim of failure to preserve evidence) are
wholly speculative and unsupported by any admissible evidence. Finally, any allegations
or claims of prosecutorial misconduct should have been brought on direct appeal.
Accordingly, these specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do not give
rise to the possibility of a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of
counsel.
Petitioner next alleges the State committed misconduct by "delaying." However,
in support of this claim Petitioner mentions nothing about delay of trial. Rather, he raises
a completely separate claim: that the State failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. In
support of this unrelated claim, Petitioner alleges that the State was asked by a member of
the grand jury whether the Petitioner was aware of the criminal investigation. Petitioner
alleges the State responded that they were unaware, as they had not had an opportunity to
speak with the Petitioner. As stated above, any allegations or claims of prosecutorial
misconduct should have been brought on direct appeal. In addition, these allegations are
unsupported by any admissible evidence, fail to address any elements of the prima facie
case for a claim of "delay" (a claim of which this Court doubts the existence) or failure to
disclose evidence. Moreover, this claim appears to be nonsensical. Accordingly, these

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 7

specific facts and arguments as alleged by the Petitioner do not give rise to the possibility
a valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of counsel.
Petitioner claims the State committed reversible error by using perjured
testimony. In support of this claim Petitioner alleges Detective Wolfe knowingly gave
false testimony during the grand jury proceedings regarding food testing. No specifics
have been provided and no admissible evidence offered in support.

This allegation

should have been raised on direct appeal, is incompletely pled, and unsupported by
evidence. Where the allegations alleged fail to raise the possibility of a valid claim, they
will not form a basis for appointment of counsel.
Petitioner also claims the Court erred by failing to declare a mistrial. The entirety
of Petitioner's explanation and allegations in support are as follows: "Again Motion in
Limine Judges Order/Statement during hearing." This is another nonsensical pleading by
the Petitioner, who has previously displayed his ability to craft a comprehensible
sentence. Here, Petitioner does not offer any factual support or possible basis for a
mistrial; and his allegations are unsupported by any admissible evidence. Accordingly,
this specific argument as alleged by the Petitioner does not give rise to the possibility of a
valid claim, and will not form a basis for appointment of counsel.
Finally, Petitioner makes several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner alleges error by his appellate attorney where he/she/they failed to appeal both
counts of conviction. Although Petitioner has not offered any other allegations in support
of this claim for ineffective assistance, the Court interprets Charboneau, supra, as
requiring the Court to waive the deficient performance and prejudice elements of an
ineffective assistance claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 8

(1984).

Petitioner also alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel as follows: (a)

facilitation of involuntary and unknowing waiver of Petitioner's right to testify; (b)
failure to object to prosecutor misconduct; (c) failure to move for mistrial (for
introduction of inadmissible evidence); (d) failure to call witnesses; and (e) cumulative
error by trial counsel.
This Court finds each of these allegations is incompletely pled, and patently
frivolous to the point that they are unable to be developed into a valid claim. However,
because of the recent court rulings dramatically increasing and expanding the law relating
to appointment of counsel and mandated hearings for any defendant who uses the words
"ineffective assistance of counsel" in a petition for post-conviction relief, and the risk
imposed on the district courts to be found to have abused their discretion if they do not
comply, the Court will err on the side of caution.
Counsel will be appointed at public expense to assist Petitioner in his attempt to
correct the deficiencies in his claim, including completely pleading the necessary facts
and providing evidence in support.

The Court reminds Petitioner and his newly

appointed counsel that "a petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to
search the record for possible non-frivolous claims." Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676, 679,
23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001).
CONCLUSION

Based on the reasoning set forth above, Petitioner's request for counsel is
GRANTED. Appropriate conflicts counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender is
hereby appointed to assist the Petitioner by filing an Amended Petition or responsive
filing as necessary.

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 9

Petitioner and his newly-appointed counsel are hereby provided with notice of
this Court's intention to summarily dismiss all claims asserted in his petition, except
those related to ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. This dismissal is
based on the reasoning above, and Petitioner, with the help of counsel has thirty (30) days
from the filing of this order to file a response to the proposed dismissal, if any response is
warranted. Petitioner and his counsel are reminded of the standard of review, above,
which will be used in analyzing any future filings. If no response is filed within the
stated time period, the Court will dismiss all claims, except those related to ineffective
assistance, without further notice or argument.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this /~ay of December, 2009.

NoticeDismissAndApptCounsel 10

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

_l}__ Interdepartmental Mail

Elmore County Public Defender's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

Interdepartmental Mail

Larry Severson
IDOC #76709-H213A
ICC
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83707

U.S. Mail

Dated this 11th day of December, 2009.

MARSA PLUMMER
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRY SEVERSON,

Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408
RENEWED ORDER APPOINTING
CONFLICTS COUNSEL

This Court has received Petitioner's pro se response to this Court's Notice of Intent to
Dismiss.
BACKGROUND

Petitioner filed an Application for Post Conviction Relief and Motion for Appointment of
Counsel on October 22, 2009. On December 11, 2009, the Court granted Petitioner's request for
counsel and gave notice of its intent to dismiss, allowing Petitioner and counsel thirty (30) days
in which to respond.
DISCUSSION and ORDER

This matter is now initiated and the Court may not have ex parte communications with
the Petitioner. The State has not been provided with the "response" and the Court may not
review and rule on any matters without the knowledge and input of opposing counsel.
Moreover, the Court has ordered the appointment of conflicts counsel for the Petitioner and will
no longer accept pro se filings on his own behalf.
RenewedOrderApptCounsel l

However, where counsel has not yet responded, the Court will suspend any action
dismissing Petitioner's claims at this time.

The Elmore County Public Defender is hereby

ORDERED to appoint conflicts counsel in this matter. Counsel has thirty (30) days from the
issuance of this Order to take some action in this matter. Copies of Petitioner's most recent
filing will be provided to conflicts counsel and the State for such action as they may deem
appropriate.

"

SO ORDERED AND DATED this.Z7 day of January 2010.

RenewedOrderApptCounsel 2
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
James Floyd, #21258
ICC Unit 15B
P.O. Box 70010
Boise, ID 83 707
U.S. MAIL
David J. Smethers
1000 S. Roosevelt Street
Boise, ID 83705
U.S. Mail
Dated this 17th day of February, 2010

MARSA PLUMMER
Clerk of the District Court

,rlj ~\k tcf,
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2082134587

01-28-2010

,t p2010
.
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09:52 Ratllff Law

,Chtd.

2 /3

P.002/011

TERRY S. RATLIFF, ISB No.: 3598
RATLIFF LAW OFJi'ICES, CBTD.
290 South Second East
Mountain Home, ID 8364 7
Telephone: (208) 587-0900
Facsimile: (208) 587-6940
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Plaintiff,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

Defendant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV 2009-1408

ORDER APPOINTING
CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER

TilE COURT having heard and considered cotm.Sel for Defendant's Motion for
Appointment of Conflict Public Defender brought before this Court by Terry S. Ratliff of the finn
of Ratliff Law Offices, Chtd., and good cause being shown;
NOW, TIIEREFORE , IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above named Defendant is
hereby appointed DAVID J. SMETHERS as Conflict Public Defender in the above entitled
matter, at county expense, at the hourly rate of$ 65.00.
DATED t h i s ~ y of January, 2010.

ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICT PUBLIC DEFENDER-1

[4] 0002/0002
2082134587
.,1

11:29:31 a.m.

otnlst:zo10 oe:sz

Ratlff Law Offlc:es. Oltd.

(FAX)2085878940

cq.TDJCATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on
within md foregoing documents to:
Kristina Schindele
Elmore County
Prosecuting Attorney

. By:

)0 Hand Delivery
_ _ Federal Express
Certffied Mail
_ _ U.S.Mail

_ _ Facsimile Tnmsmission .
By:

Marsa Plummer
C/0 Emore County Courthouse
Mountain Home, ID 83647

By:

XJ

Hand Delivery

_ _ Federal Express
_ _ Certified Matl
_ _ U.S.Mail
_ _ Facs:iroile Transmission

..l2_Hand delivery

_ _Federal Express

_Certified Mail
_U.S.Mail

_Facsiroi1e

~ax: (208) 336-1263

P.G03#011

or SERVICE

--

Terry S. .Ratliff
RATI.JFF LAW OFFICES, CHID.
290 South 2• East Street
Mauntain &me, ID 83647
Fax No. (208)587-6940

AowiaW £efJlt1 compse1;

313

tbisQ)~ of Jmma.ry, 2010, served a copy of the

190 South 4* East
.Mountain Home JD 83647

David J. Smethers
1000 S. R.oo9evelt Street
Boise, ID 83705

01-28-2010

By:

_Hand delivery
_ _Federal ExpmJ8
Certified Mail

:&:u.s. Mail
_ _Facsimile

ORDER.AP.POINTING CONll'LICT PUBUC DEl'ENDER-2

DAVID J. SMETHERS
I 000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, Idaho 83 705
208-695-9318

~:

Attorney for Petitioner

r,E

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT O

HE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY SEVERSON
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2009-001408
MOTION TO STAY PROCEEDINGS,
REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING ORDER

Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney ofrecord, and requests this
Court for an ORDER staying the proceedings, and taking no action granting partial
summary dismissal in this case until a SCHEDULING ORDER is issued by this Court.
The RENEWED ORDER APPOINTING CONFLICTS COUNSEL was filed on
1-27-10. Conflict counsel contacted the Elmore County Public Defender's office to
obtain materials necessary to pursue this action. Conflict counsel was informed that a
portion of the trial counsel's file had been damaged in a flood, and was no longer
available. Conflict counsel needs time to obtain copies of all pleadings filed to date,
transcripts of all relevant hearings, and all materials associated with the case and appeal
filed in the criminal case. Petitioner requests the proceedings in this matter be stayed to
afford conflict counsel time to amass and review materials necessary for this case.

'

. 'l
Further, petitioner requests this Court to issue a SCHEDU LING ORDER after
consultation with all parties.

~r-

3 -.t3 -10

David J. Sthers
Attorney for Petitioner

Date

CERTIFI CATE OF SERVIC E
I hereby certify that on the [ <O
day of
correct copy of the foregoing documen t was:

- - -Hand delivered

Faxed

~

~ a i l e d to the:

Elmore County Prosecut or's Office

~ -:rl-1:::.J1:~===:::::::::::,.~----

David J. Sme~ers

, 2010, a true and

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY SEVERSON,

Petitioner,
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408
ORDER STAYING PROCEEDINGS

After consideration of Petitioner's Motion to Stay Proceedings and Request for
Scheduling Order, this Court will refrain from dismissing an claims (pursuant to this Courts
Notice of Partial Summary Dismissal filed December 11, 2009) for an additional ninety (90)
days.

However, no scheduling order will be issued until an amended petition is filed and

response made by the State.

so ORDERED AND DATED this /J'

./-c-

day of March 2010.

StayProceedings I
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
David J. Smethers
1000 S. Roosevelet Street
Boise, ID 83705

US MAIL
Dated this

rd
d-D day of March, 2010

MARSA PLUMMER
Clerk of the District Court

Bct)Iunt
Deputy Clerk

DAVID J. SMETHERS
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, Idaho 83 705
208-695-9318
ISB #4711
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY SEVERSON
Petitioner
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2009-001408

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO
FILE PETITON AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS

Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this
Court for an ORDER extending the time heretofore set for the filing of the post
conviction relief PETITION and supporting documents in this case for the following
reasons:
-Petitioner has requested a stay of the proceedings on a previous occasion.
-Counsel obtained a partial transcript of the proceedings in this case, and said transcript
was in excess of three thousand pages.
-Counsel has been unable to obtain transcripts for all relevant proceedings in this case to
date.
-As stated in the REQUEST FOR A STAY OF THE PROCEEDINGS, the petitioner's
file in for the underlying jury trial proceedings was partially destroyed and the contents
must be reconstructed.
REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS Page 1 of 2

,

"

-The plaintiff has been very active in the post conviction proceedings; counsel's
communications with the plaintiff have generated issues

matters that need further

exploration and research.
-The plaintiff is incarcerated at the Idaho State Penitentiary, making communication and
exchange of materials more difficult.
-Recent decisions from the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have
defined, narrowed, and established new precedent in matters of post conviction relief,
placing a heavier burden on the plaintiff at the pleading stage, and made it more difficult
to survive the anticipated summary judgment motion(s) by the state.
Petitioner requests a six month extension to December 16, 2010, for submission
of the PETITION and supporting documents. Counsel has communicated with
handling attorney for the state Kristina Schindele, and the state does not object to
this continuance. See counsel's AFFIDAVIT accompanying this MOTION. A hearing
is requested, or in the alternative, an ORDER granting petitioner's MOTION is submitted
with this filing.

/vi--~
~
DavidJ.Stn
thers

fo-( ,6-/D
Date

Attorney for Petitioner
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the (
day of ~
, 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document was:
_?/,,,,.~---

0

~and delivered

Faxed- - - -Mailed to the:

Elmore County Prosecutor's Office

REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS Page 2 of 2

06/16 14:19:39

ltrniE::~:~:::.::FF::::=::::: =:y,
LARRY SEVERSON
Petitioner
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
)
)

I

2

22
OF

CASE NO. CV-2009-001408
ORDER

)
)

)
)

Respondent.

)

After consideration of petitioner's REQUEST FOR EXTENSION TO FILE
PETITION AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS and counsel's AFFIDA VlT, a six
month extension to file the petition and supporting documents is granted to December 16,
2010. No further extensions will be granted without good cause being shown. So
ordered.
/

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office

Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
INTERDEPARTMENT MAIL

David J. Smethers
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, Idaho 83705
US Mail
Dated this

lLoliAA.. day o f-r'"Jl 1,11\J

• 2010

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING
DOCUMENTS Page 1 of 2

T2}}:!:-

...

06/16 14:19:39

3

MARSA PLUMMER

Clerk of the District Court
By

(j J0:lu.i:

Deputy clerk

ORDER GRANTING EXTENSION TO FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING

DOCUMENTS Page 2 of 2

ILE
!O

11·• AM 8: 28

DAVID J. SMBTHBRS
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, Idaho 8370S
208-695-9318
Attorney for Petitioner

IN THB DISTRICT COURT OF THB FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP THB
STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OF BLMORB
LARRY SEVERSON
Petitioner
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO
R.elpondent.

)
)
CASB NO. CV-2009-001408
)
) SECOND REQUEST POR BXTBNSION TO
)
) FILB PBTmON AND SUPPORTING
)
) DOCUMENTS, STIPULATION OF
)
THBPARTIBS

Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this
Court for an ORDBR extending tho time heretofore sot f'or the filirli of the post

conviction relief PETITION and supporting documents in this cuo for the following
reasons:
1. Petitioner requested and recei:ved an extension on a prior occasion.
2. The time requested wu insuffioient for counsel to review the entire transcript and
eleven banker's boxes oftrlal materials, and prepare necessary t1Unas and materials.
3. Counsel ie attempting to obtain a CD of the jury trial tra11script to assist in preparation
of said filings and materials.
4. Petitioner continues to bo an active participant in preparation and presentation ofhls

case. his incarceration has mado communications more difficult.
.5. Counsers heavy cue load has contributed to the need for another extension.

REQUEST FOR BXTBNSION, STIPULATION Page l of 2

6. Recent cue law has continued to define. narrow, and establish new burdens for
petitioners in post conviction relief.
7. The State has stipulated to petitioners request, (see attached stlpulatlon).

A proposed ORDBR. accompanies this request, in tho alternative, a hearing ia requested.

/L ... l'f-(o

oavidJ.Sera

Date

Attorney for Petitioner

CBRTIPICATE OP SBRVICB

'J

I hereby certify that on the {
day of ~ . 2010, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document waa:

--Hand delivered

Faxed

~ Mailed to the:

Elmore County Prosecutois Office

David I. Smeth

REQUEST FOR BXTBNSION. STIPULATION Pago 2 of 2

31

'i

I
ILE
1l+ AH 8: 28

DAVID J. SMBTHBRS
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise. Idaho 83 70.S
208-69S-9318
Attorney for Petitionor

IN THB DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OP THB
STATB OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OP BLMORB
LARRY SEVERSON

)
)
CASB NO. CV-2009-001408
)
) STIPULATION FOR BXTBNSION TO

Petitioner
VI.

)

STATE OF IDAHO
R.eapondent.

) FILE PETITION AND SUPPORTING
)
) DOCUMBNTS
)

At petitloner'a request, the above-named parties horeby stipulate to an extension of tour
(4) months from December 16. 2010, for petitioner to file his PBTITION and aupporth1g

ll/. IJd.
-~-~.,,._.l.~......__
=-' _____.ll......,.'":<-...2-{l) 'TlJt{CU,7,
Da.vidi~etheri
Date Kristina M. Schindel
documents.

Attorney for Petitioner

Attorney for the State
CBR'fIPICA·ra OF SERV!Cli

I hereby ~erti.fythat on the / 3
day or
correct copy of the foregoing document was:

--"Hand delivered

Faxed

4-...,..... •2010, a. true and

~aile d to the:

Blmore County Prosecutor's Office

~,f

c,....,...:,- · - -

David J. Sme~

STIPULATION Page I of 1

Jll

IN THB DISTRICf COURT OF mB POlJR.TH 1UDICIAL DISTRICT OP

STATB OP mAHO, IN AND FOR nm COUNTY OF BLMOR.B
LAU.Y SBVD.SON

)
)

Petitioner

)
)

VI.

CASB NO. CV-2009-001408

ORDBR.

)

)

STATBOPJDAHO

R.eapondent.

)
)

)

Aft.er comideration ofpetitionet1 SBCOND RBQUBST FOR BXTBNSION TO

PILB PETITION AND StJPPOR.TlNG DOClJMBNTS and the STIPtJLATION OF THB

PARTIBS, thil Court flnda good cauao to pant petltionea'a request. The aforementioned
~ o n o r b o f l m : A p r l l 18, 2011, So <mlarod.

~
'"u>/0
4~~mi~M7i~i~i&miiiYH:.Liil:___ ___ ___ Lz]ilf/
Dm
~ - District Judge

OR.DBR Pap 1 of 2

9/!i

€9Z~9EE80? ::>11d OOOM3l "I~ 1 Z'111VS WV

zg:n

E~·JiilQ·moz

GIBJ<'I CQ.T lnCA D OIMAlLJNG
I certify that a true and correct copy of tho fortaoina document wu ,ent

Blmore Count y Prolecutot'1 Oftlce
Mountain Home. Idaho 83d47
INTBRDBPAR.TMBNT MAIL
David 1. Smethen

1000 S. R.ooaevolt St

Boiee, Idaho 83705

US Mail
Dated thll

e
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David J. Smethers
Attorney At Law
IS8#4711
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83 705
(208) 336-l 14S
FAX (208) 336-1263
Attorney for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
SEVER~N. LARRY M••
Petitioner,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO.
Respondent.

)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2009-1408

AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION
FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

GENERAL ALLEGATIONS:
1. Petitioner. Larry M. Severson. ls currently incarcerated at the Idaho Correctional

Institution in Boise, Idaho.
2. Mr. Severson is servlns a sentence Imposed by the District Court of the Fourth

Judicial District. State of Idaho, County of Elmore. the Honorable Michael B. Wetherell.
presiding.
3. The Elmore County District Court Number for that case is CR-2002-158.

4. Mr. Severson was indicted on one count of flrst-de;ree murder; the Indictment was
later amended over petitioner's objection to include possible murder by suffocation.
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After several chanaes ln attorneys. the Elmore County Public Defender's Office was

appointed to represent Severson at the trial. Ed Frachiseur was desig11ated as lead counsel and
Ellison Matthews wu later appointed as co-counsel.
• 6. Severson objected to the appointment of Frachiseur arguing that he had a conflict of
interest. Severson petitioned the Court numerous times to allow Scott D. Summer to assist in his
representation. which was denied by the Court.
7. The state was represented by Aaron J. Bazzoli and Ron Howen.

8. Severson did not testify at the juey trial.
9. Aft~ a seventeen day jury trial, Severson was found guilty on Counts I and U.
10. On November 22, 2004, a Motion For Judarncnt Of Acquittal was flied in the district
court.
11. November 24, 2004, a Motion For New Trial was flied.

12. On November 24, 2004, and Additional Motion for Judgment of Acquittal was flied,
and an Amended Motion for New Trial was tlled on December 13, 2004.
13. On February 22, 220S, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order denying
the Motion For Acquittal and New Jury Trial.

14. Prior to sentencina, Frachiseur withdrew as counsel for Severson, and public
defender Rob Lewis was appointed on April S, 2005.

15. On June 22, 2005. the district court sentenced Mr. Severson to a flxed life on Count
I, and five years on Count II.
16. On June 22, 2005, the Judgment and Commitment were filed.
17. On July 18, 2005, a Notice of Appeal was filed.
18. Attorneys Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen represented Mr. Severson on appeal.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELI&F Page 2 of ll
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19. The Supreme Court affinncd the Judament of conviction for first-degree murder and
poisoning food and/or medicine in 2009 Opinion No. 7S flied May 29, 2009.
20. With respect to this conviction. Mr. Severson has not flied any other petitions for
post-conviction relief.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:

Pt1tltloner Wa Dt1nled tl,e Effect/VII As1i1tonce of

Couns.i at Trial In Violation of the Sl.xth
A.m1ndm1nt Right to IYJ'•ctlvt1 A.11/1tance of
Co11ns11/ Under Strickland v. Wa1hln1ton du11 to
Coun11/1' Rttfu:,al to Allow tl,e Defendant to
TestVJ, at Jury Trial. (I.C § 19490/(a) (l))

21. At trial, Severson was precluded ftom testifying by lead counsel Frachlseur.
22. Severson informed Frachiseur and Matthews (hereafter the plural ..counsel..), prior to

the jury trial that he wanted to testify at trial.
23. Severson infbnned counsel during trial that he desired to testify at tr!al. Severson
was told by Frachiseur that he was not allowed to speak with counsel while court was In session,
and Severson was ordered by Frachiseur to write his comments. suggestions, and concerns on a
notepad supplied by counsel.
24. Severson wrote voluminous notes, suggestions, and concerns, (hereafter "notes"), on

the notepad during the state's case and during the defendant's case.
25. Severson's notes listed issues Severson desired to have addressed in cross

examination of the state's and defendant's witnesses, inconsistencies in the testimony of state's
witnesses, and evidence and testimony that would be included in Severson's testimony.
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26. Counsel read and acknowledged the information in these notes during the first week
of the state•s presentation of evidence. after which Severson did not observe Frachiseur read any
of the notes.
27. Severson had a good rapport with Matthews, who informed Severson during one of

their many consultations as follows- the decisions re,iarcling the notes, namely if the information
would be used, and how the information would be uaed., was solely Fraohiscur's duo to his rank
as lead counsel for the defense.

28. Severson attempted to communicate with Fraohiseur in excess of fifty (SO) times
durlna the trial about issues he wanted raised on cross examination of state's witnesses,
inconsistencies in said witnesses testimony, and matters Severson intended to present during hfs
testimony. and Frachiseur either ignored Severson. pointed to the legal pad. ( indicating to
Severson that he should limit his comments to notes). or made hand aestures that appeared to
Severson to be disregarding these concerns.

29. Severson asked counsel to examine the notes he had written during trial after the jury
had rendered its verdict; Severson was informed that the notes were not available.
30. Prior to the state resting their case, the Court recited information concerning
Severson's riaht to testify. riaht not to testify. and spoke of consulting with his attomey•a.
31. The Court did not ask Severson ifhe understood his right to testify. ask Severson if
he had any questions concemlns his right to testify, ask Severson ifhe had any questions for his
counsel about his rlght to testify. or elJcit a response from Severson at the time of this recitation.
32. The Court then uked if there was anything further from counsel, at which time the

Bailiff commented about an Exhibit that had been redacted.
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33. The Court did not asain mention or address Severson·s right to testify prior to the

defense resting.
34. The Court did not obtain an affirmative waiver trom Severson after the Court's
recitation about said right to testify- which Included admonitions concemina consultation with
counsel.
35. Prior to the state restina their case the Court inquired about defense witnesses, at.

which time Frachiseur responded, and Matthews remf nded Frachlseur that Severson wanted to
testify.
36. Frachlseur responded that the state need not be made aware that Severson would take
the stand at this point in the case, and that the state did not need to know that Severson would

testify until he was actually called to the stand. which indicated to Severson that he would testify.
37. Severson was not aware of the meanina and ramifications of ..consultatlon. asked
Frachiseur what it meant. and was told by Frachiseur to be quiet as he was trying to listen to the
judge, and Frach.iseur stated he would explain later.

38. Frachiseur then Informed Severson that Severson had the right to testify, but it was
ultimately up to Fnwhlseur whether Severson would be called to testify.
39. At that time Severson told Frachiseur that he wanted to testify.
40. Frachlseur rested the defense's case without calling Severson

4 I. Severson wrote a note to Frachiseur about the fact he was not called to testify after
the defense rested, Frachiseur fanored the note, and Severson was told by Frachiseur during Jury
deliberations that Severson did not need to testify as the jury would acquit him.
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42. After the jury returned with guUty verdicts on both counts. Attorney Scott Summers
explalned to Severson that Severson had a constitutional right to testify and the choice
was not
Frachiscur•s.
43. Severson then notified the Court that he had been precluded from testifying by
Frachiseur, at which time Frachiseur motioned the Court to allow him to withdraw as Scverso
n's
attorney.
44. Rob Lewis was appointed for purposes of sentencing.

45. Larry Severson•, affidavit establishing his personal knowledge of the events in
paraaraphs 1-44 and attestlna to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted
with this
, petition will be flied on or before April 26, 2001 l, Said affidavit was not filed with
this petition

due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severso
n has
been difficult due to his custody status at the ldal10 State Correctional Institution, and the
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION: Petltlo11er Was Denied th, E;ffectlve Assistance of
Counsel at Trial In J/folation o/th11 Sixth

Amendment Right to lfffect/1111 Ass/stone• of

Coun11/ Under Strickland v. Washi npon due to
Counsels' FalluN to Eff11ctlv,ly Cha//11nge Tlu1

State '.r Evidence Through Cross Exam/1,atlon 0/
The Stat•'s Wltna8111, And Preaent Exculpatory
Evidence. (I.C § I94901 (a)(l))

46. Severson realleges the facts in paraaraphs 1-45 above.
AMENDED PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF Pa9e 6 of 11
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47. Frachiseur told the jury in the openina statement that a defense witness would testify
that Severson•s financial situation was good at the time of the victim's death. Frachiseur did not
• call this financial adviser FNU Bond during the defense case to establish Severson's business

was doina well and earnina a profit.
48. Marla Spence, and employee of the Elmore County Coroner testified about the two

death certificates in this case. Ms. Spence's testimony concerning these documents was
comprised of hearsay without the proper foundation being established, and counsel should have
asserted Severson's riaht to confrontation of witnesses.
49. Dr. Olen Oroben testified about samples taken from the victim that were sent to two
labs for forensic testing, counsel objected without statfna the proper grounds. and the evidence

was admitted.
SO. Detective Mike Barclay testified without objection about pills located in a manila

envelope that were eating through the surface leaving the jury with the perception that
poisonous/caustic pllls had been located.
S 1. Barclay then testified without objection about tests performed at the state lab where

no medications were detected.
52. John Urban, a chemist for the FDA performed tests on various capsules and

substances, and testified without objection about other unknown persons that performed tests and
other unknown persons that handled items relevant to this case, and eventually opined that a
Drano like substance was deteoted.
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53. Jolm Heftkemper. a research chemist for the FDA testified without objection about a
number of tests perfbrmed by unknown persons resulting In cumulative evidence about a Drano
like substance.

S4. During the cross examination of state's witness Or. John Welch, Frachiaeur informs
the Court that the defense is still receivlna evidence. ( a two inch thick notebook). during trial,
but does not request a continuance or move for excluafon or the evidence as a sanction for
violation of the rules. Matthews later made the same observations when observing that five
volumes of exhibits weighing forty pounds must be examined over the lunch hour.
55. David Bourne, a criminal investigator for the FDA testifies without objection about
residue that was purportedly found by others that was sent to a laboratory In Ohio.

S6. Matthews objected to an improper comment made by the prosecutor about Severson
refusing to tum over capsules to the FDA so the ..investigation.. was concluded, at which time
Matthews stated he should ask for a mistrial, but there was too much time invested, at which
time the Court then instructed the state how the incident should have been handled.
S7. State's witness Steven Bock testifled about the flnancina and re-financina of the
Severson's residence on Poppy Street that was accomplished by the victim with Sock's
assistance. Counsel refused to ellclt testimony in cross examination establishing the fraudulent

nature of the application. Bock testifies without objection as to the victims• motivations for refinancing, speculates about Severson's girlfliend. and statements made by Severson about the
victim's medical conditions.
58. Mary Bledsoe testified for the state concerning the purchase of two rings by

Severson using a credit card issued to Mary L. Severson.
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.. 59, Leann Watkins testf:tled that Severson had informed her he was divorced, hi wife was

dying, and Severson was upset that a relationship had ended.
60. Jennifer Watkins testified that Severson misled her about his marital status,
committed acts arguably constitutina stalking after the demise of their relationship. and misled
her concerning the victim's health problems.
61. Jennifer Watkins was not cross examined by Severson's counsel.
62. Tracy Besler testified for the state and spoke of Severson's comments to her about

medication killing her, Severson's gifts of flowers and onrds, and having a relationship with the
witness.
Larry Severson's affidavit establishing his personal knowledge of the events in

paragraphs t-63 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this
, petition will be tlled on or before April 26, 20011. Said affidavit was not flied wtth this petition
due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson has
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:

Petitioner Was D1nled tl,e E;(fectlv, Assistance of
Counsel at Trial In Jllo/atlon of tht! Sixth

Amendment Right to FJ!ectiv, Assistance of

Cou11.sel Under Strickland v. Washingto n due to
Counsels' Failure to Object to Evidence That Was
Inadmissible, Lacking Proper Foundat/011, HlfhlJI
Prejudicial, and Failure To Object To The
Improper Comments By The State In Closl11g
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A1'funutntl, Which Contributed To tlie Ju.ry
V,rdlt:t In Th/$ Case. (I.C. 6 19-490/(a)(I))

63. Severson realleges the facts in paragraphs 1-62 above.
64. Severson submits the Justice W. JONES dissent and Justice Pro Tem KIDWELL·s
concurrence in the dissent to establish that Severson received ineffective assistance of counsel
due to counsel's failure to object in the state's closing arauments.
Larry Severson's affidavit establfshina his personal knowledge of the events In

paraaraphs 1-64 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this

.petition will be filed on or before April 26, 20011. Said affidavit was not filed with this petition
due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson h85
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION: Alternatively, the Cumulative Meet ofthe
Deficient Performance Above Prejudiced tl,e
Petitioner and Thm Dttprlved Him ofthe /Q/ectJve

Aulstanc, ofCoun ,el at Trial In Jllolatlon oftl,e
Sixth Amendment Und,r Strickland v.
Washington. (J.C. 6 19490J(a)(l))
6S. Petitioner realleges the facts in paragraphs 1..64 above.
66. The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance caused Severson to be
prejudiced.
Larry Severson's affidavit establishing his personal knowledae of the events In

paragraphs 1-66 and attesting to the authenticity of all document and exhibits submitted with this
AMENDED PeTITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF Paga 10 of 11
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• petition will be tlled on or before April 26, 2001 1, Said affidavit was net filed with this petition
due to difficulties in locatina materials related to this cue. communication with Severaon hu
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution. and the
voluminous materials associated with this post conviction relief.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF: P,tltloner r1quuts thefo/lowln1 r1ll«ft
A. That the judsment be vacated and a new trial be granted; and/or

B. For such other and further relief u tho Court deems just and proper.
Respectfully submitted thia

lt day o f ~ . 2011.

/.._.,-J:itz
era

§.

David J. S
' Attorney for Larry Severson

VERIFICATIQN OF PETITION

I. Larry Severson. beina duly sworn under oath. state:
I know of the contents of the foregoing Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and
that the matters and allegations set forth are true and
t to the best of my knowledae and
belief.

D SWORN TO BEFORE ME

.I.J.J~"'"-__, 2011
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KIUSTlNA M. SCBINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSBCVTING ATJ'ORNKY
190 South 4th But
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) S87•2144 ext. 503
Pacsimile: (208) 587•2147
ISB#dOPO

lN THB DISTRICf COURT OF THB POUR.TH 1UDIC1AL DISTRICT OP THB
STAT! OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THB COUNTY OP BLMORB

LARRY MARVlN SBVER.SON,

vs.
STATB OP IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408
S'llPULATIONTO BNLAROB TlMB

)
)

COMBS NOW. The State of Idaho. by and through Kristina M. Schindele, Bbno:re County

ProscoutingAttorney, and the Defendant, by and tbroughhfs attorney ofrecord, DavidJ. Smethers,

andharebystipulatetbattho8tate'1answertothoAmendedVerifl«IPetitionPoat..CmmctionReliof
will be duo within sixty days oftho filing ofPetitioner's aftldavit in support ofthe amended petition
in this matter.
DATBDTh i~~ofMay2 011.

KRISTINA M. SCHIND.ELB
BI.MO
OUNTY PRO E
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01 :27:150 a.m.

DATBD'Thia ]

dayofMay20U.

BYt_fd-b
David 1. S

Attorney for Petltlonor
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 South 4th East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
ISB #6090
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRY MARVIN SEVERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408
ORDER FOR STIPULATION TO
ENLARGE TIME

BASED UPON the stipulation of the parties filed in this matter, and good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED That the State's answer to the Amended Verified Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief will be due within sixty days of the filing of Petitioner's affidavit in support
of the amended petition in this matter.

DATED This

LiL_ day of May 2011.

ORDER FOR STIPULATION TO ENLARGE TIME - Page 1

CERTIFICA TE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the
following parties by the following means:
Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney
190 S. 4th East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647

David J. Smethers
Attorney at Law
David J. Smethers
I 000 S. Roosevelt, BOISE Idaho
Fax.336-1263

'A

First Class Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile

)(J First Class Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile

DATED thisl~ay of May 2011.

Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court

BY:d~1
AK
Deputy Clerk
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUN TY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 SOUTH 4TH EAST
MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 83647
TELEPHONE: (208) 587-2144, ext 503
FACSIMILE: (208) 587-2147
I.S.B. No. 6090

V,

,

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

______________
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1408
ANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF

COMES NOW, Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorne
y, and
does hereby answer Petitioner's ("Severson") Amended Verified Petitio
n for Post
Conviction Relief ("Amended Petition") in the above-entitled action as follows
:
I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO SEVERSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEG
ATIONS
All allegations made by Severson are denied by the state unless specifi
cally
admitted herein.
11.
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO SEVERSON'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATION
S
1.

Answering paragraph 1 of the Amended Petition, the Idaho Department
of

Correction's website indicates Severson is currently incarcerated
at the Idaho
Correctional Center in Boise, Idaho.

ANSWE R TO AMEN DED VERIFIED PETIT ION FOR POST- CONV ICTIO N
RELIE F - 1

;

.
2.

Answering paragraph 2 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson is currently serving sentences imposed by the Honorable Michael Wetherell
pursuant to Severson's convictions for the first-degree murder and poisoning of his wife,
Mary Severson.
3.

Answering paragraph 3 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the case

number assigned to Severson's underlying criminal case is Elmore County Case No.
CR-2002-0000158.
4.

Answering paragraph 4 of the Amended Petition, the state admits a grand

jury indicted Severson on one count of first-degree murder. The grand jury also indicted
Severson on one count of poisoning food and/or medicine.

As to the first-degree

murder charge, the indictment read: "That the Defendant, LARRY SEVERSON, on or
about the 15th day of February 2002, in the County of Elmore, State of Idaho, did
willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with the premeditation, and with malice aforethought,
kill and murder Mary Severson., [sic] a human being, by overdosing her with sleeping
pills in violation of Idaho Code Section § [sic] 18-4001, 4002, AND 4003."
(Capitalization original.) The state further admits that the indictment in relation to the
first-degree murder charge was later amended, over Severson's objection, to add the
allegation "and/or by suffocation."
5.

Answering paragraph 5 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that

Severson had a number of different attorneys during the course of his criminal
proceedings and that the Elmore County Public Defender's Office was ultimately
appointed to represent him. The state further admits Ed Frachiseur was appointed as
"lead counsel" and that Mr. Frachiseur hired Ellison Matthews to serve as co-counsel.
Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews represented Severson through trial, and on his postANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF- Z

.
'

trial motions, but both Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews withdrew prior to sentencing
because Severson filed an affidavit with the assistance of attorney Jay Clark, claiming
wanted to testify at trial but his attorneys would not let him.
6.

Answering paragraph 6 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson filed a motion asserting Mr. Frachiseur had a conflict of interest. The state
further admits Severson sought to have attorney D. Scott Summer, who he initially
retained to represent him, continue to represent him despite the appointment of the
public defender.
7.

Answering paragraph 7 of the Amended Petition, the state admits Aaron

Bazzoli, the then-elected Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, and Ron Howen
prosecuted Severson on behalf of the State of Idaho.
8.

Answering paragraph 8 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson did not testify at trial.
9.

Answering paragraph 9 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the jury

found Severson guilty of both counts alleged in the Indictment.
10.

Answering paragraph 10 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson filed a motion for judgment of acquittal on November 22, 2004.
11.

Answering paragraph 11 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson filed a motion for new trial on November 24, 2004.
12.

Answering paragraph 12 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson filed an "Additional Motion for Judgment of Acquittal" on November 24, 2004,
and filed an amended motion for a new trial on December 13, 2004.

ANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3

13.

Answering paragraph 13 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that,

on February 22, 2005, the trial court entered a memorandum decision and order
denying Severson's motions for a judgment of acquittal and a new trial.
14.

Answering paragraph 14 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that,

prior to sentencing, Mr. Frachiseur filed a motion to withdraw, which the trial court
granted. The state further admits the court appointed Rob Lewis to represent Severson
following Mr. Frachiseur's withdrawal.
15.

Answering paragraph 15 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the

court imposed sentence on June 22, 2005, and that the sentence imposed was fixed life
for first-degree murder (Count I) and a fixed 5-year sentencing for poisoning (Count 11).
16.

Answering paragraph 16 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the

Judgment and Commitment was entered on June 22, 2005.
17.

Answering paragraph 17 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson filed a notice of appeal on July 18, 2005.
18.

Answering paragraph 18 of the Amended Petition, the state admits State

Appellate Public Defenders Diane Walker and Eric Fredericksen represented Severson
on appeal.
19.

Answering paragraph 19 of the Amended Petition, the state admits the

Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Severson's convictions for first-degree murder and
poisoning and that the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion was filed May 29, 2009, and
includes the designation 2009 Opinion No. 75.
20.

Answering paragraph 20 of the Amended Petition, the state denies

Severson "has not filed any other petitions for post-conviction relier in that he did file a
different petition in this same case on October 22, 2009.

The state is, however,

ANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4

unaware of any other post-conviction petitions filed by Severson in relation to Case No.
CR-2002-0000158.
21.

Answering paragraph 21 of the Amended Petition, the state denies

"Severson was precluded from testifying by lead counsel Frachiseur." The state further
denies the allegations set forth in relation to the heading "FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION,"
appearing between paragraphs 20 and 21 of the Amended Petition.
22.

Answering paragraph 22 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny what Severson claims he told either Mr.
Frachiseur or Mr. Matthews "prior to the jury trial" regarding his position on testifying.
23.

Answering paragraph 23 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny what discussions occurred between Severson
and Mr. Frachiseur during trial or what direction Mr. Frachiseur gave to Severson
regarding the manner in which he should communicate to counsel "while court was in
session."
24.

Answering paragraph 24 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny the number or content of any "notes" written by
Severson during trial and no such "notes" are attached to either the Amended Petition
or Severson's accompanying affidavit as evidence in support of Severson's allegation.
25.

Answering paragraph 25 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny what Severson claims was included in his "notes"
and no such "notes" are attached to either the Amended Petition or Severson's
accompanying affidavit as evidence in support of Severson's allegation.

The state

affirmatively asserts that, regardless of the content of Severson's alleged "notes,"
"counsel's choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to
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testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not be secondguessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of
ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review.

Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (Ct. App.

1994); .§fil! also Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46
(Ct. App. 1990).
26.

Answering paragraph 26 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny whether or when "[c]ounsel read and
acknowledged the information" in Severson's "notes."
27.

Answering paragraph 27 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny the quality of Severson's "rapport'' with Mr.
Matthews.

The state is also without sufficient information to admit or deny what, if

anything, Mr. Matthews told Severson regarding Mr. Frachiseur's decision-making
authority vis-a-vis the "notes." To the extent Mr. Matthews advised Severson that Mr.
Frachiseur had authority to decide "if' and "how the information would be used," such
advice is consistent with the applicable law governing counsel's authority and
responsibilities for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.
28.

Answering paragraph 28 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny if, or the number of times, Severson "attempted to
communicate" with Mr. Frachiseur "about issues he wanted raised on cross examination
of state's witnesses, inconsistencies in said witnesses testimony, and matters Severson
intended to present during his testimony."

The state is also without sufficient
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information to admit or deny Severson's allegations regarding Mr. Frachiseur's
response to Severson's alleged efforts.
29.

Answering paragraph 29 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson "asked counsel to examine the
notes he had written during trial after the jury had rendered its verdicr or whether
Severson ''was informed that the notes were not available."
30.

Answering paragraph 30 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding what the trial court advised Severson in relation to his right to testify.
31.

Answering paragraph 31 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the trial court's advisements on Severson's right to testify.
32.

Answering paragraph 32 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the trial court's comments to counsel and any comments made by
"the Bailiff ... about an Exhibit that had been redacted."
33.

Answering paragraph 33 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding any discussion relating to Severson's right to testify.
34.

Answering paragraph 34 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding any discussion relating to Severson's right to testify.
35.

Answering paragraph 35 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding any inquiry made by the trial court "about defense witnesses" and
any response by Mr. Frachiseur. The state is without sufficient information to admit or
deny what, if any, conversations occurred between Mr. Matthews and Mr. Frachiseur
regarding Severson's alleged desire to testify.
36.

Answering paragraph 36 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding any statements made on the record by Mr. Frachiseur about whether
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Severson would testify.

The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny

what, if any, conversations occurred between Mr. Frachiseur and Severson at that time
regarding whether Severson would testify.
37.

Answering paragraph 37 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson understands the "meaning and
ramifications of 'consultation[']" or whether he asked Mr. Frachiseur about such. The
state is also without sufficient information to admit or deny if, or how, Mr. Frachiseur
responded if Severson, in fact, asked him about such.
38.

Answering paragraph 38 of the Amended Petition, the state denies

Severson's allegation that Mr. Frachiseur informed him that it was his decision whether
Severson would testify. The state's denial is based upon Mr. Frachiseur's motion to
withdraw filed March 21, 2005, wherein Mr. Frachiseur states Severson's claim that he
"ignored his stated desire to testify and rested the defense's case without permitting him
to testify, all in alleged violation of his stated desire to testify at trial" is "false."
39.

Answering paragraph 39 of the Amended Petition, the state denies

Severson told Mr. Frachiseur "that he wanted to testify." The state's denial is based
upon the contents of Mr. Frachiseur's motion to withdraw, relevant portions of which are
set forth in paragraph 38, supra.
40.

Answering paragraph 40 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Severson did not testify at trial.
41 .

Answering paragraph 41 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny whether Severson "wrote a note" to Mr.
Frachiseur after the defense rested regarding his desire to testify. The state is also
without sufficient information to admit or deny if, or how, Mr. Frachiseur responded to
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such a note if it was written. The state, however, affirmatively asserts Mr. Frachiseur
deprive Severson of his right to testify as indicated by Mr. Frachiseur

his

to withdraw, relevant portions of which are set forth in paragraph 38, supra.
42.

Answering paragraph 42 of the Amended Petition, the state is without

sufficient information to admit or deny what, if anything, Mr. Summers told Severson
after trial about his right to testify.
43.

Answering paragraph 43 of the Amended Petition, the state admits that

Severson filed an affidavit on March 18, 2005, in which he advised the trial court that he
"consistently declared to [his] attorneys of record that [he] wanted to testify on [his] own
behalf," that he expected to testify and that he had no "idea" that he ''was not going to
be allowed to testify." The state further admits that Mr. Frachiseur filed a motion to
withdraw based upon the allegations in Severson's affidavit. The state affirmatively
asserts Mr. Frachiseur denied the allegations set forth in Severson's affidavit as
explained in Mr. Frachiseur's motion to withdraw wherein he describes Severson's
allegations as ''false."
44.

Answering paragraph 44 of the Amended Petition, the state admits Rob

Lewis was appointed to represent Severson after Mr. Frachiseur (and Mr. Matthews)
withdrew, and that Mr. Lewis represented Severson at sentencing.
45.

Answering paragraph 45 of the Amended Petition, the state denies that

Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his personal knowledge of the events" alleged in
his Amended Petition and "attesting to the authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits
submitted with this petition ... on or before April 26, 2011." The state is without
sufficient information to admit or deny Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his
affidavit with his petition.

The state affirmatively asserts that the state received an
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unsigned affidavit from Severson on June 6, 2011.

On June 23, 2011, the State

received a proclaimed "Verification of Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on

15, 2011.
46.

Answering paragraph 46 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates

its prior responses to paragraphs 1-45. The state further denies the allegations set forth
in relation to the heading "SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between
paragraphs 45 and 46 of the Amended Petition.
47.

Answering paragraph 47 of the Amended Petition, the transcript of Mr.

Frachiseur's opening statement speaks for itself. The state admits Mr. Frachiseur's
opening statement did include the following:

"the Severson's were in pretty good

financial shape." The state, however, denies that Mr. Frachiseur ever represented that
the defense would call Severson's "financial adviser," whose first name Severson does
not even know, to "establish Severson's business was doing well and earning a profit."
The state affirmatively asserts that Severson has failed to support his claim that his
"business was doing well and earning a profit'' with any evidence and has failed to
provide an affidavit from his "financial adviser," "FNU Bond," indicating what his/her
testimony would have been had s/he been called as a witness.

Further, "counsel's

choice of witnesses, manner of cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony
fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed
on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective
counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924,877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31,
788 P.2d at 245-46.
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48.

Answering paragraph 48 of the Amended Petition, the transcript of Marla

Spence's testimony speaks for itself. The state admits Marla Spence was, at the time of
an employee of the Elmore County Coroners office and that her duties

that

capacity included completion of a death certificate for Mary Severson. The state further
admits that Ms. Spence testified about Mary's death certificate and that the death
certificate was admitted.

The state denies that the death certificate was admitted

without proper foundation and denies that Severson was denied his "right to
confrontation of witnesses" as a result of the admission of the death certificate. The
state affirmatively asserts "counsel's . . . manner of cross-examination, and lack of
objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that will not
be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under a
claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at
430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.

49.

Answering paragraph 49 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Dr. Glen Groben. The state denies Dr. Groben's
testimony regarding the "samples taken from the victim that were sent to two labs for
forensic testing," was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for
finding the testimony objectionable.

Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-

examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
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other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
50.

Answering paragraph 50 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Detective Michael Barclay.

The state denies

Detective Barclay's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate
any basis for finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's . . . manner of
cross-examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
51.

Answering paragraph 51 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Detective Barclay.

The state denies Detective

Barclay's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis
for finding the testimony objectionable.

Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-

examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
52.

Answering paragraph 52 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of John Urban.

The state denies Mr. Urban's
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testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for finding
the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination, and
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that
will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under
a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review. ~ . 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at
430•31 I 788 p ,2d at 245•46,
53.

Answering paragraph 53 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of John Heitkemper.

The state denies Mr.

Heitkemper's testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any
basis for finding the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of crossexamination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
54.

Answering paragraph 54 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding statements made by Mr. Frachiseur during cross-examination of Dr.
John Welch and "observations" made by Mr. Matthews in relation to the "weigh[t]" and
need to examine exhibits. The state denies there was any basis for continuing the trial
or for sanctions based upon the timing of disclosure of evidence, and Severson has
failed to articulate any basis for concluding counsel was ineffective for failing to file a
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motion to continue or a motion for mistrial. See Wolf v. State, 2011 WL 1900460 *3 (Ct.
App. 2011) (citing Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 916 (Ct.
App.1996) ('Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a
conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test").
55.

Answering paragraph 55 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of David Bourne.

The state denies Mr. Bourne's

testimony was objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for finding
the testimony objectionable. Further, "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination, and
lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or strategic, decisions," that
will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief under
a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show that the decision resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at
430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
56.

Answering paragraph 56 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding any "comment made by the prosecutor about Severson refusing to
turn over capsules to the FDA," and Mr. Matthew's and the trial court's response to the
comment. Paragraph 56 does not include any allegation as to why Severson would be
entitled to relief based on the facts asserted therein, and the state denies any relief is
warranted.
57.

Answering paragraph 57 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Steven Bock. Severson's allegation regarding a
''fraudulent" application for financing related to "the Severson's residence on Poppy
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Street" is unsupported by evidence. The state denies any identified portions of Mr.
Sock's testimony were objectionable, and Severson has failed to articulate any basis for
finding the testimony objectionable.

Further, "counsel's . . . manner of cross-

examination, and lack of objection to testimony fall within the area of tactical, or
strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for
post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46.
58.

Answering paragraph 58 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Mary Bledsoe.

Paragraph 58 of the Amended

Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Bledsoe's testimony, and
the state denies any.
59.

Answering paragraph 59 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Leann Watkins.

Paragraph 59 of the Amended

Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Watkins' testimony, and the
state denies any.
60.

Answering paragraph 60 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding the testimony of Jennifer Watkins. Paragraph 60 of the Amended
Petition contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Watkins' testimony, and the
state denies any.
61.

Answering paragraph 61 of the Amended Petition, the state admits

Jennifer Watkins was not cross-examined by defense counsel. The state affirmatively
asserts "counsel's ... manner of cross-examination ... fall[s] within the area of tactical,
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or strategic, decisions," that will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis
for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless Severson can show
that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or
other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at
368; Cunningham, 117 Idaho at 430-31, 788 P.2d at 245-46. The state further asserts
Severson has failed to identify what cross-examination should have been conducted
and has failed to articulate or provide an affidavit from Ms. Watkins stating what her
testimony would have been had she been cross-examined.
62.

Answering paragraph 62 of the Amended Petition, the transcript speaks

for itself regarding testimony of Tracy Besler. Paragraph 62 of the Amended Petition
contains no allegation of impropriety relating to Ms. Besler's testimony, and the state
denies any.

The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his

personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and "attesting to the
authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition ... on or
before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny
Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The state
affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on
June 6, 2011.

On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of

Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011.
63.

Answering paragraph 63 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates

its prior responses to paragraphs 1-62. The state further denies the allegations set forth
in relation to the heading "THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between paragraphs
62 and 63 of the Amended Petition.

ANSWER TO AMENDED VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTI ON RELIEF - 16

64.

Answering paragraph 64 of the Amended Petition, the state denies the

dissenting opinion of Justice W. Jones joined by Pro Tern Justice Kidwell "establish that
Severson received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to object in
the state's closing argument." The state affirmatively asserts the majority opinion of the
Idaho Supreme Court in Severson's direct appeal from his convictions establishes
otherwise.

The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit "establishing his

personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and "attesting to the
authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition ... on or
before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or deny
Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The state
affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on
June 6, 2011.

On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of

Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011.
65.

Answering paragraph 65 of the Amended Petition, the state incorporates

its prior responses to paragraphs 1-64. The state further denies the allegations set forth
in relation to the heading "FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION," appearing between
paragraphs 64 and 65 of the Amended Petition.
66.

Answering paragraph 66 of the Amended Petition, the state denies the

"cumulative effect of trial counsel's [sic] deficient performance caused Severson to be
prejudiced." The state affirmatively asserts Severson is required to establish prejudice
as to each of his claims and that he has failed to allege, much less demonstrate,
prejudice as to each of his claims. The state also denies that Severson filed an affidavit
"establishing his personal knowledge of the events" alleged in his Amended Petition and
"attesting to the authenticity of all document [sic] and exhibits submitted with this petition
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.. .
. .. on or before April 26, 2011." The state is without sufficient information to admit or
deny Severson's claims regarding his inability to file his affidavit with his petition. The
state affirmatively asserts that the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson
on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed "Verification of
Petition" signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011.
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Severson's petition should be dismissed because he has failed to comply with
the requirements of I.C. § 19-4902(a), by failing to file an affidavit setting forth the
"[f]acts within [his] personal knowledge."
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent any of the claims in Severson's Amended Petition do not relate
back to his original petition, the claims should be dismissed as untimely.
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Severson's Amended Petition contains bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 194906.
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent any of Severson's claims should have been raised on direct
appeal, the claims are procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-4901 (b).
WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:
a)

that Severson's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

that Severson's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed;
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c)

for such other and further relief as the Court deems necessary

the case.

DATED this 5tti day of August 2011.
NGATIORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to
the following parties by the following means:
David J. Smethers
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83705
Facsimile No. 336-1263
DATED this

__ First Class Mail

--r Hand Delivery
_V"_

Facsimile

e:;1-

_"J_

day of August 2011.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE

LARRYM. SEVERSON,
Case No. CV-2009-1408
Petitioner,
ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
SCHEDULING ORDER

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.

This matter is before the Court following Petitioner Severson's filing of a Petition for PostConviction Relief on October 13, 2009, pursuant to LC. § 19-4901, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA)). After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the
Petitioner was found guilty of First-Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim
and both counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole.
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction,
which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case
are found in that decision and incorporated herein by reference.
The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009. On
December 11, 2009, this Court appointed a public defender for the Petitioner and David Smethers
was appointed as conflict counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender following a renewed order
on January 27, 2010. Mr. Smethers requested a stay in proceedings and that the Court take no
action granting partial summary dismissal until a scheduling order is issued by this Court.
Proceedings were stayed for an additional ninety days but the order stated that no scheduling
order would be issued until an amended petition was filed and response made by the State.
Another request for extension to file petition was granted until December 16, 2010. An
additional four-month extension was granted until April 18, 2011.
While the Petitioner never moved the Court for permission to amend the petition , this
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Court finds the requests for extensions and subsequent orders granted leave to file an amended
petition. Since the amended petition relates back to the original petition flied within one
year of the decision on appeal, such amended petition is timely.
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed on April 18,
2011. An affidavit in support of post conviction petition was filed on October 22, 2009 with the
original petition.

The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended

petition "due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with
Severson has been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution,
and the voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's
Counsel requested the court take judicial notice of ''the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Counsel
also included a notice of filing of judically noticed material on April 18, 2011 which included the
trial transcript including the opening and closing arguments, and the Clerk's Record and
Supplemental Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal. The court will take judicial

notice of the matters in the notice of filing of judicially noticed material.
An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty days after the filing of the
Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to the amended verified petition on
August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner
filed an affidavit but affirmatively asserts "the state received an unsigned affidavit from
Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of
Petition' signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011." No affidavits or other statements
were filed with the court except the affidavit of the Petitioner filed on October 13, 2009.
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature.
It is distinct :from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). Like a
plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of
proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000).
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SCHEDULING ORDER FOR AMENDED PETITION
to

Either party has until February 10,

motions, affidavits and supporting briefs

summary disposition of the application.

If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavit( s) and a response brief, it must do
so within fourteen (14) days of being served the motion for summary disposition.
The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief within seven (7) days of being served
the response brief.

If no motions, affidavits, or supporting briefs for summary disposition are filed by
January 31, 2012, the Court will consider this matter submitted to the Court for decision pursuant
to Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq.

ANY OBJECTION TO THIS SCHEDULING ORDER MUST BE FILED AND
SERVED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS
ORDER. IF THERE IS A TIMELY OBJECTION, THEN THE OBJECTING PARTY MUST
NOTICE A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE FOR HEARING IN ELMORE COUNTY.
FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT WILL WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS
SCHEDULING ORDER.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

J3 ~
day of January, 2012.
Lynn~
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the
following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
David J. Smethers
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, ID 83 705
U.S.MAIL
Dated this 13th day of January, 2012.

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRI7Ji'

Pl,

THE

LARRYM. SEVERSON,
Case No. CV-2009-1408
Petitioner,

AM&tJD€0
ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
SCHEDULING ORDER

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.

This matter is before the Court following Petitioner Severson's filing of a Petition for PostConviction Relief on October 13, 2009, pursuant to I.C. §19-4901, et seq. (Uniform Post-Conviction
Procedure Act (UPCPA)). After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the
Petitioner was found guilty of First-Degree Murder, Felony, and Poisoning, Felony; the victim
and both counts being his wife. Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without parole.
Following his conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction,
which was upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson,
147 Idaho 694,215 P.3d 414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case
are found in that decision and incorporated herein by reference.
The Petitioner then filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on October 13, 2009. On
December 11, 2009, this Court appointed a public defender for the Petitioner and David Smethers
was appointed as conflict counsel for the Elmore County Public Defender following a renewed order
on January 27, 2010. Mr. Smethers requested a stay in proceedings and that the Court take no
action granting partial summary dismissal until a scheduling order is issued by this Court.
Proceedings were stayed for an additional ninety days but the order stated that no scheduling
order would be issued until an amended petition was filed and response made by the State.
Another request for extension to file petition was granted until December 16, 2010. An
additional four-month extension was granted until April 18, 2011.
While the Petitioner never moved the Court for permission to amend the petition , this
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"

Court finds the requests for extensions and subsequent orders granted leave to file an amended

..,..,.,, .."''"· Since the amended petition relates back to the original petition filed within one
year of the decision on appeal, such amended petition is timely.
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed on April 18,
2011. An affidavit in support of post conviction petition was filed on October 22, 2009 with the
original petition.

The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended

petition "due to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with
Severson has been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution,
and the voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's
Counsel requested the court take judicial notice of "the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Counsel
also included a notice of filing of judically noticed material on April 18, 2011 which included the
trial transcript including the opening and closing arguments, and the Clerk's Record and
Supplemental Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal. The court will take judicial

notice of the matters in the notice of filing of judicially noticed material.
An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty days after the filing of the
Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to the amended verified petition on
August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and 66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner
filed an affidavit but affirmatively asserts ''the state received an unsigned affidavit from
Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23, 2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of
Petition' signed by Severson and notarized on June 15, 2011." No affidavits or other statements
were filed with the court except the affidavit of the Petitioner filed on October 13, 2009.
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature.
It is distinct from the criminal action, which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 36
P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991). Like a
plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden of
proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 995 P.2d 794 (2000).
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SCHEDULING ORDER FOR AMENDED PETITION
Either party has until February l

to file motions, affidavits and supporting briefs

summary disposition of the application.

If the adverse party desires to serve opposing affidavit( s) and a response brief, it must do
so within fourteen (14) days of being served the motion for summary disposition.
The moving party may thereafter serve a reply brief within seven (7) days of being served
the response brief.

,-.,,..

If no motions, affidavits, or supporting briefs for summary disposition are filed by

~im<~_,o

:Jaftum~, 2012, the Court will consider this matter submitted to the Court for decision pursuant
to Idaho Code § 19-4901, et seq.

ANY OBJECTION TO THIS SCHEDULING ORDER MUST BE FILED AND
SERVED WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS AFTER THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS
ORDER. IF THERE IS A TIMELY OBJECTION, THEN THE OBJECTING PARTY MUST
NOTICE A SCHEDULING CONFERENCE FOR HEARING IN ELMORE COUNTY.
FAILURE TO TIMELY OBJECT WILL WAIVE ANY OBJECTION TO THIS
SCHEDULING ORDER.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

/<3fty of January, 2012.
Lynn~
District Judge
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the
following:
Elmore County Prosecutor's Office
Mountain Home, Idaho 8364 7
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL
David J. Smethers
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, ID 83 705
U.S. MAIL
Dated this 19th day of January, 2012.

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

FEB-07 2012(TUE) Hi: 39

Sa 11 az & Gatewood, PLLC.

(FAX)208 3361263

DAVID J. SMETI-IBRS
1000 S. Roosevelt

I6

Boise, Idaho 83705

208-336-1145
208-336-1263
Attorney for Petitioner
TN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D1STR1CT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY SEVERSON

)

Petitioner

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO

Respondent.

P. 002/005

)
CASE NO. CV·2009-001408
)
) OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER;
) MOTION TO ENLARGE TIME TO BE HEARD
) ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR
)

AN EXTENSION TO FILE MOTIONS,

) AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPORTING BRIEFS;
) REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING CONFERENCE

Comes now the petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, and requests this
Court for relief from the AMENDED ORDER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE AND
SCHEDULING ORDER file stamped January 19, 2012, as set forth in the caption of this

motion for the following reasons:
-Counsel for the petitioner received the aforementioned order on January 23, 2012;

·Counsel for the petitioner will not be able to submit the requisite documents by February
10, 2012, (sec affidavit of counsel, attached);

The petitioner requests this Court to enlarge the time to be heard on the
scheduling order, grant an extension on the time to file motions, affidavits, and
supporting briefs, and grant a scheduling conference in this matter. A hearing is
requested, or petitioner requests to be heard at the time of the requested scheduling
conference.
OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER; MOTION 1'0 ENLARGE TIME TO BE
I-IEARD ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION TO FILE
MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPORTING BRIEFS; REQUEST FOR
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 1 of 2

FEB-07-2012 TUE) 16:39

Sallaz & Gatewood. PLLC.

I
~{_,,
~
'crs

(FAX)208 3361263

~;2-l'L-

David J. Smc
Attorney for Petitioner

Datc

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'7

I hereby certify that on the

day of

correct copy of the foregoing document was:

- -Hand delivered

7-4 .2012, a true and

-~--Mailed to the:

~axed

Elmore CounLy Prosecutor's Office

~-/-..£--~----

David J. Smetherl

OBJECTION TO SCHEDULING ORDER; MffflON TO ENLARGE TIME TO BE

HEARD ON SCHEDULING ORDER; REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION 1'0 FILE
MOTIONS, AFFIDAVITS, AND SUPOR.TING BR1EFS; REQUEST FOR
SCHEDULING CONFERENCE 2 of2
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David J. Smethers
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, ID 83 705
Telephone: (208) 336-1145
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THESTATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
SEVERSON, LARRY M.
Petitioner,

-vsSTATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1408
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, the above named Petitioner, by and through counsel of David J.
Smethers, and does hereby respond to each point in the state's MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY DISMISSAL and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL sequentially by page as follows:
MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
Page 1- The state admits in their motion that petitioner's first claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel has merit and unreservedly concedes this issue should be heard by
this Court.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
DISMISSAL
Page I7-

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - I

ORIGINAL

The state argues that petitioner's amended petition does not sufficiently relate
to the

petition.

initial petition and the amended petition speak

petition cites ineffective assistance
specific categories that adequately preserves these issues for post conviction
determination. The amended petition further expands and develops these issues. The
state was on notice and can show no prejudice from the issues covered in the amended
petition. Petitioner was not represented by counsel at the time of the initial filing. 1
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure, (hereafter "IRCP'115(b) permits the Court to
allow the pleadings to be amended and "shall do so freely when the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby ... ". Noble v. Ada County Elections Bd, 135 Idaho 495,
500, 20 P.3d 679,684 (2000), holds, "The purpose of Rule 15(b) is to allow cases to be
decided on the merits, rather than upon technical pleading requirements." The Court has
wide discretion in permitting amendments to the pleadings,2 and the standard for
allowing amendments is abuse of discretion.3
Pages 18-21
Petitioner reiterates all arguments at "Page 17" on the issue of the amended
petition relating back to the initial petition. Once again, at the time the petitioner filed the
initial petition, he was not represented by counsel.
All issues listed by the state in this section of their brief establish that trial counsel
was ineffective for the reasons stated in petitioner's initial and amended petition, these

1

Present counsel had great difficulty amassing the materials necessary for this case due to the fact the
petitioner was represented by some nine attorneys at different stages of the criminal proceedings, part of the
file was destroyed in a flood in the Elmore County's Public Defender's Office, and the court reporter's CD
of the trial transcript was compromised and not available to counsel.
2
Obray v Mitchell, 98 Idaho 533 (1977).
3
Sweitzer v Dean, 118 Idaho 568 (1990).
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citations by the state supports petitioner's claims in this post conviction action. On page
the last sentence of the continuation paragraph, the state argues,
ineffective assistance

claims

majority

no resemblance to

specific ineffective assistance of counsel claims Severson alleged in his original
Petition." The state does not specifically list which of these 16 "majority" claims "bear
no resemblance" to the claims in the initial petition. Once again, a pro se defendant
initiating at post conviction cannot be held to the standards required after appointment of
counsel.
It is noteworthy that on page 21, l st full paragraph, the state once again concedes
that petitioner's original petition was sufficient to establish ineffective assistance as to the
issue of failing to request a mistrial, (by arguing that the initial petition was sufficient,
petitioner is not conceding the amended petition does not properly relate back to said
initial petition).
Pages 21-26
The state does an commendable job of citing appropriate case law and attendant
precedential rulings, then makes a series of bland, broad, and dismissive statements
arguing that petitioner has not met his burden in the Second through Fourth Causes of
Action. Petitioner's affidavit establishes that material issues of fact exist as to whether
trial counsels' performance was deficient, and a material issues of fact exist as to whether
the deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's case.
Page 26-27
The state correctly asserts that at the time petitioner executed the affidavit he was
unaware of the first name of financial adviser Bond that trial counsel promised would be

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 3

called to prove to the jury that the petitioner's financial condition was good at the time of
death. 4

affidavit at page
this Court.

#

is sufficient to preserve this

state argues that

a vital witness that would negate the state's evidence that the petitioner's main motive for
killing the victim was financial was a "trial tactic" or "strategic choice(s)". This
purported ''tactic" or "choice" confirms that counsel were deficient in their performance.
Petitioner's affidavit at page 5, #35, establishes that the automotive repair business was
showing a profit with gross income in the hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Page 28Testimony of Marla Spence regarding death certificates: Petitioner argues that
Marla Spence appeared on the stand with death certificates, and the state was allowed to
place these certificates in front of the jury without any regard for the rules of evidence.
One essential element of the state's case was proving the death of the victim, conclusive
evidence of this element was placed in front of the jury without challenge. This Court
cannot fmd that holding the state to their burden of proof on an essential element that
must be established by the state is a strategic decision.
Page 29-40
The state continues with the same arguments for some eleven pages, alleging the
ineffective performance by counsel does not state a claim, tactical decisions, insufficient
in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, et al. These arguments ignore the
petitioner's affidavit and two petitions. The petitions and affidavit clearly place these
subjects at issue in this case.
Page41-43
4

See Footnote 1
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In the State v Severson, 147 Idaho 723, three members of the Supreme Court
acknowledged numerous and egregious examples of prosecutorial misconduct at various
stages of the trial.

bare majority then reviewed the record to determine

petitioner's counsel had preserved the record by making proper and timely objections to
said misconduct. Proper objections to misconduct would preserve the issues for appellate
review. Lack of an objection moved review of the misconduct to a fundamental error
analysis as decided in State v Reynolds, 120 Idaho 445, et al. This bare majority then
decided and denied petitioner's appeal partially based on the fact that many instances of
prosecutorial misconduct were not preserved for appellate review as trial counsel did not
make proper and/or timely objections. The fact that the Supreme Court is able to use this
default analysis of fundamental error establishes and proves ineffective assistance of
counsel as alleged in petitioner's petitions. The UNIFORM POST CONVICTION
PROCEDURE ACT exists because of and as a remedy for cases such as the petitioner's.
Justice W. Jones and Justice Pro Tern Kidwell confirm and substantiate this argument in
their nine page dissent:
"I find the prosecutor's conduct relentless and a blatant abuse of power; time and time
again the prosecutor continued to engage in a pattern of conduct which waivered on and
over the edge of appropriate conduct. Severson's fifth issue on appeal asserted that he was
denied a fair trial due to the serious and unrelenting acts ofprosecutorial misconduct.n,

Severson, (supra), at p 38.
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Petitioner argues the three justice majority in Severson implicitly ruled that butthe ineffective and inadequate performance by counsel, the guilty verdict would have
vacated on appeal.
The petitioner's affidavit clearly establishes that the testimony he would have
presented to the jury would have helped convince the jury of his innocence. The
petitioner would have presented testimony that would have contradicted the state's
evidence, and/or established an alternative explanation for said evidence, which would
undoubtedly overcome a harmless error analysis.
The fact trial counsel deemed it necessary to withdraw from the case after verdict
but prior to sentencing is telling and dispositve. Petitioner's filing with the court after the
jury trial stating that trial counsel did not allow petitioner to testify is sufficient standing
alone to establish ineffective assistance.
CONCLUSION
Two recent US Supreme Court with decisions5 released March 21, 2012, portend
future trends for cases where indigent citizens are represented by public defenders. These
decisions dealt with public defenders' failure to fully apprise clients of plea bargains.
These broad holdings signal that the appellate courts will now be required to examine all
facets of representation by appointed counsel, i.e., the rights of indigent clients were
greatly expanded by this ruling. That being said, in determining whether petitioner in this
case deserves a hearing on his petition and amended petition, this Court can utilize well
settled case law and relevant rules and statutes to decide said hearing is mandated under
the facts in this record.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this)) day of March, 2012.
5

Missouri v Frye and Lafler Cooper
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~3day of March, 2012, I caused a true and
correct copy of the foregoing to be served upon the following by the method indicated
below:
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTOR
190 S. 4th E.
Mountain Home, ID 83647

M United States mail

f\j Facsimile: (208) 587-2147

[ ] Other:
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
190 SOUTH 4TH EAST
MOUNTAIN HOME, IDAHO 83647
TELEPHONE: (208) 587-2144, ext 503
FACSIMILE: (208) 587-2147
I.S.8. No. 6090
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-1408
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF THE
STATE'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

. COMES NOW,. Kristina Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney, and
hereby submits this reply brief in support of the state's motion for partial summary
dismissal of Petitioner's ("Severson") amended petition for post-conviction relief
pursuant to Idaho Code§ 19-4906(c).
On February 13, 2012, the state filed a motion for partial summary dismissal and
supporting brief (hereafter "Motion"), in which it requested summary dismissal of all
claims raised in Severson's amended petition with the exception of his first claim.
Severson filed his response to the state's motion on March 26, 2012 (hereafter
"Response"). Pursuant to the Court's Amended Order of Judicial Notice and Scheduling
Order, the state hereby submits this reply.

Reply Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Partial Summary Dismissal • 1

A.

Severson Has Failed To Establish That Several Of His Claims Are Not Barred By
The Statute Of Limitation
In its Motion, the state requested summary dismissal of all of the ineffective

assistance of counsel claims alleged in the Second Cause of Action in Severson's
Amended Petition, with the exception of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing
to request a mistrial, based on the one-year statute of limitation and the fact that the
claims in the amended petition did not relate back to Severson's original timely petition.
In response, Severson argues his "initial petition cites ineffective assistance of counsel
and lists eight specific categories that adequately preserves these issues for post
conviction determination" and that his "amended petition further expands and develops
these issues." (Response, p.2.)
While Severson correctly notes that he listed "eight specific categories" in his
original petition, a point the state acknowledged in its Motion (Motion, p.19), he is
incorrect in his assertion that the claims in his amended petition simply "further expandO
and develop[] these issues." As explained in the state's Motion, there is a significant
difference between Severson's claim that counsel failed to "examine" a witness as
alleged in his original petition and his claims in his amended petition that counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to certain testimony, call an expert, or "recall witnesses."
(Motion, pp.18-20.) Severson's implicit claim that there is a core of similarity between
several of the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he alleges in his amended
petition and those alleged in his original petition is without merit.
Severson also asserts in response to the state's statute of limitation defense that
I.R.C.P. 15(b) allows liberal amendment. (Response, p.2.) This argument misses the

point Nothing in I.R.C.P. 15(b) authorizes avoidance of a statute of limitation defense.
Reply Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Partial Summary Dismissal - 2

4

To the contrary, amendment after the statute of limitation expires is only appropriate if
amendment relates back to the original claim. See Herrera v. Conner, 111 Idaho
1

2, 1

6, 729 P.2d 1075, 1079 (Ct. App. 1986). If there is no relation back, as the

state contends here, the claim is subject to dismissal based on the statute of limitation.
Severson's claims to the contrary are without merit.
Any suggestion by Severson that the fact he was not represented by counsel
when he filed his original petition excuses non-compliance with the statute of limitation
also lacks merit. (See Response, p.2.) This argument is not only unsupported by any
authority, it seems contrary to the principle that post-conviction counsel cannot eliminate
or abandon claims raised in a pro se petition without the petitioner's consent.

See

Schwartz v. State, 145 Idaho 186, 177 P.3d 400, 403 (Ct. App. 2008).
For the reasons set forth in the state's Motion, and because Severson has failed
to offer any reason for tolling the statute of limitation or provide an adequate basis for
concluding the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his amended petition relate
back to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in his original petition, the state
requests summary dismissal of the claims alleged in paragraphs 47-55 and 57-62
based on the statute of limitation. 1

1

On page 3 of his Response, Severson argues: "the state . . . concedes that
petitioner's original petition was sufficient to establish ineffective assistance as to the
issue of failing to request a mistrial." Nowhere in its Motion does the state "concedeO"
Severson has "establish[ed] ineffective assistance as to the issue of failing to request a
mistrial." To be clear, with respect to Severson's claim that counsel was ineffective for
failing to request a mistrial, the only "concession" the state makes is that the claim was
raised in the original petition and, therefore, would not be subject to dismissal based on
the statute of limitation, which is precisely why this claim is not included in the state's
specific request for dismissal as stated on page 21 of its Response, which excludes
paragraph 56 of the amended petition where that particular claim is alleged. This
Reply Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Partial Summary Dismissal - 3

8.

Severson Has Failed To Allege A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact Entitling Him
To An Evidentiary Hearing On Any Claim Other Than Claim One
In response to the state's argument that he has failed to allege a genuine issue

of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing on any claim with the exception of
his first claim, Severson commends the state for its citation to "appropriate case law and
attendant precedential rulings" but asserts the state "then makes a series of bland,
broad, and dismissive statements arguing that petitioner has not met his burden in the
Second through Fourth Causes of Action."

(Response, p.3.)

The state would, of

course, disagree with Severson's characterization of its Motion given that the reasons
for dismissal are stated with particularity as is required. I.R.C.P. 7(b)(1 ); DeRushe v.
State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009). If anything suffers from a lack
of specificity, it is Severson's response to the state's Motion, which, with a few
exceptions that will be discussed below, consists of the generic response: "Petitioner's
affidavit establishes that material issues of fact exist as to whether trial counsels'
performance was deficient, and a material [sic] issues of fact exist as to whether the
deficiency prejudiced the petitioner's case." (Response, p.3; see also p.4.)

Merely

saying something is so does not make it so.

1.

Claim Alleged In Paragraph 47

Severson acknowledges the state is correct in its assertion that when he
"executed the affidavit'' filed in support of his petition, he ''was unaware of the first name
of financial adviser Bond that trial counsel promised would be called to prove to the jury
that the petitioner's financial condition was good at the time of the victim's death."
"concession" is far different than conceding that Severson has actually established
counsel was ineffective in this regard.
Reply Brief In Support Of Respondent's Motion For Partial Summary Dismissal - 4

(Response, pp.3-4.)

Severson has not cured this deficiency but instead asserts his

is "sufficient to preserve this issue for a decision by this Court." (Response,
Severson is incorrect. The law clearly requires Severson to support his claim with
evidence.

What Severson thinks a witness could testify to is not evidence - it is

speculation that is wholly inadequate for purposes of establishing a genuine issue of
material fact that would entitle Severson to an evidentiary hearing. Self v. State, 145
Idaho 578,581,181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct. App. 2007); Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77,844
P.2d 706 (1993).

Without admissible evidence of what "FNU Bond" would actually

testify to, Severson cannot demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that counsel
was deficient for failing to call this person as a witness, much less that he was
prejudiced by counsel's failure to do so. Accordingly, this claim should be dismissed.

2.

Claim Alleged In Paragraph 48

In response to the state's request for summary dismissal of Severson's claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to "assert[] Severson's right of confrontation of
witnesses" in relation to Marla Spence's testimony regarding "the two death certificates"
and failing to object based on foundation (Amended Petition, p.7), Severson argues:
Marla Spence appeared on the stand with death certificates, and
the state was allowed to place these certificates in front of the jury without
any regard for the rules of evidence. One essential element of the state's
case was proving the death of the victim, conclusive evidence of this
element was placed in front of the jury without challenge. This Court
cannot find that holding the state to their burden of proof on an essential
element that must be established by the state is a strategic decision.
(Response, p.4.)
This argument fails for several reasons.

First, Severson cannot seriously

contend that Mary Severson did not die, much less that the death certificates were the
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only "conclusive evidence" of her death. Second, whether or not the state established
proper foundation for the death certificates has nothing to do with Severson's claim that
right to confrontation was violated as a result of the state introducing the certificates;
thus, Severson offers no explanation as to why that portion of his claim should not be
dismissed. Third, even assuming the state did not lay proper foundation for the death
certificates, Severson has failed to explain why counsel's failure to object based on
foundation would be deficient.

Severson's argument assumes the state would be

unable to lay foundation, which is highly unlikely, making an objection on this basis a
waste of time and a decision not to object more than reasonable.

Fourth, and still

assuming the state did not lay proper foundation for the death certificates, Severson
provides no reason for concluding he was prejudiced as a result of the certificates being
introduced into evidence. The question at trial was not whether Mary Severson was
dead; the question was whether Severson murdered her.

Moreover, evidence

regarding the medical examiner's conclusion as to how Mary died came from trial
testimony from the medical examiner himself, not the death certificates.
Severson's claim that he has a raised a genuine issue of material fact entitling
him to an evidentiary hearing regarding the introduction of the death certificates is
without merit.
Severson has failed to present any admissible facts or evidence to support any of
the ineffective assistance of counsel claims set forth in his Second Cause of Action. His
own affidavit, which does not even address the vast majority of the claims, does not
provide a sufficient factual basis for any of the claims. For these reasons and those set
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forth in the State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, the Second Cause of Action
should be summarily dismissed in its entirety.

C.

Severson's Third Cause Of Action Should Be Summarily Dismissed
In response to the state's request for summary dismissal of his third cause of

action, in which Severson appears to allege ineffective assistance of counsel for failing
to object during closing argument, Severson essentially just repeats the allegations from
his amended petition. (Response, pp.5-6.) No additional response is required from the
state with respect to this claim, and the state submits it is entitled to summary dismissal
of this claim for the reasons set forth in its Motion.

D.

Severson's Remaining Arguments Lack Merit
In his Response, Severson contends, "[t]he fact trial counsel deemed it

necessary to withdraw from the case after verdict but prior to sentencing is telling and
dispositve [sic]." (Response, p.6 (emphasis original).) Severson does not explain what
counsel's withdrawal is supposed to be "dispositive" of for purposes of the partial
summary dismissal sought by the State. To the extent Severson believes counsel's
withdrawal proves counsel was ineffective, this claim is specious.
Severson also argues that his ''filing with the court after the jury trial stating that
trial counsel did not allow petitioner to testify is sufficient standing alone to establish
ineffective assistance." (Response, p.6.) The purpose of this argument is unclear. To
the extent Severson is suggesting that his allegations alone prove he is entitled to relief,
such an assertion is erroneous. While Severson's allegation may be sufficient to entitle
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him to an evidentiary hearing at which he can attempt to prove he is entitled to relief, his
allegations do not entitle him to relief based solely on the pleadings.
Severson's final "argumenr references two recent United States Supreme Court
cases - Missouri v. Frye, --- U.S. ---, 2012 WL 932020 (2012), and Lafler v. Cooper,
2012 WL 932019 (2012), and argues the "broad holdings" of these cases "signal that
the appellate courts will now be required to examine all face ts of representation by
appointed counsel, i.e., the rights of indigent clients were greatly expanded by this
ruling." (Response, p.6.) Both~ and Cooper involved evaluation of trial counsel's
obligations vis-a-vis communicating and advising clients on plea offers and can in no
way be interpreted as "requir[ing]" appellate courts to "examine all facets of
representation by appointed counsel," or as "expanding" a defendant's rights. Further,
these cases have absolutely no bearing on any claim in Severson's petition, much less
any relevance to whether he has established a genuine issue of material fact entitling
him to an evidentiary hearing.
For the reasons set forth in the state's Motion, and in this reply, the state is
entitled to summary dismissal of all the claims alleged in Severson's amended petition
with the exception of his first claim.
DATED this 30th day of March 2012.
KRISTI A M. SCHINDELE
EL
E COUNTY RROS CUTI NG ATTORNEY
/
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to
the following parties by the following means:
David J. Smethers
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83705
Facsimile No. 336-1263
davidj@smetherslaw.com

The Honorable Lynn Norton
Bench Copy
lnorton@adaweb.net

__ First Class Mail
_)'tand Delivery
~Facsimi le
_..;;;;:::,

{?()\.A-J

~mail

DATED this 30th day of March 2012.
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KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
1 South 4th East
Mountain Home, Idaho 83647
Telephone: (208) 587-2144 ext. 503
Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
ISB No. 6090
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY MARVIN SEVERSON,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009-001408
SECOND MOTION
FOR ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, The State ofldaho, by and through Kristina M. Schindele, Elmore County
Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby moves this Court for an order granting summary dismissal ofPetitioner
Larry Marvin Severson's initial petition for post-conviction relief. The State is asking the Court to
summarily dismiss all ofthe claims raised in Severson's initial petition with the exception ofSeverson's claim
that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing or refusing to pennit Severson to testify in his own
defense at trial. The State is filing a memorandum setting forth the bases for this motion contemporaneously
herewith.
DATED This 81h day of June 2012.
TING ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the following
parties by the following means:
David J. Smethers
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1000 South Roosevelt
Boise, ID 83705
Facsimile No.336-1263
davidj@smetherslaw.com
The Honorable Lynn G. Norton
Bench Copy
lnorton@adaweb.net
DATED this 8th day of June 2012.
KRISTINA M. SCHINDELE
ELMO
OUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY

SECOND MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING
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LARRYM. SEVERSON,
Case No. CV-2009-1408
Petitioner,
vs.

PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF
CLAIMS RELATED TO INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.
Appearances:
David Smethers for Petitioner in person, Mr. Severson telephonically
Kristina Schindele for Respondent
This matter came before the Court on May 9, 2012 for a hearing on the Respondent's
Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal on the Petitioner's Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
This was Mr. Severson's first appearance before the court in this proceeding and he
stated that he had not abandoned the claims in the original petition; the claims in the amended
verified petition were in addition to the claims in the original petition. Since the Court Notice of
Intent to Dismiss was filed two and one-half years prior to this hearing and the Petitioner had
since been appointed counsel, and because the court had never addressed the status of the
amended petition, the Respondent was granted additional time to address the claims in the
original petition since the record was not clear that the amended petition was not meant to
substitute for the original petition. However, the Court heard arguments on the Motion for Order
Granting Summary Dismissal that had been filed addressing the amended petition. This decision
only addresses the claims in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the original Petition. The court will issue a
decision on the remaining claims in the original petition after additional briefing.
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Additionally, the Respondent's brief in support of the motion referenced Mr. Severson's
subsequent affidavit that had never been filed with the Court. The Petitioner filed an Affidavit
M. Severson at the hearing and Mr. Severson acknowledged that he knew of the contents
and had signed the affidavit. The Court considered the Respondent's Motion for Order Granting
Partial Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed February 13, 2012 (hereinafter
"Respondent's Motion"), the Petitioner's Response to Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal
filed March 25, 2012 (hereinafter "Response"), the Respondent's Reply Brief in Support of the
State's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed March 30, 2012 (hereinafter "Reply), the
Affidavit of Larry M. Severson filed on the day of the hearing (hereinafter "Severson's second
affidavit"), the Petitioner's Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition filed on
October 22, 2009 (hereinafter "Severson's first affidavit"), and the pleadings which include the
Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief filed October 22, 2009 (hereinafter "Petition"),
the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter
"Amended Petition"), and the Respondent's Answer to Amended Verified Petition for PostConviction Relief filed on August 5, 2011.

BACKGROUND
After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was found
guilty of two felonies, First-Degree Murder and Poisoning; the victim of both counts being the
Petitioner's wife. The Petitioner was represented by a series of counsel between indictment and
the trial 1 but was represented at trial by Elmore County Public Defender E.R. Frachiseur and
Ellison Matthew.2 Petitioner is currently serving a sentence oflife without parole. Following his
conviction, Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, which was
upheld in a May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho
694,215 P.3d 414 (2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that
decision and incorporated herein by reference. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur
on September 4, 2009.
The Petitioner filed a sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on
October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct appeal
(hereinafter "Petition"). The Petition makes the following claims: (1) corpus de/ecti (sic); (2)

1

Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, pp. 12-13, fus. 3-5.

2

Id p. 13, fu. 5, Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, ff 5-6.
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ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; (4) due
State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence;

due process: State use of perjured

testimony; (6) court error and failure to declare a mistrial; and (7) ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts.
The ineffective assistance claims of trial counsel in paragraph 7 of the Petition more
specifically alleges (a) facilitation of involuntary and unknowing waiver of Petitioner's right to
testify; (b) failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct; (c) failure to move for mistrial (for
introduction of inadmissible evidence); (d) failure to call witnesses; and (e) cumulative error by
trial counsel.
A Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Order Appointing Counsel was
filed on December 11, 2009 by Judge Wetherell. In this Notice, the Court found each of the
claims in the original petition incompletely pied and patently frivolous to the point that they were
unable to be developed into a valid claim. Still, the Court stated it would err on the side of
caution and appoint counsel since some of the claims related to ineffective assistance of counsel.
Counsel was appointed to provide the Petitioner an opportunity to work with counsel and
properly allege the necessary supporting facts as required in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789,
792, 102 P .3d 1108, 1111 (2004 ). Mr. Severson filed a handwritten Petitioner's Response to
Court's Notice of Intent on January 7, 2010 before counsel had actually been appointed. The
response was not sworn so is not considered by this Court as an affidavit.
A renewed order appointing conflict counsel was filed on January 27, 2010. There was
difficulty completing the record in this case so there were a number of extensions of time
granted. An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed with the
assistance of counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition
was verified by Mr. Severson as true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief as
required by I.C. § 19-4902(a). The amended petition alleges (1) ineffective assistance of
counsel: defense counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial; (2) ineffective
assistance: defense counsel's failure to cross examine State's witnesses and present exculpatory
evidence; (3) ineffective assistance: defense counsel's failure to object to inadmissible evidence
and the State's closing argument; and (4) in the alternative, the cumulative effect of the defense
counsel's performance in the first three allegations thus deprived petitioner of effective
assista.nce of counsel at trial.
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The amended petition alleged that an affidavit was not filed with the amended petition
to difficulties in locating materials related to this case, communication with Severson has
been difficult due to his custody status at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, and the
voluminous materials associated with this post-conviction relief." The Respondent's Counsel
filed a request for the court to take judicial notice of"the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged
documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Filing and
Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material by counsel on April 18, 2011 included the trial
transcript with opening and closing arguments, the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court
appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's Record in that appeal. The court considered these
judicially noticed materials. For this matter, the court considered admitted State's Exhibits 1-3,
1-4, 1-5, 1-6, and 4-7 through 4-12. The court also examined State's Exhibits 9-2 through 9-8
which were not admitted into evidence.
The amended petition stated the Respondent's affidavit establishing personal knowledge
and attesting to authenticiy of all documents and exhibits submitted with this petition will be
filed on or before April 26, 2011. An order to enlarge time for the State's Answer until sixty
days after the filing of the Petitioner's affidavit was granted. The State filed its Answer to
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on August 5, 2011. Paragraphs 62, 63 and
66 of the Respondent's Answer denies that the Petitioner filed an affidavit but affirmatively
asserts "the state received an unsigned affidavit from Severson on June 6, 2011. On June 23,
2011, the State received a proclaimed 'Verification of Petition' signed by Severson and notarized
on June 15, 2011." This affidavit was filed with the Court on the day of the hearing and was
considered by the court.
LEGAL STANDARDS
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following
situations: ( l) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3)
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5)
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error.
LC. § l 9-490l(a). After the Court's review an application for post-conviction relief, if satisfied
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that the applicant is not entitled to relief and that no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings, the Court can indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its
reasons for doing so.

§ 19-4906(b). The applicant shall have an opportunity to respond to

the Court's notice of intent to dismiss within twenty (20) days of the proposed dismissal. Id.
Summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906 is the "procedural equivalent of a summary judgment
motion under I.R.C.P. 56." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000); see also

Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994). In "determining
whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, the Court reviews the facts in a
light most favorable to the petitioner and determines whether the facts would entitle petitioner to
relief if accepted as true." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833.
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if "the petitioner
has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Id. Idaho's Supreme Court has stated that an
application for post-conviction relief requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim
but, rather, requires verification ''with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached,
or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application."

Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002).

If the

application fails to include such evidence supporting its allegations, the application will be
subject to dismissal. Id. at 271, 61 P.3d at 629. A Court is not required to accept the applicant's
"mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,
716 P.2d 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1986).

At summary disposition of a post-conviction petition,

affidavits must satisfy Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which requires affidavits to be made upon
personal knowledge setting forth facts that would be admissible at trial.

Where petitioner's

affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without
an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-10
(1992).
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not a substitute for an appeal from the
sentence or conviction. ",Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not,
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forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the
on the basis

a substantial factual showing,

affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, that the

asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901 (b).
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature.

It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden
of proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27,995 P.2d 794, 797
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action,
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin, 138
Idaho at 271, 61 P.3d at 628).
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. Facts within the personal knowledge
of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902. The
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing.

Martinez, l 25 Idaho at 846, 87 5 P .2d at 941 ; Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P .2d
546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982).
A petition for post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive
a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P .3d
1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). The test for
evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective assistance of counsel is twopronged. Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has the burden
of proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional
norms; a.11d (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of t.he deficient conduct. Pratt, 134
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Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. See also Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629 (citing Aragon

1

11

Idaho

1176

988)).

objective standard embraces a

strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho
at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial strategy. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775
P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case
requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance,
the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at
1177. The appellate courts require substantive proof of ineffective assistance of counsel rather
than mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of one's trial. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877
P.2d 365, 368 (1994).

To survive a motion for summary dismissal of a petition claiming

ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that material facts exist as to each of the
above elements. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833.
Related to whether counsel's failure to cross examine, call witnesses, or object during the
trial constitutes "deficient performance," the element of deficient performance "requires a
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel'
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984).

Error is only presumed when a defendant is denied counsel or when counsel

represents conflicting interests. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924-25, 877 P.2d at 368-69. Severson raised
the issue of counsel with conflicting interests on his direct appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court
did not find error. Severson v. State, 147 Idaho 694, 702-707, 215 P.3d 414, 422-27 (2009).
Therefore, the matter cannot be relitigated in this action, prejudice is not presumed, and the
accused bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice to the outcome. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924,
877 P.2d at 368. "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as basis
for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is
shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d
337, 344-345 (citing Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368).
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely
on substantial evidence in the record, although the evidence may be conflicting. Martinez, 125
Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943; Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983,985 (Ct. App.
1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence,

PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL

-7-

need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App.
1

Drapeau, 1

Idaho at

651

at

1, supra. If the allegations fail to frame a

genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a
claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and
the reasons for so doing." LC. § 19-4906(b); LC.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrott v. State, 117
Idaho 272, 276, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260, 262 (1990). However, if the application raises a
material issue of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific
findings. LC.§ 19-4907(a); Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943.

DISCUSSION
This decision only addresses the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in Petitioner's
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as rephrased in the Amended
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April 18, 2011.
The Respondent concedes in the Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment
that material issues of fact were adequately raised by the Petitioner on the issue of whether trial
counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own
defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition.
The court grants an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
A. Petition 7(g): Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel
In the original petition in paragraph 7(g) (continuation on page 3), the Petitioner alleged
"Appellate counsel failed to appeal both counts." (Petition, pp. 2 and 3). The affidavit filed with
the petition states, "This issue played a possible role in the Idaho Supreme Court's ruling. See
ruling. Supreme Court recognized and made mention of this when ruling on other issue."
(emphasis added) (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 8). No additional facts related to this claim
were asserted in the affidavit filed in court on the day of the hearing and the amended petition
did not expand upon this ineffective assistance claim. A footnote in the direct appeal decision
reads, "Severson does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for
poisoning Mary" although the next footnote recites the evidence related to the poisoning.

Severson, 147 Idaho at 714 fns. 24, 25,215 P.3d at 435 fns. 24, 25. The Supreme Court
concluded,
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There was substantial circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that Severson was the person who suffocated or overdosed
Mary. The fact that the State did not provide direct evidence to that effect does
not prohibit this conclusion. (citation omitted) The evidence produced at trial
revealed that it was unlikely that Mary's overdose was self-imposed, but there was
substantial evidence linking Severson to her murder. The evidence revealed that
Severson had a motive to kill his wife, was preparing people for her death, had
recently tried to poison her, had tried to conceal the circumstances surrounding
her death, and had the opportunity and means to kill her.
(Id.)
A petition for post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive
a motion for summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as
to whether counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to
whether deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. A Court
is not required to accept the applicant's "mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to
dismiss. Id The pleading and affidavit related to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel does
not meet Severson' s burden of proof ( 1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide
range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient
conduct. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. The Petitioner's assertion that the alleged
failure "played a possible role" in Supreme Court's ruling only because the Supreme Court
"made mention of this" is conclusory and falls far short of the Petitioner's burden of proving
either that there was a failure to appeal or, if there was a failure, that the Peitioner was
prejudiced. Additionally, it appears in reading the Supreme Court's decision that the court did
consider the sufficiency of the evidence related to poisoning on appeal. Summary dismissal of
the allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is appropriate since the petitioner has
not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claim that
appellate counsel was ineffective. This allegation of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is
DISMISSED.
B. Petition 7(a) and 9(t): Ineffective Assistance of Counsel by Failure to Raise
Corpus Delicti Issue During Trial
The Petitioner claims in paragraph 7(a) of the petition "ineffective assistance of counsel"
(Petition, p. 2). Later in the petition, paragraph 9 states, "If your application is based upon the
failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to
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do when representing your interests." (Petition, p. 3). Severson used a continuation page titled
"what trial counsel failed to do" and listed

failure to raise corpus delecti [sic] issue during

trial." (Petition, unnumbered continuation page). Petitioner's affidavit filed October

2009

addresses "corpus delicti procedure" on pages one and two that alleges the same argument raised
on direct appeal related to the State's burden of proof to show corpus delicti. (Severson Aff.,
Oct. 22, 2009, pp. 1-2). The facts in this first affidavit only addresses the State's burden of
proof and does not mention defense counsel in any way, much less raise specific facts of how
defense counsel was ineffective in not raising this issue. Neither the amended petition nor the
affidavit filed the day of the hearing expand upon this claims of ineffective asssistance of
counsel. Placing the words "ineffective assistance" in front of the same argument is not enough
to create a valid claim or prove fundamental error.
Idaho Code§ 19-4901(a)(4) allows claims when ''there exists evidence of material facts,
not previously presented and heard...." (emphasis added). Idaho Code § 19-4901 (b) states that
"[a]ny issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not
be considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" See also Watkins v. State, 101 Idaho 758, 759,
620 P.2d 792, 794 (1980); Henderson v. State, 123 Idaho 138, 139, 844 P.2d 1388, 1389
(Ct.App. 1992). The Petitioner litigated the issue of corpus delicti in his underlying appeal. See
Severson, 147 Idaho at 712-715, 215 P.3d at 432-35. In homicide cases, the corpus delicti
consist of two elements: (1) the death of the individual "named in the charge as ... being dead;"
and (2) the death was caused by a criminal act of the defendant." Id. at 712-713, 215 P.3d at
432-33. In the direct appeal, the Supreme Court noted these two elements may be satisfied based
solely on circumstantial evidence. Id at 713, 215 P.3d at 433. Stevenson argued in the direct
appeal that the state failed to meet its burden of proving corpus delicti and the Supreme Court
analyzed the evidence at trial and found there was substantial and competent evidence to support
the jury's conclusion that Severson was guilty of first-degree murder. Id. at 712-715, 215 P.3d at
432-35.
A "convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual questions in his
application in virtually the same factual context already presented in a direct appeal." GilpinBanuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 863, 908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct.App. 1995), citing Whitehawk v.
State, 116 Idaho 831,833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1989). The Petitioner has alleged only
material facts previously presented and heard to support the conclusory allegation of ineffective
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assistance of counsel so the allegation of ineffective assistance by failing to raise corpus delicti
is DISMISSED.

The Amended Petition Claims are Not Barred by the Statute of Limitations
The Respondent alleges some of the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
claimed in the amended petition are untimely because the amended petition sets forth "a new
cause of action unrelated to the original transaction or occurrence pied" so the amendment was
untimely filed seven months after Remittiur since it does not related back to the date of the
original pleading. (Mtn. for Order Granting Partial Summ. Dismissal, p. 17) Idaho Code § 194902(a); I.R.C.P. I5(c); Idaho First Nat'/ Bankv. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266,281,
824 P.2d 841,856 (1991) (citing Black Canyon Raquetba/1 Club, Inc. v. Idaho First Nat'/ Bank,
119 Idaho 171,804 P.2d 900 (1991); Wing v. Martin, 107 Idaho 267,688 P.2d 1172 (1984)).
The Respondent's Motion sets out sixteen ways in which the amended petition sets forth "new
causes of action" more broadly than the petition (Respondent's Motion, pp. 18-210) citing the
requirement of Monahan v. State that "claims of ineffective assistance of counsel should be
individually pied with specificity" and the practice of ''us[ing] one broad category such as
'failure to investigate' as a springboard to raise any argument ... as 'part and parcel' of the
claim" should be discouraged. 145 Idaho 872,877 n.2., 187 P.3d 1247, 1252 n.2. (Ct. App.
2008).
The Court distinguishes this case from Monahan because Monahan addressed an unpled
assertion of ineffective assistance that was actually tried at an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 875.
The petition in Monahan was amended to delineate seventeen separate claims of ineffective
assistance and those amendments related back to the original petition-the appropriateness of
this amendment was not contested in the appeal. The holding of Monahan only addressed the
fact that the pleadings were not amended at the evidentiary hearing to include an unpled but tried
claim, therefore, that unpled claim raised only in the reply brief was not properly raised on
appeal. Id.
This court recognizes that the amended petition filed with the assistance of counsel
contained much more specificity and addresses more witnesses and objections than the cursory
claims of the original petition. However, this court finds the ineffective assistance claims in the
amended petition arose "out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence ... attempted to be set
forth in the original pleading" and a.111ended petition relates back to the date of the original
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pleading. I.R.C.P. 15(c). Idaho Code § 19-4908 requires all grounds for relief must be raised in
original, supplemental, or amended application. Judge Wetherell appointed ..,v,.u,"''"'' to
the Petitioner with developing the ineffective assistance claims of the original petition into a
valid claim, which resulted in the amended petition. Counsel's amended petition resulted in the
claims being pled with specificity as required by Monahan. Therefore, this Court denies the
Respondent's request to summarily dismiss the ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the
amended petition as untimely.

D. Second Cause Of Action: Failure To Cross Examine State's Witnesses And
Present Exculpatory Evidence
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is stated
"concisely and in detaif' in paragraphs 9(c) as failure to examine, 9(d) failure call expert
witness, and 9(g) as failure to recall witnesses. Severson's Second Cause Of Action (paragraphs
46-62) in the amended petition a further details these claims of ineffective assistance by trial
counsel as failure to effectively challenge the state's evidence through cross examination of the
state's witnesses and present exculpatory evidence.
The affidavit filed with the original petition alleges counsel failed to call witnesses to
testify about tampered diet pills but does not allege the names of any witnesses. It alleges
counsel failed to recall a witness to testify as to damage to Mary's mouth seen the night before
her death but does not allege which witness had this information and does not provide any
additional affidavits. Additionally, the first affidavit alleges defense counsel refused to recall a
witness to testify about verbal conversions with Mary about tampered diet pills but again, does
not allege which witness. (Severson Aff., Oct. 22, 2009, p. 4).
In the affidavit filed May 9, 2012, Severson alleges that he wrote notes during the trial on
a pad of paper. (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 1110-11). Severson states he wrote notes of issues
he wished to have addressed during cross-examination of the state's witnesses, inconsistencies
and the testimony of the state's witnesses, false statements made by the state's witnesses,
additional evidence, and testimony he wanted elicited from defense witnesses. Id., ,r 15.
Additionally, Severson states the judge inquired about defense witnesses near the end of the
state's case and lead defense counsel announced the defense was resting. Id., 11 20, 24.
As to all the claims addressed below of failure to call witnesses or cross examine, and
whether one or more constitutes "deficient performance," the element of deficient performance
"requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466
687

984).

is not presumed

this case,

accused bears the burden

demonstrating prejudice to the outcome. Giles, 125 Idaho at 924, 877 P.2d at 368. The
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing.

Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at 551.
To justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent
on the applicant to tender written statements from potential witnesses who are able to give
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge. Id. See also Self v. State, 145 Idaho
578, 581, 181 P.3d 504, 507 (Ct. App. 2007). No affidavits of these three witnesses were filed in
support of Severson's vague assertions. An objective standard of whether counsel's performance
was within professional norms embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was
competent and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial
strategy. Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). Idaho's
appellate courts recognize "[t]rial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed
in that aspect of trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices.'" Campbell

v. State, 130 Idaho 546,548, 944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct.App. 1997) (citing State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho
231,234,628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). The decision to impeach a witness is a tactical decision.

State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149, 152, 609 P.2d 1140, 1143 (1980). Likewise, the decision of
what evidence should be introduced at trial is also tactical. Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38,
121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005). "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed
or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the
relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho
365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365,
368 (1994)). When faced with a tactical decision, the court utilizes the "strong presumption"
that the decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel. Hairston v.

State, 133 Idaho 496,511,988 P.2d 1170, 1185 (1999).

To prove that such deficiency

prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon,
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.
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1. Failure to Call Witnesses to Testify

"""'''"'r,,nn makes
FNU Bond,

specific allegations that

to

Bazzolli, and Felicia LNU.
a.

FNU Bond

Paragraph 47 of the amended petition alleges counsel was ineffective by failing to call
FNU Bond as a witness during trial. Severson states that in the opening statement, the lead
defense counsel "told the jury the defense witnesses would testify that his financial condition
was good at the time of Mary Severson's death, Frachiseur did not call FNU Bond, who would
have testified that my automotive repair business was showing a profit every year, and the gross
income was in the hundreds of thousands." (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 135). What was
actually said in the opening by defense counsel was, "We will establish through the testimony
often of the same witnesses the State has that Larry and Mary needed money like we all need
money.. . . And there will be evidence designed to show you whether or not financial difficulties
motivated the alleged crime. Our expert witness in this area, forensic accounting, forensic
bookkeeper... who will testify that the Severson's were in pretty good financial shape." (Trial
Tr., pp. 47-48). Later in the opening statement, the accountant bookkeeper was identified as

"Mr. Bays." (Id, p. 51)
The State presented Mr. Christiansen (Tr. pp. 1880-1906) who testified about the lease of
Mr. Severson's business and Mr. Bock who testified about the Severson's financial situation (Tr.
pp. 1907-2032). Mr. Frachiseur elicited on cross examination of Mr. Bock financial records
related to the Severson's assets and liabilities. This testimony included the Auto Works profit
and loss statements, which showed the business making money (Tr. pp. 1963-1964), and assets
of the business increasing from $325,500 to $515,500 (Tr. p. 2008). State's Exhibits 4-8 through
4-14 were Auto Works profit and loss statements from February 2000 through August 2000,
showed a steady increase in profits of over $54,000 during that period, and were admitted into
evidence (Tr. p. 2042). The State also introduced State's Exhibit 1-3 that showed net assets of
$82,981.00; State's Exhibit 1-4 that showed net assets of $325,500.00; State's Exhibit 1-5 that
showed net assets of$309,000; and State's Exhibit 1-6 that showed net assets of $390,000.00
(Tr. p. 1949). Mr. Frachiseur then established on cross examination that the profit and loss
statements were verified by using actual income figures and Mr. Bock explained the increase in

net assets (Tr. pp. 2008-2010). The court had ruled before trial that the financial information
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related to Auto Works was not admissible through this witness (Tr. pp. 2033). However, based
answers to
. . . .,

1

"'"'~"""

Frachiseur's cross-examination questions to

Bock, the court

its ruling, admitted the financial documents over State's objection for all purposes, and

allowed the parties to argue their meaning to the jury (Tr. pp. 2033-2043).
The court had a conversation about disclosure of documents reviewed by Mr. Bays and
Mr. Bays testimony at the end of the trial (Tr. pp. 2296-2299) and it appeared Mr. Frachiseur still
intended to call Mr. Bays. The State objected to the testimony of Mr. Bays on Friday, November

5, 2004 (Tr. pp. 2785-2791). In response to that objection, Mr. Frachiseur stated,

It is our position that the State has in fact already proved a large part of what Mr.
Bays, what we anticipate that he will be testifying to for the Defense; that is, they
have put in the account statements, the deposit records for various bank accounts
pertaining to personal accounts and business. I do not intend to have him testify
to those documents that are already in evidence and testimony. We would have in
that respect would merely be a summation of what the state has already put in and
we can do that for jury, and they can do it for themselves without the necessity of
someone to point their way ....
(Tr. p. 2792). "Mr. Bays will simply be talking about the status of the real estate as far as the
equity therein at or about the time of Miss Severson's death." (Tr. p. 2793). Mr. Bays testimony
was again discussed at pages 2979 through 2981 and it was clarified that Mr. Bays would only
testify to the equity in the residence. (Tr. p. 2981). The defense rested without calling Mr. Bays
or offering any additional explanation.
Severson alleges that when Severson asked Frachiseur after closing why he did not
explain the solvency, Fraschieur replied, "he forgot." Id. No affidavit from FNU Bond was filed
in support of Severson's opposition to the motion for summary dismissal. In considering
summary dismissal on post-conviction application, the court must accept as true verified
allegations of fact in application or in supporting affidavits, unless they have been disproved by
other evidence in the record. LC.§ 19-4906(b). Considering Mr. Frachiseur's statement on the
record that the State had admitted all of the evidence the defense would had offered, which
included the matters Mr. Severson cited in paragraph 35 of his second affidavit, the record
supports that the decision to not call Mr. Bays to present evidence of the solvency of Auto Works
was a tactical decision enjoying the "strong presumption" that the decision fell within the
acceptable range of choices available to trial counsel. Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511, 988 P.2d at
1185.
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After the weekend and prior to closing arguments, it appears the defense did not call Mr.
to testify about the equity in the residence. It is unclear from the record why.
Severson alleges Mr. Frachlseur said "he forgot." "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be
second-guessed or serve as basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel unless that decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance
of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130
Idaho 365, 372-373, 941 P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d
365,368 (1994)). The defense could have forgotten, as Severson alleges, or he could have made
a tactical decision not to present the evidence of value of the residence. The judge in a postconviction action is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for
summary disposition, but rather is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from
uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353,355, 195 P.3d 712, 714 (Ct. App.
2008). The court finds that Mr. Severson's affidavit supports that Mr. Frachiseur forgot to call Mr.
Bays on the last day of trial but the court does not find that he would have been called to testify to the
matters alleged in Mr. Severson's second affidavit, but only the narrow issue of equity in the
residence.
To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a
"reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial
would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. Related to whether
counsel's failure to call a witness, the element of deficient performance "requires a showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Mr.
Severson does not allege how the outcome would have been different, especially since evidence
was admitted to the jury that before Mary Severson died, Mr. Severson's business was solvent
with over half a million dollars in assets. If there was an omission by counsel, it did not arise to
a deficiency so serious that it deprived the defendant of the Sixth Amendment guarantees. Based
upon the evidence and pleadings in this matter, there is not a material question of fact of whether
counsel's omission of the value of the residence caused a different outcome of the trial and
prejudiced the Petitioner in the way alleged in his second affidavit. The motion to summarily
dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to FNU Bond is GRANTED as to paragraph 4 7 of the
amended petition.

PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL

- 16-

Aaron Bazzom
Severson's affidavit states there was a difference between Detective Wolfs grand jury
testimony and Detective Barclay's testimony at trial related to whether Mary Severson's stomach
could be tested for the presence of prescription medications. (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 148).
Severson's affidavit states he requested that Frachiseur call Aaron Bazzolli, one of the
prosecutors of this case, as a witness to examine Bazzolli about this difference in testimony
between the two witnesses being possible perjury. Id. 148.
During Detective Barclay's testimony which begins in the trial transcript at page 503,
there is a lengthy discussion on the record related to discrepancies in testimony between
Detective Barclay, Deputy Sterling and Detective Wolfe (Tr. pp. 559-563). Detective Barclay
was examined by Mr. Bazzoli about evidence collection (Tr. p. 503-519). The court allows the
prosecution to call witnesses to explain testimony which may have been incorrect and Detective
Wolfe is then called to the stand by Mr. Howen (Tr. pp. 565-656), an inconsistency in testimony
was not allowed because of defense objection (Tr. pp. 648-649), and the color of a pudding bowl
was clarified (Tr. p. 652). Detective Wolfe is also recalled by the State later in the trial (Tr. pp.
1462-1547, 1562-1575).
The Court had also issued a pretrial order addressing inconsistencies in Detective Wolfe's
grand jury testimony. (Decision RE: Various Pending Pre-Trial Motions of the Defendant, June
3, 2004, App. Record pp. 842-856). The Court's pretrial ruling relating to the inconsistencies
was that the defense had not established any willful statement made to mislead or knowledge that
the statement was false. The Court had previously ruled that Detective Wolfe's statement did not
constitute perjury in addressing the defense's motion to dismiss.
"Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as basis for postconviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that decision is shown
to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other
shortcomings capable of objective review." Osborne, 130 Idaho at 372-373, 941 P.2d at 344345. The Court had already made a pretrial ruling that there was no perjury. While the
inconsistency could have been the subject of cross examination of Detectives Barclay and Wolfe
at trial, the Petitioner has not met his burden of showing that failing to call the prosecutor as a
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witness during trial to testify about potential perjury was deficient performance, especially given
pretrial ruling that the statements did not constitute perjury.
An objective standard of whether counsel's performance was within professional norms
embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent (Schoger,
148 Idaho at 624,226 P.3d at 1271) and had sound trial strategy (Davis, 116 Idaho at 406, 775
P .2d at 1248) recognizing counsel's decision on which witnesses to call and whether to impeach
is encompassed in trial counsel's role denominated "trial tactics" or "strategic choices."

Campbell, 130 Idaho at 548,944 p.2d at 145; McKenney, 101 Idaho at 152,609 P.2d at 1143.
The motion to summarily dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to calling Aaron Bazzolli as a
witness is GRANTED.

c. Felicia LNU
Severson's affidavit also states that at the time of closing argument, Severson told
Frachiseur that "Felicia LNU, the wait person who served Mary Severson and I pizza the night
before her passing, could have testified that Mary Severson had an injury on her mouth prior to
the night of her death." (Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 140). Severson did not offer an affidavit
of Felicia LNU that she would have testified as he alleges.
Felicia Gartung testified for the defense that she served the Seversons at Smokey
Mountain Pizza on February 14, 2002 (Tr. pp. 2748-2757). This was the night before Mary
Severson died (Tr. p. 1163). Ms. Gartung testified that Mary Severson "put her hand to her
mouth and said that it would be soft" and had pasta for dinner (Tr. p. 2752). On crossexamination, Ms. Gartung stated she did not observe Mary Severson having difficulty eating or
complain that her mouth was hurting (Tr. p. 2756). She also testified on cross-examination that
she did not observe any bruising around Mary Severson's mouth at the time (Tr. p. 2757).
From the description of the witness and testimony in Mr. Severson's second affidavit, the
court finds the defense did call this witness but her cross-examination testimony clearly
contradicted what Mr. Severson alleges in his second affidavit.
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. The applicant's factual showing must
be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875
at 941; Drapeau v. State, 103 Ida.ho 612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct. App. 1982). The
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Petitioner's statement of what another witness saw or how they would have testified is outside
.......ivu.vA

and

has not met his burden

showing that counsel's performance was deficient by not calling or recalling Felicia LNU.
Therefore, the motion to summarily dismiss the Second Cause of Action as to Felicia LNU is
GRANTED.
2. Failure to Cross Examine the State's Witnesses
The petition and amended petition allege that counsels' performance was deficient by
failing to cross examine the state's witnesses including Steven Bock, Jennifer Watkins, FNU
Buchholtz, and Mellea LNU. More broadly, Severson alleges counsel failed to question
unnamed witnesses about Mary Severson's unhappiness and whether unnamed witnesses had
any knowledge of Petitioner purchasing Drano.
Related to counsel's failure to cross examine witnesses as deficient performance, an
objective standard of whether counsel's performance was within professional norms embraces a
strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with sound trial
strategy. "Trial counsel's decision of which witnesses to call is encompassed in that aspect of
trial counsel's role denominated 'trial tactics' or 'strategic choices."' Campbell v. State, 130
Idaho 546,548,944 P.2d 143, 145 (Ct.App. 1997) (citing State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231,234,
628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981)). To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case requires
a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.

a.

Steven Bock

The Amended Verified Petition alleges at paragraph 57 that Steven Bock testified without
objection as to Mary Severson's motivations for refinancing a house, speculation about the
Petitioner's girlfriend, and statements made by Severson about the victim's medical conditions.
Severson states Steven Bock testified for the state about Mary Severson refinancing a house
located in Mountain Home, Idaho. (Severson Aff., May 8, 2012, 136). Severson states the
testimony in trial was that Mary Severson's income on the loan application was $97,000. Id, ,r
36(b). Severson alleges the information was fraudulent because her actual income was $12,000
per year, that Steven Bock arguably committed fraud in assisting Mary Severson in aquiring the
loan "by altering my pay stubs to show Mary Severson's name and Social Security number as
income." Id 1136(a), (b) and (c). Severson's affidavit states he requested Frachiseur to
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cross examine Bock, that Frachiseur told Severson he would ask Bock about the fraudulent
PntinP<:!

but that Frachiseur did not cross examine Bock on these issues. Id. 136(a) and (d).

Bock testified (Tr. pp. 1907-2032) and Mr. Frachieseur did object to the testimony

p. 1923,

1927, 1929-1930, 1921-1932, 1937-1938, 1949, 1966-1967, 1980-1981, 1982, 1983-1990)with
some of the objections sustained.
The loan applications are State's Exhibits 1-3 through 1-6 and were discussed in the
transcript and admitted at page 1949. While the parties addressed pay stubs and W-2s marked as
State's Exhibits 9-2 through 9-8, those exhibits were never admitted into evidence (Tr. pp. 19072032). Mr. Frachiseur only had Mr. Bock identify that those documents were used to verify the
figures on the loan applications.
The Petitioner's statement that Bock arguably committed fraud by altering pay stubs to
show Mary Severson's name and Social Security number as her income in paragraphs 36(a), (b)
and (c) is conclusory, speculative, and not based upon personal knowledge. Therefore, this
portion of Severson's allegation is unsubstantiated and would not be admissible at trial and will
be disregarded. However, Severson's allegation of facts of Mary Severson's income is within
his personal knowledge and would be admissible. However, Severson does not completely
allege how counsel's failure to cross examine as to Mary Severson's incorrect income on the
loan application was deficient and, if it was deficient, how bringing out the fact of her "real"
income shows a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the
outcome of the trial would have been different. The conclusory allegation that counsel should
have asked about this issue on cross examination does not present a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel so the allegation in paragraph 57 of the amended petition is
DISMISSED.

b. Jennifer Watkins
Paragraphs 60 and 61 of the amended petition alleges defense counsel did not cross
examine Jennifer Watkins after she testified that Severson misled her about his marital status,
committed acts arguably constituting stalking after the demise of their relationship, and misled
her concerning the victim's health problems. Severson's affidavit states Severson told both
Frachieur and Matthews that he wanted Jennifer Watkins cross examined about "falsehoods and
inconsistencies." Id.

,r 39 and 39(a).

The only specific area for cross examination he notes in his

affidavit is that Jennifer Walkins had married someone else approximately one month after Mary
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,r 39(b).

death. Id
,., .... v ......

did not have

Severson states this cross-examination would establish that the

motive to harm his wife in order to

because

with another male. Id

,.,,,.,... ,..•• Watkins was

The court had previously ruled concerning relationships or marriages entered into after
the alleged crime, for limited purposes, was admissible but "evidence of a sexual relationship
was not admissible unless, of course, the Defense attempt to impeach the witness with this
information, at which point the Court would advise the jury the State did not advise them of the
sexual relationship because the Court had prohibited them from doing so unless the issue was
raised by the Defense." (Tr. p. 1988-1989; Orders RE: Various Motions, Sept. 17, 2004, App.
Record, pp. 1484-1507). Jennifer Watkins testifed at the end of the State's Case in Chief (Tr.
pp. 2595-2621) and was not cross examined by the defense. Ms. Watkins testified that she
renewed a relationship with an ex-boyfriend and they moved in together after her relationship
with Mr. Severson ended (Tr. p. 2615). Ms. Watkins gave her married name at the beginning of
her testimony (Tr. p. 2595).
Again, Severson does not allege sufficient facts as to how counsel's failure to cross
examine Jennifer Watkins on her subsequent marital status was deficient given the presumption
of trial strategy and tactics within defense counsel's role, especially considering the Court's
ruling that the defense could open the door to otherwise inadmissible 1.R.E. 404(b) evidence by
way of cross examination of Miss Watkins. Given the presumption of sound strategic choices
within professional norms, the defense's election not to cross examine this witness was
proficient. Even if it was deficient, the Petitioner has made now showing of how this fact shows
a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
trial would have been different given the substantial evidence of Petitioner's guilt presented at
trial. The conclusory allegation that counsel should have cross examined Jennifer Watkins does
not present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel so the allegation in paragraph
60 and 61 of the amended petition is DISMISSED.

c. FNU Buccholtz and Mellea LNU
Severson's affidavit states the Petitioner wanted state's witnesses FNU Buchholtz (sic)
and Mellea LNU (sic) cross-examined on whether they owed Petitioner money to show
motivation and bias in their testimony. Id. ,r 45(d). Teresa Mallea testified on the second day of

t.-ial (Tr., pp. 96-100) and was recalled later (Tr. pp. 762-769). Teresa Bucholtz testified on
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Wednesday, October
either of these

2004 (Tr., pp. 2198-2222). Here, there is no factual basis established

nm~ss€!S owed Severson money-all the court has is Mr. Severson's

assertion. Whether to impeach a witness is a tactical decision with a "stong presumption" that
the decision fell within the acceptable range of choices available to counsel. McKenney, 10 I
Idaho at 152,609 P.2d at 1143; Hairston, 133 Idaho at 511,988 P.2d at 1185. There is nothing
in reviewing the record and affidavits presented to cause the court to disturb that presumption.
Both witnesses were cross-examined, just not on the issue of whether they owed the Petitioner
money. Severson does not allege sufficient facts to show counsel's failure to cross examine on
this issue was deficient given the presumption of trial strategy and tactics within defense
counsel's role, and, if it was deficient, how there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the trial would have been different given the substantial evidence of Petitioner's guilt presented
at trial. Therefore, the allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to cross examine
Teresa Bucholtz and Teresa Mallea is DISMISSED.

d. Unnamed State's Witness on Unhappiness and Drano Purchases
Severson's affidavit also alleges Frachiseur refused to cross-examine unnamed state's
witnesses about (1) "Mary Severson's unhappiness emanating:from her relationships with her
children, family, and money problems as 'it would make her look bad"' Id. ,i 36(g) and (2)
whether the Petitioner had ever purchased Drano. Id

,r 43.

Related to Mrs. Severson's

unhappiness, evidence was elicited from several witnesses that Mrs. Severson was upset when
she went to Colorado (Tr., p. 92), was having some marital discord (Tr., p. 100), and had no
money in her bank account (Tr. p. 604). Evidence was also introduced by the State through the
testimony ofNancy Ellwanger (Tr. pp. 710-762), Carol Diaz (Tr. pp. 1004-1038), and Teresa
Mallea (Tr. pp. 96-100, 762-769). During the examinations of Ms. Ellwanger and Ms. Mallea,
substance of conversations the witness had with Mary Severson about these issues was not
elicited because the court had ruled it was inadmissible hearsay (Tr. pp. 92, 589-595, 657-707).
The court was very specific about its ruling on inadmissible hearsay and Mr. Frachiseur stated
there were continuing defense objections based upon the written brief presented to the court so
they would not interrupt ever time a statement was made (Tr. 595, 702). Whether counsel's
performance was deficient must be examined in light of the Court's pretrial ruling that
statements that Mary Severson had made when she was alive that she believed her husband was
trying to kill her were inadn1issible tLrtless the defense "opens the door" regarding Mary
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Severson's state of mind. (Orders RE Motions Concerning Use of Prior Inconsistent Statements
Deceased, September

2004, pp. 1

528).

the opportunity for admission

statements prejudicial to the defendant if cross examination veered into the state of mind of Mary
Severson, it is reasonable that questions would not have been asked by the defense about Mary
Severson's state of mind or her unhappiness with evidence prejudicial to the defense looming.
Pursuant to this Court's review of the trial transcript, there was adequate evidence in the record
based on previous examinations to establish the facts Severson contends should have been
asserted in cross-examination so cross-examination on these issues was not necessary.
Related to whether the Petitioner purchased Drano, the Petitioner's allegation is bare and
conclusory, especially since Mr. Severson would have had many opportunities to purchase a
common item such as Drano while unobserved by any of the witnesses called at trial so cross
examination on this issue would have been futile.
Related to counsel's failure to cross examine witnesses on these issues as deficient
performance, the Petitioner has not overcome by his affidavits the strong presumption that the
petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with sound trial strategy or that trial counsel's
decision of whether to cross examine on these issues was anything other than a trial tactic or
strategic choices. The Petitioner has not shown a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel by averring sufficient facts to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different if counsel would have asked about Mary Severson's more frequently
about unhappiness or the Petitioner's Drano purchasing habits. The allegation of ineffective
assistance for failure as these questions on cross examination of unnamed witnesses is
DISMISSED.
3. Failure to Test Hair in Evidence Bag for DNA

Severson's affidavit alleges Matthews had requested ofFrachiseur that the hair found in
an evidence bag containing the tampered Hydrocut bottle should be DNA tested to establish it
was not Petitioner's hair but that the hair was not tested because Frachiseur "did not want to
mess with it." Id. ,I 44. Again, no affidavit of Matthews or Frachiseur is offered by Severson or
the Respondent. Any discussion of what Matthews told Frachiseur is hearsay and not admissible
at trial. The hair, found by the FDA investigator in the evidence bag, is discussed on the record
and that it "didn't have any evidentiary value per se because of the fact that the bottle had been
opened. It could've been John Ba.'1ks' hair, Detective Wolfe's hair, anybody sitting in that room's
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hair. It could've been somebody else's hair." (Tr. pp. 1115-1118). Additionally, the presence of
the bag was used by Mr. Matthews during cross-examination

Mr. Banks to attack

investigation and the defense established that "Larry Severson was not around at any time"
the evidence was collected or sealed (Tr. pp. 1138-1139). It was used in the re-crossexamination of Mr. Banks (Tr. p. 1143) and raised by the defense in cross-examination of Dr.
Heitkemper (Tr. p. 1258).
"[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence,
need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho at 647,873 P.2d at 901. The Petitioner
bears the burden of showing prejudice and prejudice turns upon the likelihood the discovery of
exculpatory evidence overlooked by counsel would have changed counsel's prediction as to the
outcome of a trial. Dunlap v. State, 126 Idaho 901,905,894 P.2d 134, 138 (Ct.App. 1995),
rehearing denied; Fox v. State, 125 Idaho 672,675, 873 P.2d 926, 929 (Ct.App. 1994).

4. Failure to Object to New Evidence During Welch's Testimony Not
Fundamental Error
The verfied amended petition alleges that Frachiseur and Matthews stated on the record
during cross examination of Dr. John Welch that they were still receiving new evidence but
failed to request a continuance or move for exclusion of the evidence. (Amended Petition 154).
Neither affidavit filed addresses this allegation. The direct appeal of this case addressed two late
disclosures (the first related to documentation regarding the testing and calibration of equipment
and laboratory litigation packet (Tr. pp. 1039-1044, 1112-1115, 1118, 1361-1363)) and a second
oflitigation notes prepared by the FDA (Tr. pp. 1360-1361)). The Supreme Court held nothing
about the prosecution's late disclosures went to the foundation of Severson's case or otherwise
deprived him of his rights. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694,717,215 P.3d 414,437 (2009).
"Accordingly, the late disclosures were not fundamental error." Id. Mr. Severson's affidavit
stating the exhibits ''must be examined over the lunch hour" does not not comport with the
record. The defense received the full litigation packets on the "Wuesthoff and other two labs"
before noon recess on Tuesday, October 19, 2004 (Tr. p. 1112) and the defense was offered
additional time to review (Tr. pp. 1118-1119, 1120). Dr. Welch testified late in the morning the
following day, October 20, 2004 (Tr. pp. 1307-1359). There is no statement by the defense on
the record during cross-examination of Dr. Welch that they were still receiving new evidence
(Id.) There is a statement on the record on Friday, October 22, 2004 by Mr. Frachiseur where he

says, "The fact that so far we have been able to handle [late disclosures] doesn't mean that if
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materials are forthcoming that we will be able to be ready to go." (Tr. p. 1362). This
statement shows that
prc>spect1ve that

defense had been able to prepare as the materials were received but is

defense would need more

if additional materials were disclosed. Dr.

Stout did not testify for the defense about the litigation packets and calibration until Monday,
October 25, 2004 (Tr. pp. 1724-1864).
A Court is not required to accept the applicant's mere conclusory allegations,
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law in deciding whether to
grant a motion to dismiss. The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not to religate matters
raised on direct appeal. LC. § 19-4901 (b).

There are no additional facts alleged in response to

the motion for summary dismissal. This allegation in the post-conviction proceeding is merely
rephrased as ineffective assistance because of the failure to object. The Supreme Court
examined whether the late disclosure and the lack of objection to it prejudiced Severson and
found that it did not. Severson, 147 Idaho at 717,215 P.3d at 437. The Supreme Court found
that even if the late disclosures prejudiced the defense, that the prejudice was cured by remedial
measures to offer the defense additional time to prepare its case. (Id.) The late disclosures were
not fundamental error on direct appeal and sufficient proof has not been provided in this
proceeding to disturb that determination. Therefore, the allegation in paragaph 54 of the
amended petition is res judicata and DISMISSED.
5. No Alleged Error Related to Witnesses Bledsoe, Leann Watkins, or Besler
The Amended Verified Petition alleges there was testimony of Mary Bledsoe (Amended
Petition 158), Leann Watkins (Id. 159), and Tracy Besler (Id. 162) but does not allege how
counsel was ineffective related to these witnesses and none of these witnesses are addressed in
either affidavit filed. Summary dismissal is appropriate since ''the petitioner has not presented
evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the
applicant bears the burden of proof." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. A post-conviction
petition requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim: it requires verification "with
respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting its allegations must be attached, or ... state why such supporting evidence is
not included with the application." Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 62829 (Ct. App. 2002). Since paragraphs 58, 59 and 62 of the amended petition fail to state a claim,
these paragraphs are summarily DISMISSED.
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E. Third Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Object
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed
paragraphs 9(b) as failure to object during trial and during closing arguments and perhaps 9(e)
failure "call mistrial." Severson's Third Cause Of Action (paragraphs 63-64) in the amended
petition further details these claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel as failure to object
to evidence that was inadmissible, lacking proper foundation, highly prejudicial, and failure to
object to the improper comments by the state and closing arguments.
Related to whether counsel's failure to object during the trial constitutes "deficient
performance," the element of deficient performance "requires a showing that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Since prejudice is
not presumed in this case, the accused bears the burden of demonstrating prejudice to the
outcome. Giles at 924. "Strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as
basis for post-conviction relief under a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless that
decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Osborne, 130 Idaho 365, 372-373, 941
P.2d 337, 344-345 (citing Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921,924,877 P.2d 365,368 (1994)). A court
is not required to accept the applicant's mere conclusory allegations or the applicant's
conclusions of law in deciding this motion. The court is not required to speculate what objection
would have made had he objected. That burden of proof falls upon the Petitioner.
1.

Lack of Foundation for Death Certificates

The Verfied Amended Petition alleges Marla Spence, a Coroner's Office employee,
testified about two death certificates and makes the assertion that the testimony was comprised of
hearsay to which defense counsel should have objected and required witnesses to testify as to the
proper foundation for the death certificates. (Amended Petition -,r 48). Neither affidavit
addresses this allegation or states which witnesses should have been called. Additionally, the
trial transcript reveals extensive questions on the death certificate and the fact that the cause of
death on State's Exhibit 6-1 was received from a pathologist by Ms. Spence, the deputy coroner.
It was Ms. Spence's job to complete death certificates recorded with Vital Statistics (Tr., pp 325328). Ms. Spence was cross-examined about a second death certificate, Defense Exhibit A (Tr.,

pp. 329-338). The record contains Mr. Fraschier's ai,alysis of the adm.issibility of the death
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certificates under the public records exception to hearsay, which included his hearsay analysis of
cause of death

State's Exhibit 6-1

p. 340). The next witness called in the trial was Dr.

Glenn Groben, the pathologist who completed the autopsy who was allowed to testify as to the
cause of death over the lengthy objection of lack of foundation by Mr. Frachiseur. (Tr., pp. 350,
370-379). The record shows the failure to object to lack of foundation for the death certificates
was a strategic decision by defense counsel and is presumed to be within the wide norms for the
practice of law.
Severson fails to meet his burden of proving a prima facie case of ineffective assistance.
He fails to explain how the admission of the death certificates violated his right to confront
witnesses and simply assumes a violation of that right. A Court is not required to accept the
applicant's "mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions of law" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,
716 P.2d 369,373 (Ct. App. 1986). The Petitioner's allegation that defense counsel should have
objected as hearsay for lack of foundation is merely conclusory and not supported by sufficient
facts to prove how the outcome of the trial would have been different if additional witnesses had
been called to lay the foundation for the death certificates ... especially considering Mr.
Frachiseur's analysis of the public record exception since the cause of death was received from
the very next witness at trial and Mr. Frachiseur challenged his opinions repeatedly for lack of
foundation. There are no facts alleged as to the deputy coroner's testimony showing that
counsel's failure to object for lack of foundation was an error "so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment" required by
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

Therefore, there is no genuine issue of fact raised and the

allegation in paragraph 48 of the amended petition is DISMISSED.

2. Dr. Groben's Testimony Samples Were Sent to Two Labs for Testing
The verified amended petition alleges defense counsel objected without stating the proper
grounds to Dr. Glen Groben's testimony to samples sent to two labs for forensic testing, and the
evidence was admitted. (Amended Petition ,r 49). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation or
states why the objection was improper nor what the basis of the objection should have been. Dr.
Groben's testimony is in the trial transcript from pages 350 through 476. There was testimony
by Dr. Groben of many tests conducted a.rid sent to laboratories to be evaluated. Throughout the
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testimony, Mr. Frachiseur objects repeatedly to the admissibility of the results, including asking
questions of Dr. Groben in aid of those objections. Additionally, the results of tests sent to two
labs were used in lengthy and capable cross-examination and re-cross-examination of Deputy
Dawson by Mr. Frachiseur (Tr. pp. 943-973, 1001-1004).
The Petitioner's allegation that defense counsel should have stated other grounds of
objection to the laboratory testing is bare and conclusory and nothing beyond a simple statement.
Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has not met his burden of
proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional norms;
and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct as required in Pratt. 134
Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. The Petitioner's allegation and affidavits have not overcome the
strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent and possessed a
sound trial strategy. It also does not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such
deficiency in the objections given (ifthere was any deficiency) prejudiced Petitioner's case by
showing a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome
of the trial would have been different" as required by Aragon. 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at
1177. The Petitioner has not shown that material facts exist as to the element of deficient
performance or to the element of prejudicial outcome and the record supports the presumption of
performance within professional norms. There has been no showing that Mr. Frachiseur "made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by
the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). Therefore, the
allegation of deficient performance related to objections to laboratory tests in paragraph 49 of the
amended petition is DENIED.

3.

Detective Barclay Pills Eating Through Surface and Test Where No
Medication Detected

The Verfied Amended Petition alleges Detective Mike Barclay testified without
objection to pills eating through the surface leaving the jury with the perception that
poisonous/caustic pills had been located but does not allege what the objection should have been.
(Amended Petition ,r 50). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation. Mr. Banks testified later in
the trial that he had found degraded, decomposing capsules (Tr. pp. 1103-111) and that Mr.
Severson had called the FDA about adulterated pills (Tr. p. 1127). The chain of custody for the
pills was established through Detective Barclay and Mr. Banks with Mr. Urban testifying that
they contained a substance similar to Drano. Detective Barclay testified of his own observation
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of the pills and what he saw. Mr. Severson does not state how an objection to this observation
have overcome the later evidence that the pills were tested and contained a
poisonous/caustic substance. Therefore, no prejudice to the outcome of the trial by the failure to
object to Detective Barclay's observation has been proven by Mr. Severson.
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges Detective Mike Barclay testified without
objection to a test performed at the state lab where no medications were detected. (Amended
Petition 1 51 ). Neither affidavit addresses this allegation or states what the basis of the objection
should have been made. Detective Barclay's testimony related to no medications being found in
pudding cups and other items in the kitchen was exculpatory and elicited by the defense (Tr. pp.
870-871). Interestingly, this testimony developed an inconsistency that another test had detected
medications to impeach the state's evidence which supports the presumption of effectiveness of
counsel. Deputy Dawson testified to an analysis of the stomach contects where very, very low
quantities of drugs were detected when compared with the contents detected in blood meaning
the stomach contents had already been absorbed by the body (Tr. pp. 892-893, 899-905) and
their presence had been unlikely to cause death (Tr. p. 921 ).
The strong presumption is that petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent with
sound trial strategy. The Petitioner has not shown a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of
counsel by averring sufficient facts to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial
would have been different if counsel would have objected to this inconsistency in lab results.
Therefore, the allegation that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to Detective Barclay's
testimony of a test performed where no medications were detected is DISMISSED.

4. John Urban: Various Capsules and Substances Handled/fested by Others
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges John Urban, a FDA chemist, testified without
objection to tests on various capsules and substances that were handled by other unknown
persons and tests performed by other unknown persons. (Amended Petition 152). John Urban
testified about the receipt and tracking of evidence in the FDA laboratory and his maintenance of
the custody of tested samples (Tr. pp. 1147-1172) and that he conducted tests on the samples (Tr.
pp. 1172). He testified he was the lead analyst and oversaw testing by other groups with other
specialties (Tr. pp. 1185-1193) which was eventually reviewed by Dr. Doug Heitkemper, the
team leader (Tr. p. 1192). The Verified amended petition also alleges David Bourne, a FDA
criminal investigator, testified without objection about residue found by others sent to a
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laboratory in Ohio. (Amended Petition ,r 55). Neither affidavit addresses these allegations or
states what the basis of the objections should have been. Mr. Bourne testifed (Tr. pp.138514499). Mr. Bourne's testimony was that he received two bottles from Mr. Banks (who had
testified in the trial previously about the receipt of the bottles), marked and packaged them, then
sent them to the FDA Forensic Chemistry Center in Cincinnati, Ohio (Tr. pp. 1396-1399) which
is the lab in which two previous witnesses, John Urban and Dr. Heitkemper, worked (Tr. pp.
1147). Prior to Mr. Bourne's testimony, Mr. Banks had already testified about his receipt of the
bottles and Mr. Urban and Dr. Heitkemper had already testified about the testing of the content
of the bottles. This testimony was completing the chain of custody testimony.
The strong presumption is that counsel was competent and his performance fell within
the wide range of acceptable professional norms. This is especially true given that the Supreme
Court of the United States opinion in Crawford v. Washington, related to confrontation of
witnesses of testimonial statements, had only been issued seven months before this trial.

Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The court and counsel routinely have discussions in the record
about the applicability of Crawford and it is obvious from the record that the defense team was
not ignorant of the case. Additionally, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts interpreting Crawford as
applying to reports by lab analysts was not decided until five years after this trial. Melendez-

Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). Counsel's examinations of Mr. Urban or Dr.
Heitkemper were not outside the range of acceptable professional norms and presumed effective.
The court is not required to accept Severson's conclusory allegation that there should
have been objections to the testimony of these two witnesses without showing what the objection
should have been. The petitioner has also not met his burden of showing that these failures to
object were deficient, not tactical or strategic given the previous testiony about the receipt of the
items and testing, and how the outcome of the trial would have been effected had these
objections been made. Therefore, these allegations related to a vague objections to John Urban's
testimony and David Bourne's testimony are DISMISSED.

5. John Heitkemper: Cumulative Tests Performed by Others
The Verfied Amended Petition alleges John Heitkemper, a FDA research chemist,
testified without objection to tests performed by other unknown persons resulting in cumulative
evidence about a "Drano like substance." (Amended Petition ,r 52). Neither affidavit addresses
this allegation. Nothing states clearly what the objection should have been but seems to infer ai,
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objection to evidence that was cumulative under Idaho Rule of Evidence 403. Dr. Heitkemper
as a team leader for the FDA tests responsible for assigning and reviewing work in the
laboratory and providing advice to the lead analysts (Tr. pp. 1243-1260).
Again, the court is not required to accept Severson' s conclusory allegation that there
should have been an objection without an adequate showing of what the objection should have
been. The petitioner has also not met his burden of showing that the failure to object was
deficient and how hearing about the testing a second time in a much more cursory fashion
effected the outcome of the trial in a way that prejudiced Mr. Severson. Therefore, this
allegation related to a vague objection to John Heitkemper's testimony is DISMISSED.

6. Failure to Object to State's Closing Argument
The paragraph 64 of the verified amended petition also alleges that Justice Jones's dissent
and Justice Pro Tern Kidwell's concurrence in the dissent establish ineffective assistance of
counsel due to counsel's failure to object to the state's closing argument. This issue is not
addressed in affidavits or detailed in the response brief and the amended petition only mentions
the dissenting opinion and the concurrence in the dissent as basis for an allegation in this action.
Severson's first affidavit states that "During trial petitioner's court appointed attorney
failed to object to improper, prejudicial, and inflammatory remarks and statements by the
Prosecutor" and cites the dissent in the direct appeal as its basis. (Severson A:ff., Oct. 13, 2009,
p. 3). Severson specifically identified prosecutor's comments alleged as error in the direct
appeal and the Idaho Supreme Court found that most were not improper but found ''the single,
isolated [improper] comment made during the course of a seventeen-day trial, [where] there was
substantial evidence of Severson's guilt" was not prejudicial. Severson, 147 Idaho at 719,215
P.3d at 439. The Supreme Court's finding that there was no fundamental error in the comments
will not be relitigated here. When legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal,
the defendant is barred by the doctrine of resjudicata from raising them again in a postconviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 10, 966 P.2d 1, 10 (1998) (citing

State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988)).
F. Petition 7(a) and 9(e): Ineffective Assistance by Failure to Call Mistrial
The Petitioner claims in paragraph 7(a) of the petition "ineffective assistance of counsel"
(Petition, p. 2). Later in the petition, paragraph 9 states, "If your application is based upon the
failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what counsel failed to
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do when representing your interests." (Petition, p. 3). Severson used a continuation page titled
"what trial counsel failed to do" and listed "(e) failure to call mistrial." (Petition, unnumbered
continuation page).
Severson's first affidavit states, "During the hearing on defence [sic] Motion in Limine,
this Honorable Court deemed that certain evidence was admissible and if entered into testimony
trial would be deemed a mistrial. Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial during testimony
of Detective." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 4) Beyond that allegation in the affidavit, there
is no further evidence of what evidence in which Detective's testimony was inadmissible that
would be the basis of a mistrial. In reviewof the record, there are comments on the record
beginning at page 1433 during Mr. Bourne's testimony about why Mr. Bourne did not refer the
matter for prosecution. Mr.Howen, the prosecutor, stated "It would be [Mr. Bourne's]
investigative jurisdiction if this matter was not tampered with anywhere but at the end of the
consumer line." (Tr. p. 1432). Mr. Matthews stated on the record,
Your Honor, what the Prosecutor did in response to my objection was, in essence,
to tell the jury that the end user was the responsible tampering party. That, in
front of the jury is as close as you can get, in my opinion, to giving us a basis for a
motion for mistrial. I don't wish to make that motion at this time ....
(Tr. pp. 1433-1434). The defense asked for a limiting instruction and the limiting instruction
was given by the Court (Tr. pp. 1433-1434, 1438-1439). The defense's statement of"is a close
as you can get ... to giving us a basis for a motion to mistrial" is different than a request for a
mistrial. The statement show~ that Mr. Matthews knew he could ask and that not asking was
obviously a tactical or strategic decision.
Severson's first affidavit states, "Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial based on
prosecutors improper, prejudicial improper, and inflammatory comments" as ineffective
assistance of counsel. (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 4) The amended petition alleges the
same information in paragraph 56 with no additional detail.
Severson's second affidavit states Matthews objected to the prosecutor's statement about
the Petitioner's refusal to tum over capsules to an FDA investigator. (Severson Aff., May 9,
2012, ,r 37). Severson then states Matthews stated he should ask for a mistrial, but there was too
much time invested.

Id

,r

37(a).

The affidavit continues about a discussion between the

Petitioner and Matthews about what a mistrial was and whether the petitioner would be released
if the mistrial was granted. Id.

,r 3 7(b)-(f).
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ask for a mistrial the issue would not be preserved for appeal and that he would discuss the issue
Frachiseur. Id.

1 37(f)-(g).

Counsel did not move for mistrial. Id.

1 37(h).

petition for

post-conviction relief claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will survive a motion for
summary dismissal if the petitioner establishes: (1) a material issue of fact exists as to whether
counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) a material issue of fact exists as to whether
deficiency prejudiced petitioner's case. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 226 P.3d 1269,
1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)). Related to whether
counsel's performance was deficient, the petitioner has the burden of proving (I) that his
attorney's representation fell outside the wide range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner
was prejudiced as a result of the deficient conduct. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 584, 6 P.3d at 834. This
objective standard embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent
and diligent (Schoger, 148 Idaho at 624, 226 P.3d at 1271) and sound trial strategy. Davis v.

State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). To prove that such deficiency
prejudiced Petitioner's case requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon,
114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177. The facts as alleged by the Petitioner show that Mr.
Matthews was aware he could have requested a mistrial after his objection was overruled but
made a strategic decision not to request a mistrial. The Petitioner has made no showing that
there was a reasonable probability that the trial would have been different if Matthews had
requested a mistrial since the facts alleged by the Petitioner show that the judge was unlikely to
grant a mistrial even if requested and limiting instructions were given to the jury to cure any
comments made in front of the jury. The Petitioner has not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence either that the defense counsel's performance was deficient or that the Petitioner was
prejudiced by the failure to request a mistrial; and to survive summary judgment the Petitioner
has the burden of proving both. The Supreme Court had already applied the harmless error
doctrine in considering the errors of the prosecution at trial and determined a conviction will
stand if the Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the same result would have been
reached by the jury had the prosecutorial misconduct not occurred. Severson, 147 Idaho at 716,
215 P.2d at 436, citing State v. LaMere, 103 Idaho 839,844,655 P.2d 46, 51 (1982). Therefore,
if the comments were not prejudicial error, then the failure to object to the comments was also
not prejudicial to Mr. Severson and paragraphs 7(a) and 9(e) of the Petition are DISMISSED.
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G. Fourth Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance Through Cumulative Error
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed
paragraph 9(h) as trial counsel's cumulative errors. Severson's Fourth Cause Of Action
(paragraphs 65-66) in the amended petition alleges further detail, that in the alternative, the
cumulative effect of the deficient performance in the first three alleged causes of action
prejudiced the petitioner and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
The Amended Verified Petition alleges all of the facts used to support the previous causes
of action and states, "The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance cause
Severson to be prejudiced." (Amended Petition 166).
"While [the Idaho Supreme Court] has recognized the doctrine of cumulative error, a
necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of error in the first instance."

Borman v. State, 129 Idaho 520,527,927 P.2d 910,917 (1996). Since an evidentiary hearing is
required for the First Cause of Action, a material question of fact exists as to whether there is any
error(s). Since whether counsel's performance was deficient must be determined before the
court can examine the cumulative effect that the errors may have had in prejudicing the
Petitioner, the Court cannot at this time make a determination whether there were errors so a
material issue of fact still remains and the motion to summarily dismiss the Fourth Cause of
Action in the amended petition and paragraph 9(h) of the Petition is DENIED.

CONCLUSION
Based on the reasoning set forth above, the court GRANTS an evidentiary hearing on
whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in
his own defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in
the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9( a) in the original
petition.
The remaining allegations of ineffective assistance of appellate and trial defense counsel
in the petition and amended petition are DI~J!SED.
SO ORDERED AND DATED thisl::f.1iay of June, 2012.

~
District Judge
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I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was sent to the following:
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Attorney at Law
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LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Case No. CV-2009-1408
Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER FOR WAIVER OF
ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res

ndent.

This Court having reviewed the record and pleadings in this matter, having determined
that an evidentiary hearing on whether counsel was ineffective by preventing Mr. Severson from
testifying at trial as alleged in the First Cause of Action in the Amended Petition in the above
proceedings, and the Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attorney/client privilege is waived, as to all
information held by defense counsel, Ellison Matthews and E.R. Frachiseur, concerning
Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged in the First Cause of Action in the
Amended Petition only.
Dated this 29th day of June, 2012.

L ~
District Judge
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LARRY M. SEVERSON,
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SECOND PARTIAL SUMMARY
DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
Appearances:
David Smethers for Petitioner in person, Mr. Severson did not appear telephonically
Kristina Schindele for Respondent
This matter came before the Court on July 16, 2012 for a hearing on the Respondent's
Second Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal on Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief.
In Mr. Severson's first appearance before the court in this proceeding on May 9, 2012, he
stated that he had not abandoned the claims in the original petition by filing the amended verified
petition. Since the Court's Notice oflntent to Dismiss was filed two and one-half years prior to
this hearing and the Petitioner has since been appointed counsel, and because the court had never
addressed the status of the amended petition, the Respondent was granted additional time to
address the claims in the original petition. The court previously heard arguments on the Motion
for Order Granting Summary Dismissal that had been filed addressing the ineffective assistance
claims and has previously issued a decision summarily dismissing some of the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel in this matter. The court has now considered the remaining
claims in the original petition and the additional briefing.
The Court considered the Respondent's Second Motion for Order Granting Partial
Summary Judgment and Brief in Support filed June 8, 2012 (hereinafter "Respondent's
Motion"). The Petitioner did not file a response to the Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal.
Tne court also considered the Affidavit of Larry M. Severson filed on May 9, 2012, the
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Petitioner's Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition filed on October 22, 2009,
and the pleadings which include the Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief filed
October 22, 2009, the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on April 18,
2011, and the Respondent's Answer to Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
filed on August 5, 2011.
At the hearing, Mr. Smethers represented that the Petitioner would withdraw the
remaining claims in the original Petition. However, since Mr. Severson was not available at the
hearing and had previously represented he did not want to withdraw his original claims, the court
considers those claims in this decision.

BACKGROUND
The factual and procedural background in this case is cited in this court's Order for
Partial Summary Dismissal of Ineffective Assistance Claims.
The Petitioner filed a sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction Relief on
October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct appeal
(hereinafter "Petition"). The Petition makes the following claims: (1) corpus delecti; (2)
ineffective assistance of counsel; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; (4) due
process: State's failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State use of perjured
testimony; (6) court error and failure to declare a mistrial; and (7) ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel: failure to appeal both counts.
A Notice of Intent of Partial Summary Dismissal and Order Appointing Counsel was
filed on December 11, 2009 by Judge Wetherell. In this Notice, the Court found each of the
claims in the original petition incompletely pied and patently frivolous to the point that they were
unable to be developed into a valid claim but appointed counsel to provide the Petitioner an
opportunity to work with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts as required
in Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004).
Mr. Severson filed a handwritten Petitioner's Response to Court's Notice of Intent on
January 7, 2010 before counsel had actually been appointed. The response was not sworn and is
not considered by this Court as an affidavit.
A renewed order appointing conflict counsel was filed on January 27, 2010 and an
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was then filed with the assistance of
counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition was is subject
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to this court's earlier summary dismissal except (1) ineffective assistance of counsel: defense
counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial and (4) in the alternative, the
cumulative effect of the defense counsel's performance deprived petitioner of effective
assistance of counsel at trial, which will be set for evidentiary hearing.
The Respondent's Counsel filed a request for the court to take judicial notice of"the
transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore County
criminal case, CR 2002-158. The court considered the trial transcript with opening and closing
arguments, the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's
Record in that appeal.

LEGAL STANDARDS
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, I.C. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following
situations: (1) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3)
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5)
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error.
I.C. § 19-4901(a). After the Court's review an application for post-conviction relief, if satisfied
that the applicant is not entitled to relief and that no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings, the Court can indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its
reasons for doing so. I.C. § 19-4906(b). The applicant shall have an opportunity to respond to
the Court's notice of intent to dismiss within twenty (20) days of the proposed dismissal. Id.
Summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906 is the "procedural equivalent of a summary judgment
motion under I.R.C.P. 56." Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000); see also

Martinez v. State, 125 Idaho 844, 846, 875 P.2d 941, 943 (Ct. App. 1994). In "determining
whether a motion for summary disposition is properly granted, the Court reviews the facts in a
light most favorable to the petitioner and determines whether the facts would entitle petitioner to
relief if accepted as true." Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833.
Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if ''the petitioner
has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon
which the applicant bears the burden of proof." Id. Idaho's Supreme Court has stated that an
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application for post-conviction relief requires more than a short and plain statement of the claim
rather, requires verification "with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached,
or the application must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the application."
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002).

If the

application fails to include such evidence supporting its allegations, the application will be
subject to dismissal. Id. at 271, 61 P.3d at 629. A Court is not required to accept the applicant's
"mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's
conclusions oflaw" in deciding whether to grant a motion to dismiss. Id. (citing Roman v. State,
125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 989, 901 (Ct.App. 1994)); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159,
716 P.2d 369, 373 (Ct. App. 1986). At summary disposition of a post-conviction petition,
affidavits must satisfy Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure which requires affidavits to be made upon
personal knowledge setting forth facts that would be admissible at trial.

Where petitioner's

affidavits are based upon hearsay rather than personal knowledge, summary disposition without
an evidentiary hearing is appropriate. Ivey v. State, 123 Idaho 77, 80-81, 844 P.2d 706, 709-710
(1992). Summary disposition is also appropriate where the affidavit doesn't address a claim at
all.
The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is not a substitute for an appeal from the
sentence or conviction. "Any issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not,
is forfeited and may not be considered in post-conviction proceedings, unless it appears to the
court, on the basis of a substantial factual showing, by affidavit, deposition, or otherwise, that the
asserted basis for relief raises a substantial doubt about the reliability of the finding of guilt and
could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have been presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901(b).
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature.
It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454,456,808 P.2d 373,375 (1991).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden
of proving the allegations upon which the petitioner for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action,
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
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claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin, 138
at 271, 61 P.3d at 628).
The applicant for post-conviction relief is required to make a prima facie case by
presenting admissible evidence on each essential element of his claims. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho
517, 518-19, 960 P.2d 738, 739-40 (1998); I.C. § 19-4903. Facts within the personal knowledge
of the applicant and the authenticity of all documents and exhibits included in or attached to the
application must be sworn to affirmatively as true and correct. Id.; I.C. § 19-4902. The
applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at hearing.
Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846, 875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612,617,651 P.2d

546, 551 (Ct. App. 1982).
The district court is vested with the discretion of making factual findings, and must rely
on substantial evidence in the record, although the evidence may be conflicting. Martinez, 125
Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 943; Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,314,658 P.2d 983,985 (Ct. App.
1983). "[A]n applicant's conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated by any admissible evidence,
need not be accepted as true." Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App.
1994); Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at 551supra. If the allegations fail to frame a
genuine issue of material fact, or fail to establish all the necessary prima facie elements of a
claim for relief, the court "may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and
the reasons for so doing." I.C. § 19-4906(b); I.C.R. 57(c); Roman, supra; Parrottv. State, 117
Idaho 272, 274, 276, 787 P.2d 258, 260, 262 (1990). However, if the application raises a
material issue of fact, the district court must conduct an evidentiary hearing and make specific
findings. LC. § 19-4907(a); Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846, 875 P.2d at 943.
DISCUSSION

This decision only addresses claims other than the ineffective assistance of counsel in
Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as rephrased in the
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April 18, 2011. For
purposes ofthis order, the court has considered the following claims in the original petition: (1)
corpus delecti; (3) due process: failure of State to preserve evidence; (4) due process: State's

failure to divulge exculpatory evidence; (5) due process: State use of perjured testimony; and (6)
court error and failure to declare a mistrial.

A. Petition 7(b): Failure to Establish Corpus Delicti
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Petitioner's affidavit filed October 22, 2009 addresses "corpus delicti procedure" on
pages one and two that alleges the same argument raised on direct appeal related to the state's
burden of proof to show corpus delicti. (Severson Aff., Oct. 22, 2009, pp. 1-2). Idaho Code§
19-4901(a)(4) allows claims when "there exists evidence of material facts, not previously

presented and heard...." (emphasis added). Idaho Code§ 19-490l(b) states that "[a]ny issue
which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not be
considered in post-conviction proceedings[.]" The Petitioner litigated the issue of corpus delicti
in his underlying appeal. See State v. Severson, 147 Idaho at 712-715, 215 P.3d at 432-435.
A "convicted defendant may not simply relitigate the same factual questions in his
application in virtually the same factual context already presented in a direct appeal." Gilpin-

Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860,863,908 P.2d 162, 165 (Ct.App. 1995), citing Whitehawkv.
State, 116 Idaho 831,833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1989). The Petitioner has alleged only
material facts previously presented and heard to support the conclusory allegation so the
allegation that the State did not prove corpus delicti at trial is DISMISSED.

B. Petition 7(d): Due Process: Failure of the State to Preserve Evidence
Mr. Severson's first affidavit states makes conclusory statements about Hydrocut diet pill
being banned from sale, causing problematic symptoms, and being "know to have caused over
250 deaths." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 5). These statements are conclusory and outside
of the personal knowledge of Mr. Severson and will not be considered. The next paragraph
alleges, "The state has the duty to take and preserve [blood or tissue] samples for defence (sic) to
use, but failed to do so. It is argued that the testing done by the state is questionable. Defence
(sic) was not allowed and could not have their own testing done due to lack of samples."
(Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 5). Again, these statements are conclusory, outside the personal
knowledge of the defendant, and unsupported by affidavits or other admissible evidence.
Therefore, allegation 7(d) is DISMISSED.

C. Affidavit Page 6: Due Process: Failure of the State to Divulge Exculpatory
Evidence
The applicant's factual showing must be based upon evidence that would be admissible at
hearing. Martinez, 125 Idaho at 846,875 P.2d at 941; Drapeau, 103 Idaho at 617,651 P.2d at
551. To justify an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent on
the applicant to tender written statements from potential witnesses who are able to give
testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge. Id See also Self v. State, 145 Idaho
SECOND PARTIAL SUMMARY DISMISSAL
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578, 581, 181 P.3d 504,507 (Ct. App. 2007). No affidavits of potential witnesses showing there
was any exculpatory evidence were filed in support of Severson's vague assertions. The
Petitioner's allegation that the State was required to inform a potential defendant of an ongoing
investigation is incorrect. The next portion of the allegation is that "Exculpatory evidence stands
a remote chance of being destroyed, and is required to collect exculpatory evidence for defence
(sic)." (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 6). This seems to be a continuing allegation of the
failure to preserve evidence and is summarily dismissed for the same reasons discussed supra.

D. Petiton 7(c): Due Process: State Use of Perjured Testimony
Severson's affidavit states Detective Wolfs grand jury testimony was perjured and
should not have been used without an attempt to correct it. (Severson Aff., Oct. 13, 2009, p. 6).
Severson was not convicted based upon the grand jury testimony. Detective Wolf was called,
and recalled, to testify at trial. The contents of the testimony and the alleged "perjury" are
discussed in this court's first order of summary dismissal within the context of ineffective
assistance of counsel in failing to call the prosecutor as a witness to question him about the
"perjury" in the court's previous order. The prosecutor brought to the court's attention early in
the trial that there had been a discrepancy and a lengthy discussion ensued on the record related
to discrepancies in testimony between Detective Barclay, Deputy Sterling and Detective Wolfe
(Tr. pp. 559-563). Detective Barclay was examined by Mr. Bazzoli about evidence collection
(Tr. p. 503-519). The court allowed the prosecution to call witnesses to explain testimony which
may have been incorrect and Detective Wolfe is then called to the stand by Mr. Howen (Tr. pp.
565-656), an inconsistency in testimony was not allowed because of defense objection (Tr. pp.
648-649), and the color of a pudding bowl was clarified (Tr. p. 652). Detective Wolfe is recalled
later in the trial (Tr. pp. 1462-1547, 1562-1575). 1462-1547, 1562-1575). Mr. Severson's
conclusion that the testimony was "perjured" is bare and conclusory, especially since Detective
Wolfe was confronted with inconsistencies and given the opportunity to explain. The motion to
summarily dismiss the allegation of use of perjured testmimony is GRANTED.

E. Petition 7(t): Court's Failure to Declare a Mistrial
The issue of ineffective assistance of defense counsel alleged in paragraph 7(e) of the
Petition for not asking for a mistrial is addressed in the court's previous ruling. Whether the
court erred in not sua sponte declaring a mistrial is discussed below. Severson' s first affidavit
states, "During the hearing on defence [sic] Motion in Limine, this Honorable Court deemed that
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certain evidence was admissible and if entered into testimony trial would be deemed a mistrial.
Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial during testimony of Detective." (Severson Aff., Oct.
1

2009, p. 4) During Mr. Bourne's testimony, Mr. Howen, the prosecutor, stated "It would be

his [Mr. Bourn's] investigative jurisdiction if this matter was not tampered with anywhere but at
the end of the consumer line." (Tr. p. 1432). Mr. Matthews stated on the record, "Your Honor,
what the Prosecutor did in response to my objection was, in essence, to tell the jury that the end
user was the responsible tampering party. That, and in front of the jury is as close as you can
get, in my opinion, to giving us a basis for a motion for mistrial. I don't wish to make that
motion at this time," and then the defense asked for a limiting instruction (Tr. pp. 1433-1434),
and the limiting instruction was given by the Court (Tr. pp. 1438-1439).
Severson's first affidavit states, "Defence [sic] attorney failed to call mistrial based on
prosecutors improper, prejudicial improper, and inflammatory comments." (Severson Aff., Oct.
13, 2009, p. 4)
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed all of the comments in the direct appeal and did not
find that any rose to the level of fundamental error, especially given the court's limiting
instructions.

Therefore, the issues raised on direct appeal will not be relitigated here as

rephrased as the court's failure to sua sponte order a mistrial. This issue is res judicata and the
Motion for Summary Dismissal on this issue is GRANTED.

F. Fourth Cause Of Action: Ineffective Assistance Through Cumulative Error
Paragraph 7(a) of the petition alleges ineffective assistance of counsel which is detailed
in paragraph 9(h) as trial counsel's cumulative errors. Severson's Fourth Cause Of Action
(paragraphs 65-66) in the amended petition alleges further detail, that in the alternative, the
cumulative effect of the deficient performance in the first three alleged causes of action
prejudiced the petitioner and deprived him of effective assistance of counsel.
The Amended Verified Petition alleges all of the facts used to support the previous causes
of action and states, "The cumulative effect of trial counsel's deficient performance cause
Severson to be prejudiced." (Amended Petition ,r 66).
"While the Idaho Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of cumulative error, a
necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a finding of error in the first instance."
Borman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 527, 927 P .2d 910, 917 ( 1996). Although an evidentiary
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hearing is required for the First Cause of Action, the court has now considered all claims in the
original and amended petition and has only granted an evidentiary hearing on one issue conceded
the State that there remains a material question of fact exists as to whether there is any
error(s). Since one error cannot be "cumulative" and there remains only one error within this
court's consideration., the motion to summarily dismiss the Fourth Cause of Action in the
amended petition and paragraph 9(h) of the Petition is GRANTED.
-

CONCLU SION

Based on the reasoning set forth above, the court DENIES an evidentiary hearing on any
of the claims in the original petition and on the cumulative errors in the Fourth Cause of Action
in the Amended Petition, except whether trial counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to
permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of
Action.," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
~
and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this2ila y of July, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
LARRY M. SEVERSON
Plaintiff
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Defendant

)
)
CASE NO. CV-2009-1408
)
) PLAINTIFF'S CLOSING ARGUMENT
)
)
)
)
)

INTRODUCTION
This Court should grant petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief,
vacate the conviction, and grant plaintiff a new trial. Petitioner requests this Court
consider the pro se petition, the amended petition, all arguments and materials
submitted in support of said petitions, and the testimony and arguments made at
hearings when deciding this case. During his testimony, the plaintiff affirmed the
pro se, amended petition, and the affidavit in support.
Petitioner is entitled to post-conviction re 1i e f because he did not receive the
constitutionally effective assistance of counsel from his trial attorneys, (hereafter
"attorneys" denoting Ed Frachiseur and Ellison Matthews, and/or "Frachiseur"
denoting Ed Frachiseur, and/or "Matthews", denoting Eliison Frachiseur), as he was
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prevented from testifying by Frachiseur' s bullying, lack of communication, erroneous,
improper, and deficient legal advice, the fact Frachiseur did not request the Court to
advise the defendant concerning his right to testify and obtain an affirmative and
knowing waiver of said right, and the fact Frachiseur prevented the plaintiff from
addressing the Court at the time the defense rested and before the case was submitted
to the jury.
In addition, the Sixth Amendment right to testify claim is meritorious. The
testimony of the Plaintiff, Frachiseur, and Scott Summer at the hearings on this matter
clearly establishes that the plaintiff was not allowed testify, did not understand he had the
constitutional right to testify until after discussion with Summer after the verdict had been
returned, even though he repeatedly requested to do so at every opportunity prior to,
during, and even after the case was submitted to the jury before the verdict was returned.
THE INNEFFECTIVE ASSISATANCE OF COUNSEL GATEWAY HAS BEEN
ESTABLISED
The law on ineffective assistance of counsel is also well-established.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.668 (1984), established a two-prong test.

First, counsel's representation must be deficient, i.e., that it "fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Second, the deficiency must be prejudicial.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692. Prejudice exists when "there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. at 694.
Plaintiff raised the ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his pro se and
amended petitions.
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As the United States Supreme Court has written: "[t]he right to testify on
one's own behalf at a criminal trial has sources in several provisions of the
Constitution. It is one of the rights that are essential to due process of law in a fair
adversary process." Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-53 (1987) (internal quotations
marks omitted). "The right to testify is also found in the Compulsory Process Clause
of the Sixth Amendment, which grants a defendant the right to call 'witnesses in his
favor,' a right that is guaranteed in the criminal courts ofthe States by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id, quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967). "Even
more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self-representation . . • 1s
an accused's right to present his own version of events in his own words. A
defendant's opportunity to conduct his own defense by calling witnesses is
incomplete if he may not present himself as a witness." Rockv. Arkansas, supra.
And our own Supreme Court has written, "(a] defendant in a criminal proceeding has
the right to testify in his own behalf. Although a defendant can and should consult
with counsel about the risks and benefits of testifying, the ultimate decision of
whether to do so must be left to the defendant." DeRuslu'! v. State, 146 Idaho
599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009). In other words, Frachiseur could not refuse to allow
plaintiff to testify, yet that is what happened here.
This case should be analyzed under ineffective assistance of counsel and as a
claim of a violation of a constitutional right. The Court of Appeals held in State v
Rossignol, 152 Idaho 700, (2012), as follows:
"Our review of Darbin , Hoffman , Cootz, Kuehl, DeRushe , and Barcella, leads
to the following conclusions relevant to this case. Darb in indicates that the issue of the
failure of a defendant to testify may be viewed in post-conviction proceedings either as
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a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel or as a claim of a deprivation of a
constitutional right. With respect to Hoffman, we first note that Hoffman's claim that
his attorney prevented him from testifying on his own behalf came to this Court on
appeal from the denial of Hoffman's motion for a new trial. As such, this Court could
not review Hoffman's claim as ineffective assistance of counsel because such a claim is
not a ground for which a new trial may be granted. LC. § 19-2406. However, of
relevance here, Hoffman indicates that a defendant may not be found to have waived
the right to testify unless the defendant was aware he or she had such right and also the
ultimate authority to decide whether to testify, regardless of counsel's
advice. Cootz demonstrates that the issue of the failure of a defendant to testify may be
viewed in post-conviction proceedings both as a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel and as a claim of a deprivation of a constitutional right when both are
presented to the district court. Kuehl indicates that, when a post-conviction claim that
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by depriving a defendant of the right to
testify is presented only as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the appropriate
inquiry is that pursuant to Strickland. Similarly, DeRushe indicates that, if a defendant
alleges that he or she was deprived by trial counsel of the right to testify on his or her
own behalf, without also alleging ineffective assistance of counsel related to such
claim, it should be analyzed as a claimed deprivation of a constitutional right.
Finally, Barcella specifies that the appropriate inquiry depends upon on how the claim
is pied and argued before the district court. Barcella, 148 Idaho at 476-77, 224 P.3d at
543-44.", (emphasis added for plaintiff Severson's case).

THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERROR WAS NOT HARMLESS
The deprivation of these constitutional rights requires relief on postconviction. Under DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2009), this
particular constitutional deprivation is subject to the Chapman harmless error
standard. Under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. !8, 24 (1967), the burden of
proof is on the State to prove that the error in not permitting p 1a inti ff to testify
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. It has not met its burden here. Frachisuer
and Matthews were ineffective for failing and refusing to call the defendant to
testify.
In short, the testimony plaintiff would have provided, (see examples infra
ad nauseum), would have negated and invalidated the state's evidence. The record of
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what the plaintiff's testimony would have been and the record of the criminal trial
establish that the plaintiff would have been acquitted of murder had he testified.
The post conviction hearings in this case encompassed some ten hours of
testimony. Plaintiff will present his closing arguments in a sequential fashion the
same as presented during the hearings.
EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT HEARINGS 1
This case essentially comes down to what evidence the plaintiff would/could
have produced had he been allowed to testify, and the plaintiffs credibility vs.
Frachiseur's.
The defendant testified that his relationship with Frachiseur was "rocky from the
beginning"2 of the case to the point where plaintiff sought to have Frachiseur removed
and new counsel appointed numerous times. Plaintiffs testimony was as follows:
Frachiseur had a bad attitude, "blew me, (plaintiff), off', would not listen, did not have
time for the case, did not want the case, refused to communicate or discuss the case,
would not take his calls from the jail. ..
The plaintiff told Frachiseur that he wanted to testify on numerous occasions,
and he did not ever tell Frachiseur that he did not want to testify. Frachiseur advised the

1

The post conviction hearings in this case encompassed some ten hours of
testimony. Plaintiff will present his closing arguments in a sequential fashion the
same as presented during the hearings in order to hopefully provide some modicum
of coherence.
2

Information in quotation marks not otherwise attributed is from counsel's review of the
audio recordings of the hearings and not from ai,y transcript.
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plaintiff that the judge could not prevent him from testifying, but whether or not the
plaintiff testified was ultimately up to Frachiseur. The plaintiff testified that this meant
to him that his ability to testify was up to Frachiseur.
During plaintiffs initial testimony on direct exam, plaintiff testified he told
Matthews that he wanted to testify, and was asked what Matthew's response was, at
which time the Court sustained the states' objection as to hearsay. At that time, the
plaintiff cited IRE 804(4)3 and argued that Matthews was unavailable as he was
deceased. Plaintiff argues as an offer of proof that Matthew's statement to the plaintiff
which would have disclosed that Matthews told plaintiff he was second chair and it was
up to Frachiseur if the plaintiff testified and there was nothing Matthews could doshould have been considered by this Court.4 Mathews told the plaintiff that he was
second chair, and all important decisions were to be made by Frachiseur.
Plaintiff then testified that he told Matthews that he wanted to testify on
numerous occasions; the plaintiff did not ever tell Matthews he did not want to testify.

3

"Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable - (a) Definition of
unavailability. "Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant -

(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing
physical or mental illness or infirmity; or"
4

The state objected to this testimony on the basis of hearsay, which the Court sustained.
Plaintiff additionally argues that the proper objection to this question is that it calls for
negative evidence. The state did not make the proper objection, which would have
allowed the Court to rule on the matter, so plaintiff argues that the Court should consider
this testimony as given. This testimony further bolsters plaintiffs contention that he was
unaware the decision on whether to testify was his and his alone, and that he was never
disabused of this legal advice by either of his attorneys.
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A the time during jury trail that Judge Wetherell explained a defendant's right to testify
on the record, the plaintiff told Frachiseur he did not understand what the judge had
said, asked Frachiseur to request that the judge explain again, and attempted to address
the Judge concerning what the judge had just said. Frachiseur refused plaintiffs
request. 5 The plaintiff later discussed his right to testify with Frachiseuer after the jury
had the case but before said jury had reached a verdict at the Elmore County Jail's old
facility.
Frachiseur would not allow the plaintiff to speak with him during the trial, and
insisted that the plaintiff write everything, (which included comments, concerns,
questions, discrepancies in witness testimony, suggestions for cross examination issues,
requests for legal advice), on yellow legal pads, (hereafter "notes"). Frachiseur ignored
the notes, the plaintiff did not observe Frachiseur ever read any of the notes, and did not
ever discuss the contents of the notes with the plaintiff. Plaintiff attempted to draw
Frachiseur' s attention to the notes by underlining and pointing, but "it was like I was
not there". Plaintiffs testimony established implicitly and explicitly that he wanted to
testify. When Frachiseur did communicate with the plaintiff, he assured him many
times that the plaintiffs concerns in the notes would be addressed when the plaintiff
testified, which confirmed from plaintiffs perspective that he would be allowed to
testify. Frachiseur told the plaintiff forty to fifty times he would be allowed to testify.
Frachiseur took the notes with him at the end of the trial every day as the plaintiff could

5

Further argument concerning the advice of rights by the Judge is included later in this
document, not included here to maintain the sequential presentation.
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not have the notes in jail. Plaintiff asked Frachiseur numerous times to see the notes,
and was told they were not available.
The plaintiff desired to testify that his financial condition was good at the time
of the victim's death, with $11,000 in one account. Frachiseur informed the jury in the
opening statement that the plaintiff was successful and the cash flow was more that
adequate, (Jury Trial Transcript, (hereafter "Ct Tr, (vs. "App Tr")6, p 47, 11 8-23).
Plaintiff testified that his business in a bad month was netting twelve to fifteen thousand
dollars. Frachiseur told the plaintiff that he would be able to attest to the businesses
profitability when he testified. The state presented evidence that money and life
insurance proceeds were partial motivations for the plaintiff killing the victim because
the plaintiff was experiencing money problems.
Felicia Gartung testified for the plaintiff at trial. Gartung waited on the couple
on Valentine's Day the night of the victim's death, and told the jury that the victim
asked about ordering cheese sticks, the plaintiff told her she could not have cheese
sticks, and the victim put her hand to her mouth "and said it would be soft", (Ct Tr p

2751, 11 7-25, p 2752, 111-3). Plaintiff testified that the bread sticks were not ordered
due to an existing injury in the victim's mouth. Had the plaintiff been allowed to
testify, he would have told the jury how the victim's mouth had been recently injured
when the victim had been on a ladder at their residence cleaning the blades on a ceiling
fan when the family dog rushed through, hit the ladder, which resulted in the victim

6

The "Ct Tr" transcript was ordered by Judge Wetherell for use by the sentencing
attorney, and the "App Tr" was used for the appeal.
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falling onto the coffee table and cutting her lip. This detail alone is enough to grant
plaintiffs petition in that a main focus of the state's case was that the plaintiff caused
the victim's death by smothering her with his hand or by the use of some other
implement which left the cut on the inside of her mouth. This damning evidence that
the plaintiff smothered the victim was never countered by the defense. Plaintiff testified
that he wrote Frachiseur numerous notes concerning this issue and Frachiseur
threatened to leave the case if he continued to show him the notes.
Plaintiff would have told the jury that he was unaware of the victim's life
insurance policy until after her passing when he was informed by Carol Diaz. When
plaintiff first learned of the policy, he assumed he was the beneficiary, and later
discovered that the policy had been changed to benefit Carol Diaz.
Plaintiff testified that the victim had problems with money due to her son's
profligate behavior, she was mad at herself as she put on weight, and she suffered from
depression. This information was not presented to the jury for their consideration in
determining the plaintiffs guilt.
The plaintiff is the only person that could have countered Lean Watkins
testimony that he had told her he was separated and contemplating divorced from the
victim versus Watkins' testimony that he had told her he was divorced, (Ct Tr p 2589, 11
10-14). The jury is the finder of fact, if a defendant is precluded from supplying the
jury with all relevant admissible evidence due to actions by his counsel, said defendant
has been denied due process of law.
The plaintiff was prepared to counter some of the most damaging evidence
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against him, that of Jennifer Watkins, and would have testified as follows: he did not
tell her he was already divorced, (Ct Tr p 2599, 11 10-11), he did not stalk her or park
outside of her house, (Ct Tr p 2615, 1118-25; p 2616, 11 7-25), he loaned her $1,100 for
the down payment for a residence with a backyard for her son, (which was never
repaid).
Teresa Buckholtz testified that plaintiff obtained Lorazepam prescription pills
from her on two occasions, (Ct Tr p 2214, 1114-25; p 2215, 11 1-25). The defendant
would have testified this did not happen.
The plaintiff would have testified he attempted to call 911 using the preprogrammed phone when he found that the victim was not breathing, and there was no
answer at the 911 Call Center. Pliantiff would have testified that he had witnessed
many occasions when the 911 Call Center was not staffed at the Elmore County Jail.
After the defense rested without calling him to the stand, the plaintiff testified he
was in shock, wrote Frachiseur another note which was not read, at which time
Frachiseur went to the jail to meet with the plaintiff. When questioned, Frachiseur told
the plaintiff he did not need to testify, the jury would acquit him, many things you need
to say should not be said and are irrelevant, and you do not need to testify.
The plaintiff testified that after his conversation with Scott Summer, he was
aware that he had the right to testify.
On cross examination, the plaintiff established the following:
The plaintiff testified that when Judge Wetherell asked the defense how many
witnesses would testify, Frachiseur told the judge two, (Ct Tr p 3922, 11 9-18), and the
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plaintiff testified that at that time, Matthews pointed to the plaintiff and said, "What
about the guy next to you", to which Frachiseur responded, "Oh, yeah, yeah".
The state introduced Defendant's Exhibit 4, the transcript where Judge
Wetherell pronounced a defendant's right to testify. The plaintiff testified that he was
writing a note to Frachiseur, did not hear the entire pronouncement by the judge, he was
not paying attention, and did not know at the time the judge was talking to him.
The plaintiffs rendition is credible in light of the circumstances at the time. In a
court room during a jury trial, unless the defendant testifies, the colloquy is between and
among the trial attorneys, the judge and various witnesses for both parties. This trial
lasted approximately five weeks, and the Court did not address the plaintiff at all.
When pronouncing a defendant's right to testify, the judge starts by speaking of
other matters, specifically, "I can understand that. And neither party has gone beyond
the time scheduled for this trial. And if Mr. Severson chooses to testify, clearly, you
will have the opportunity to meet anything that you're not clearly aware of that he might
testify to.", (Ct Tr p 3932, ll 5-10). What is significant in this passage is the record does
not show in any way that the plaintiff acknowledges that he was listening to the
pronouncement. Plaintiff estimates that this pronouncement took approximately one
minute out of this five week trial. Judge Wetherell did not ask the plaintiff if he
understood this right, and did not elicit any acknowledgment of any waiver. The
passage ends with the Court asking, "Is there anything further, Counsel?", at which time
the Bailiff is the first to respond concerning an unrelated matter, (Ct Tr p 3933, 111317).
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The plaintiff testified he discussed the issue of testifying with attorneys Clark
and Summer, and they both advised the plaintiff he should testify. The plaintiff testified
Frachiseur did not ever tell him it was not a good idea to testify, and did not discuss
with plaintiff about his concerns on potential cross-examination and opening the door to
possible damaging evidence.
The plaintiff testified that the police report out of Colorado did not prove a
gunshot wound was self-inflicted, so the possible evidence would not have been
harmful.
The plaintiff testified that the hiding of assets was not an issue, most assets were
in the victim's name, but he was not worried about losing the business to her as the
customers were his and not the business's.
Plaintiff called Scott Summer to testify who testified that the plaintiff called him
from the jail after the verdict and was upset that he was not allowed to testify. Summer
explained that it was the plaintiffs absolute right to testify. Plaintiff attempted to elicit
the legal advice that was given to the plaintiff by Summer, the Court ruled that what
Summer said on an earlier occasion is hearsay. 7 Summer responded to the Court's
inquiry by stating that he advised the plaintiff he had a constitutional right to testify
after the verdict was reached.

7

Plaintiff argues that the testimony the plaintiff was attempting to elicit was not hearsay
as the declarant was present in court and testifying, so the testimony was not an out of
court statement made by someone other than the declarant. Plaintiff argues he was
prejudiced by what he characterizes as an erroneous ruling by the Court ruling as he was
not able to present a full and accurate portrayal of the conversation between plaintiff and
Summer.
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The state called Ed Frachiseur at this point in the proceeding.
Frachiseur testified he did not remember when he discussed the plaintiff's right
to testify as it had been eight years ago. Frachiseur went on to relate many justifications
why the plaintiff should not testify: damaging evidence would come in, the affair
would be rehashed, divergent stories regarding hydroxycut, and the possible selfinflicted gun shot wound in Colorado. This evidence elicited by the state further proves
that the plaintiff was not well served by counsel. All of these factors are strategic
decisions that should have been discussed with the plaintiff, followed by a
recommendation on whether to testify, and then a full and frank dialogue with the
plaintiff ultimately making the final determination.
This Court allowed State's 7 into evidence of plaintiffs objection, and ruled that
only certain portions would be considered. The fifth bullet point from the bottom of
State's 7 proves the plaintiffs contention that Frachiseur decided that he would not
allow the plaintiff to testify, "Ed wants to decide whether we are going to put Larry on
the stand: Probably not. We discussed pros and cons." This statement comports with
all of the evidence in front of this Court save Frachiseur's testimony to the contrary.
State's 8 admitted over objection states at the second bullet point form the
bottom, "Larry wishes he could sit in on our meetings: we said so far he would have
nothing to contribute. We have ask (sic) him to help us on defense theories: nothing
forthcoming so far". Plaintiff argues more than two yellow legal pads full of his notes
would constitute contributions and defense theories. State's 8 proves the plaintiff was
kept in the dark and not consulted about his case, and he consistently attested to this at
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the hearings.
Frachiseur did not remember that Judge Wetherell had stated that a defendant
has the right to testify on the record, and his memory had to be refreshed with the
transcript. At that time, Frachiseur was asked if he remembered discussing the
plaintiffs right to testify after the Court's pronouncement, to which he answered "No".
Frachiseur went on to testify that the plaintiff may have told him he wanted to testify,
and when then asked if the plaintiff demanded to testify, Frachiseur answered "He may
have". Any doubt this Court may have should be construed in plaintiffs favor. Based
on this testimony, Frachiseur could and should have cleared up the matter of plaintiff's
right to testify.
The state then inquired about Frachiseur's understanding about the plaintiffs
right to testify at the time the defense rested, and he answered over objection that it was
his understanding the plaintiff did not want to testify. The next exchange between the
state and Frachiseur is telling. When asked the time he was aware that the plaintiff
wanted to testify, he replied when he was notified of "this" hearing. The state then
reminded Frachiseur about the affidavit prepared by Jay Clark, and Frachiseur's
withdrawal from the case. Frachiseur continued to testify he did not remember, was
handed State's 2 & 3, then asserted his memory is refreshed and he did sign the affidavit
withdrawing as counsel. This questioning by the state and the responses from
Frachiseur call into question his memory, credibility, and the trustworthiness of all of
his testimony. Once again, the only evidence in front of this Court that the plaintiff was
aware of and waived his right to testify is in the form ofFrachiseur's testimony.
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Cross examination.
Frachiseur did not at first remember that the plaintiff used yellow pads to
communicate, acknowledged that use of these pads was his practice, and this had been
done in approximately 70 to 80 percent of his jury trials. Frachiseur then acknowledged
he did not remember how many pads were used, did not know where the pads were, and
conceded that the plaintiff could not take the pads with him as he was in jail. The
plaintiffs case file was damaged in a flood and Frachiseur had retrieved what was left
of the file.
What is dispositive in this case is that Frachiseur testified that he does not have
any notes of any date and time when the plaintiffs right to testify was discussed and
waived by said plaintiff. Frachiseur acknowledged that these matters are important and
should be preserved, and as lead counsel he was responsible for the criminal file.
Frachiseur was asked how many times Matthews informed him that the plaintiff wanted
to testify, Frachiseur replied that he had "No idea". Frachiseur was then asked if there
were some occasions when Matthews informed him of plaintiffs desire to testify, and
he replied, "Certainly, certainly".
Frachiseur testified that he believed he told Judge Wetherell on the record that
the plaintiff would not be testifying. The record clearly indicates he did not. The
plaintiff has testified he desired to testify and never wavered in this desire, and this
Court should believe the plaintiff. Once again, competent representation of a client
includes making sure the Court fulfills the mandates of the constitution- obtaining an
informed and knowing waiver.
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Frachiseur was asked if he remembered the plaintiff informed him that he
wanted to testify at the time the state rested and before the jury was out, to which
Frachiseur responded, "Not to my recollection". It is noteworthy that Frachiseur did not
answer definitively, he equivocates. Frachiseur did not remember telling the plaintiff he
need not testify as the jury would acquit him, but he though the jury would indeed
acquit. Further equivocation and a convenient memory. When asked about the plaintiff
summoning him to the jail after resting but before the jury reached a verdict, Frachiseur
said he did not remember but it could have happened. The plaintiff clearly remembered
all of these events, and so testified. Our judicial system mandates live testimony so the
trier of fact can observe the witness's body language, expressions, mannerisms, and
hear voice inflections in addition to the actual testimony from the witness. The
plaintiff's testimony was credible.
Further evidence casting doubt on all of Frachiseur's testimony, his ability to
recall, and his judgment in this proceeding is his action of drafting and executing State's
2 & 3 when he withdrew from the case. The motion and affidavit contain privileged
information that is now contained in the court file and part of the public record.
Frachiseur did not obtain a waiver from the plaintiff or the Court before drafting,
signing, and filing these documents. This was done prior to sentencing, and arguably
cast a bad light on the plaintiff from Judge Wetherell' s perspective. This Court is well
aware of the procedure for an attorney to withdraw from a case when said attorney has a
conflict with the client, and this procedure does not involve or require the violation of
numerous Rules of Professional Conduct. Frachiseur' s relationship with the plaintiff
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interfered with his judgment and this Court should consider State's 2 & 3 accordingly.
The state called CJ Nemeth, who was present at the time Judge Wetherell
announced the right of a defendant to testify. Nemeth was not in a position to hear
anything said at the defense table. At the time of the admonishment, Nemeth saw a
discussion between Frachiseur and Judge Wetherell, and then between Frachiseur and
the plaintiff. The state did not establish what was being said when. This testimony
corroborates plaintiffs testimony that he was speaking with Frachiseur and not listening
to the judge. Nemeth testified during the admonishment, plaintiff leaned over and
spoke with Frachiseur, then shook his head. The state was attempting to show that the
plaintiff heard the Judge's admonishment and was shaking his head "No". This line of
questioning establishes just the opposite, the plaintiff was speaking and interacting with
Frachiseur at the same time Judge Wetherell was talking.
The plaintiff was recalled, and established the following:
He told Frachiseur about the cut lip caused by the dog knocking the victim off of
the ladder and on to the coffee table before, during and after the trial, and wrote 10-12
notes on the subject.
After the case was submitted to the jury, the plaintiff insisted on seeing
Frachiseur at the jail. There was a heated discussion, the plaintiff had tears in his eyes,
got down on one knee, his body was shaking, and he begged Frachiseur to allow him to
testify. At this time, Frachiseur requested that the jail staff sedate the plaintiff, and he
was given a blue pill by the staff. Plaintiff requests that this Court review its notes
concerning this testimony about what happened at the jail. Once again, credibility is
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..
determined by observing how a witness testifies about what happened at a particular
place and time. It is obvious that the plaintiff was telling the truth during this
testimony.
CONCLUSION
The state presented evidence attempting to establish and justify Frachiseur's
decision to not allow the defendant to testify as somehow being strategic. "Strategy" in
the context of this case is of no consequence. The right to testify is a basic fundamental
constitutional right and Frachiseur' s strategy should have been discussed with the
plaintiff, but the ultimate decision rests with the plaintiff. It is important to note that
the material that the plaintiff was precluded from presenting represents a double edged
sword, much of said material arguably could have been detrimental to plaintiffs case,
but plaintiff still had the fundamental constitutional right to present it. Frachiseur' s
concerns about testimony that could be harmful, potential impeachment issues, and
apprehensions relating to IRE 404(b) materials cannot be used to prevent the plaintiff
from exercising his constitutional right.
The plaintiff has proven this case by the requisite preponderance of the evidence.
This Court should vacate the judgment of conviction and grant the plaintiff a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this

[1

day of ~ ' 2012.

David J. Smethers
Attorney for Plaintiff Larry M. Severson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: This certifies that a true and correct copy of the
above and forgoing instrument was: __Mailed v1-Iand Delivered _ _Faxed, to:
__ Boise County
Ada County P.A.;

_

__ Boise City P .A;

v
Dated this

~~
/

4

day of

ft,

b,

,2012.

J. David J. Smethers
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Severson v. State
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The State respectfully submits the following as and for its closing argument herein.
The sole issues before the Court following the evidentiary hearing held in this matter
are: 1) whether trial counsel violated Severson's due process rights by refusing to call
Severson to testify; and 2) whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
when counsel recommended to Severson that he not testify in his own defense at trial. While
Severson's initial and amended petitions both phrase the claim as ineffective assistance of
counsel for refusing to allow Severson to testify, the Court clarified, upon request of the State,
that Severson intended to proceed with respect to the related claims - an alleged violation of
Severson's constitution rightto testify in his own behalf and ineffective assistance forfailing
to call Severson to testify1 •
Idaho's appellate courts have iterated the general standards applicable to the Court's
inquiry following this evidentiary hearing. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may

1

In Rossignol, the Court of Appeals recently reiterated that a claim alleged as ineffective
assistance of counsel for not permitting the defendant to testify should not be converted to a
free-standing constitutional claim. Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, _ , 274 P.3d 1, 9 (Ct.
App. 2012). However, upon a request for clarification from the State, it appears that Severson
did assert both an ineffective assistance and a constitutional deprivation claim. See id.
(where post conviction counsel tried the issue under both theories after having only pied
ineffective assistance, and the trial court analyzed both claims, the appellate court likewise
analyzed both claims). The State therefore argues both in this argument.
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properly be brought under the post-conviction procedure act. Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,
924-25, 828 P.2d 1323, 1329-30 (Ct. App. 1992). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim, the defendant must show that the attorney's performance was deficient and that
the defendant was prejudiced bythedeficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 68788 (1984); Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313, 316, 900 P.2d 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1995). To
establish a deficiency, the applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114
Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). To establish prejudice, the applicant must
show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome
of the trial would have been different.

19.:. at 761, 760 P.2d at 1177.

This Court has long-

adhered to the proposition that tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be
second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate preparation,
ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v.
State, 126 Idaho 231,233,880 P.2d 261,263 (Ct. App. 1994).
The trial court should make findings offact. Hoffman v. State, 125 Idaho 188, 192, 868
P.2d 516,520 (Ct. App. 1994). The Court's findingsoffactwill not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous. Reeves v. State, 105 Idaho 844, 673 P.2d 444 (Ct. App. 1983). The
Court's ultimate decision will be affirmed so long as competent and substantial evidence
supports the decision. Holmes v. State, 104 Idaho 312,658 P.2d 983 (Ct. App.1983).
The State urges the Court to make the following findings of fact, supported by the
testimony and exhibits adduced at the hearing herein.
•

Severson wanted to be represented at trial by Scott Summer or Jay Clark.
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Severson wrote notes to trial counsel Ed Frachiseur on yellow notepads.
Severson obtained these notepads from Mr. Clark.
•

Severson's proposed trial testimony contradicted various State's witnesses'
testimony. Severson's proposed trial testimony invited the jury to believe him
and discredit several State's witnesses, including Teri Buchholtz, Teresa
Mallea, Felicia Gartung, Nancy Ellwanger, Carol Diaz, Rebecca Deppen,
Steven Bock, Jennifer Watkins, Leeann Watkins and Tracy Besler. Specific
portions of the under1ying trial transcript, related to testimony from Steven Bock,
Rebecca Deppen, Leeann Watkins, Jennifer Watkins, Tracey Besler, and
Felicia Gartung were admitted at the evidentiary hearing as State's exhibit 11.
These portions contain the testimony Severson specifically contradicted in his
proposed trial transcript.

•

Severson testified with great detail regarding his version of events to which
each of these State's witnesses testified.

•

Severson did not recall that Judge Wetherell advised him of his right to testify
in his own defense or not.

•

Severson did not recall all of the prosecuting attorney's statements during
opening statements, only those that related to Severson's litany of "incorrect"
testimony.

•

Severson described his relationship with Mary Severson in these words - "We
were great."

•

Severson admitted Mary Severson had gone to see a divorce attorney.
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Severson admitted he was "aggravated" and beginningtodoubtwheth erthey
should stay married.
•

Severson admitted Mary Severson was not happy.

•

Severson offered his opinion that his business was "solvent" so he would have
discredited the State's theory regarding his need for life insurance proceeds.
Severson failed to present any evidence supporting his claim that his business
was "solvent." Furthermore, the State's financial motive at trial was not limited
to Severson's belief that he would receive life insurance proceeds. Rather,
Severson thought Mary would receive all or most of the couple's assets in a
divorce because the couple bought everything in his name due to financial
issues Severson had with his first wife. Whether Mary would have actually
received all of the couple's assets was not important. Severson's belief
regarding the community property was the important factor. Mr. Frachiseur
testified that he was concerned about Severson's ability to meet the State's
evidence concerning Severson's beliefs about the property.

•

Severson perjured himself during the July 1, 2002, hearing on Carol Diaz'
request to return the cremains of Mary Severson. Severson, under oath,
testified before Judge William Hart that Mary's cremains had been scattered.

See State's Exhibit 10. Carol Diaz withdrew here motion based on Severson' s
sworn statements to Judge Hart. In truth, the cremains were in his daughter's
possession and later turned overto him. Detective Michael Barclay seized the
cremains from Severson's possession.
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Mr. Frachiseur and co-counsel Ellison Matthews advised Severson and
recommended that Severson not take the stand in his own defense. Mr.
Frachiseur had concerns about Severson's ability to withstand crossexamination. Mr. Frachiseur was concerned that Severson had not been
honest with the trial team. Mr. Frachiseur was concerned that Severson's
proposed and intended testimony that he did not poison Mary would not be
accepted by the jury because the State's testimony regarding the safety
mechanisms used by the hydroxycut packagers made his testimony impossible.

See State's Exhibit 9. Mr. Frachiseur believed Severson and Mary adulterated
the pills in an attempt to swindle the hydroxcut manufacturers in a product
liability lawsuit. Mr. Frachiseur did not believe the jury would find Severson
credible. Mr. Frachiseur believed the jury would not convict Severson based on
the circumstantial case where the State could not, in his opinion, pinpoint the
exact manner of death-asphyxiation versus poisoning. Mr. Frachiseurdid not
think Severson should testify.
•

During the course of the underlying criminal case, Mr. Frachiseur and Mr.
Matthews met with their investigators and staff in team meetings. On August
18, 2004, the team discussed whether Severson should testify. The team
recommended that Severson not testify. Severson had provided a "latest
version" of events. The team voiced concerns that a jury would believe Mary
would have voluntarily taken hydroxycut containing Drano. See State's Exhibit
7. On August 23, 2004, the team again discussed whether counsel should

CLOSING ARGUMENT - Page 5

recommend putting Severson on the stand. The team again recommended
against Severson testifying based on a perceived change in Severson's
version of events in light of recently disclosed evidence. The team expresses
concerns with Severson's failure to tell counsel the truth. See State's Exhibit 8.
•

Judge Michael Wetherell clearly advised Severson that Severson had the right
to testify in his own defense or to stand on his to remain silent. See State's
Exhibit 4.

•

Severson never made any statement to Judge Wetherell evincing a clear intent
to testify in his own defense.

•

Severson first advised Judge Wetherell that he wanted to testify at trial in March
2005 - approximately five months after the jury returned a guilty verdict.

•

Severson signed an affidavit on March 18, 2005, prepared by Jay Clark. The
affidavit included a statement that Severson had been advised of his right to
testify by the trial court, which Severson denied recalling during this evidentiary
hearing. The affidavit is admitted as State's Exhibit 1.

•

Mr. Frachiseur's memory has faded since 2004.

•

Mr. Frachiseur clearly understood in 2004 and understands today that a criminal
defendant has the rightto testify. Mr. Frachiseurtestified that he would not, and
did not, tell Severson that it was his - Mr. Frachiseur's - decision whether
Severson should testify. In direct testimony, Mr. Frachiseurtestified that he met
with Severson between 40 and 50 times prior to trial and that he talked to
Severson about his right to testify approximately 8 to 10 times. Upon cross-
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examination, Mr. Frachiseurtestified that Severson did not unequivocally assert
his right to testify. When asked if he told Severson that the decision whether
Severson would testify was "his call," Mr. Frachiseur specifically testified that
"I know that I did not tell him that."
•

Mr. Frachiseurftled a motion to withdraw as counsel and supporting affidavit in
March 2005, when the events of the trial were more clear in his mind. See
State's Exhibits 2 and 3. In his March 21, 2005, affidavit, Mr. Frachiseur stated
he and Mr. Matthews had discussed Severson's constitutional rightto testify or
to assert his Fifth Amendment right on numerous occasions. Mr. Frachiseur
stated he and Mr. Matthews repeatedly advised Severson against testifying.
Mr.

Frachiseur stated

Severson

had

agreed with

counsels' joint

recommendation to not testify and remain silent.
•

Scott Summer testified that he never discussed Severson's right to testify as
he always intended to have Severson testify at trial. Severson did not talk to Mr.
Summer after Mr. Frachiseur. Rather, Severson spoke with Mr. Summer after
the jury's verdict came back. The timing of Severson's call to Mr. Summer is
convenient - after Severson unsuccessfully rolled the dice with the jury.

•

C.J. Nemeth served on the trial team in 2004. Ms. Nemeth testified that she
was present during a conference with Severson right before trial commenced.
During pre-trial preparation, Severson had waffled back and forth regarding his
desire to testify. On the advent of trial, Severson agreed with counsels'
recommendation that he not testify. During trial, Ms. Nemeth sat in the
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courtroom. As Judge Wetherell advised Severson regarding his right to testify
orto invoke his Fifth Amendment right and not testify, Severson shook his head
back and forth. Ms. Nemeth has seen such a gesture on many different
occasions. While the gesture could have many different meanings, in her
experience, a head shake generally means "no."
•

Based on all of the foregoing, the Court does not find Severson's testimony
regarding Mr. Frachiseur's pre-trial and trial communications credible. The
Court finds that Mr. Frachiseur, after adequate investigation and preparation,
advised Severson that he should invoke his Fifth Amendment right and not
testify.

Mr. Frachiseur's recommendation that Severson not testify was

reasonable, strategic and tactical. Severson has failed to meet his burden of
rebutting the strategic and tactical decision of trial counsel. Severson has failed
to meet his burden of establishing prejudice.

The Court finds that Mr.

Frachiseurdid not prohibit, bar, forbid or prevent Severson from testifying in his
own behalf. The State has met its burden and established that Severson freely,
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify and stood on his Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.
A.

Because Severson freely, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to testify
and chose to stand on his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, Severson' s
constitutional challenge fails.

A defendant in a criminal case has a fundamental right to testify in his or her own behalf
and the defendant is personally vested with the ultimate authority to decide whether or not to
testify. State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 689,690, 778 P.2d 811,812 (Ct. App. 1989). The Court
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of Appeals noted, "Ordinarily, such an allegation, made by a convicted defendant after trial,
would be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism." Id. In Hoffman, trial counsel advised the
defendant to not testify because counsel was concerned Hoffman would offer perjured
testimony, which would be caught and capitalized on by the State during cross-examination.

kL.

However, during a hearing held on motion for new trial on the grounds that counsel

deprived him of his right to testify, Hoffman testified to certain facts, and "[t]he record
discloses no specific ground upon which Hoffman's trial attorney might have concluded that
the foregoing testimony would constitute perjury. Indeed, when the attorney was asked at the
post-trial hearing why he thought Hoffman would have testified falsely, he gave a nonspecific
response relating to other matters in the case."

kt at 691,

778 P.2d at 813.

The Court of Appeals further addressed circumstances under which a criminal
defendant may be deemed to have waived his right to testify by acquiescing to trial counsel's
insistence that he refrain from testifying.

kt A defendant may be found to have acquiesced

in trial counsel's recommendation where he ''was aware of his ultimate right to decide whether
or not he would testify."

kL. at 692,

778 P.2d at 814. This knowledge can come from trial

counsel's advice or the trial court's informing the defendant of his right.

kt

In the present case, Severson clearly knew he had the right to testify. This Court does
not have to credit Severson's after the fact assertion that he did not know he had the right to
testify. In fact, the Court should discredit Severson's claim given Judge Wetherell's notice to
Severson of his right to testify - notwithstanding Severson's self-serving testimony at the
evidentiary hearing that he did not hear, pay attention to or recall the trial court's specific
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notice to him on the record. In addition, Mr. Frachiseur advised Severson he had the right to
testify. He also recommended Severson waive that right.
Trial counsels' recommendation was reasonable. It was made after investigation. It
was made after consultation with the investigators and a review of the facts. It was made after
counsel discovered that Severson's story kept changing. It was made after Severson perjured
himself in Judge Hart's court. It was made after Severson himself disclosed a witness who
described Severson's physical ailments after Severson ingested drano. Trial counsel
explained that a jury would never believe Mary ingested drano purposefully knowing the
deleterious effects of the substance. In addition, it was all too clear that the hydroxycut had to
have been sabotaged by the end possessors - Mary and Larry Severson. The Court should
deny Severson's claims for these reasons.
Even if the Court does not find that Severson in fact freely, knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to testify or knowingly acquiesced to trial counsels' recommendation that he
not testify, the Court should deny Severson's constitutional claim as any error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Idaho Court of Appeals recently addressed the State's
burden in Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700, _ , 274 P.3d 1, 5(Ct. App. 2012). "However,
if the failure of a defendant to testify is considered in the context of deprivation of a
fundamental constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or she was
deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then convince the reviewing court beyond a
reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute to the defendant's conviction -that
it was harmless error."

kt at 5; see also Cootz v. State, 129 Idaho 360, 369, 924 P .2d 622,
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631 (Ct. App. 1996) (the trial court could not have determined that Gootz knew of his ultimate
right to testify and therefore that he had waived his right to testify; therefore appellate court
considered whether the failure to testify effected the jury's verdict beyond a reasonable doubt).
The jury would have disregarded Severson's testimony. He did not offer any actual
evidence to explain Mary's death. Rather, Severson's explanation of the injury to Mary's
mouth was inconsistent with trial testimony from Felicia Hartung. Severson's repeated denials
of pre-trial statements he had made to Jennifer Watkins, Leeann Watkins and Tracy Besler
were not credible. Severson's denial of knowledge regarding Mary's life insurance was not
credible. The State's witnesses were believable. While circumstantial, the State's case
against Severson was strong. Mary Severson was killed. Severson was the only person with
motive, means and opportunity. Any deprivation resulting from Severson's failure to testify is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Severson has failed to meet his burden of establishing that ( 1) trial counsel's
recommendatation that he not testify was not strategic or tactical and (2) his trial
testimony would have changed the outcome of the trial.

Mr. Frachiseur and Mr. Matthews engaged in extensive pre-trial investigation into the
facts of Mary Severson's poisoning and death. They discussed the pros and cons of
Severson's prospective testimony with the trial team and Severson himself. Severson
vacillated in his desire to testify.

Trial counsel made a reasonable decision and

recommended Severson not testify in his own defense. The State has addressed this
strategic and tactical decision infra. Mr. Frachiseurdetailed for the Court the reasons why he
and Mr. Matthews believed Severson should not testify. These reasons are supported by the
contemporaneous trial team memoranda adduced at the evidentiary hearing herein. Ms.
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Nemeth also testified to the team's concerns regarding Severson testifying. The Court should
find that Severson has failed to rebut the presumption that trial counsels' recommendation that
Severson not testify was anything other than strategic and tactical.
When a petitioner asserts he was prevented from testifying, his proposed testimony
can be readily compared with the evidence adduced at trial in order to determine if the result
would have been different. Kuehl v. State, 145 Idaho 607,611, 181 P.3d 533,537 (Ct. App.
2008). Where much of the petitioner's testimony merely pits his word against that of other
witnesses, it is more likely that the jury would not have believed him.

kt. Here, Severson did

not establish prejudice as his proffered testimony merely pitted his version of events against
the State's witnesses. He cannot explain why any one, let alone all, of the State's witnesses
would have testified falsely or mistakenly. The jury would not have believed Severson. In
addition, Severson was impeached by his prior perjured testimony to Judge Hart. He would
have likewise been impeached at trial.

C.

Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this Court deny Severson's
claims. Severson has failed to demonstrate that he did not freely, knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to testify. Furthermore, the State has met its burden of demonstrating that any
deprivation is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Severson was not credible during the
evidentiary hearing here after having approximately eight years to prepare his response to the
State's evidence. It is unlikely he would have been more persuasive in 2004. In addition,
Severson perjured himself before Judge Hart. The jury would have discredited his testimony
and so should this Court. Finally, Severson has failed to rebut the presumption that trial
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counsels' recommendation was anything other than strategic and tactical or established any
prejudice resulting from his failure to testify. The evidence of Severson's guilt, while
circumstantial, was strong. Severson's repeated mantra that each of the State's witnesses
were lying, absent a reason to provide false information, would not have been believed by the
jury. Therefore, Severson's free-standing constitutional claim and ineffective assistance claim
both fail and should be dismissed.
Dated this 3rd day of December 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on today's date, I served a copy of the attached document to the
following parties by the following means:
David J. Smethers

ATIORNEY AT LAW

V

Facsimile
;?Email ( copied on email to Judge)

1000 South Roosevelt
Boise, Idaho 83705
Facsimile No. 336-1263
davidj@smetherslaw.com
The Honorable Lynn G. Norton
Bench Copy
lnorton@adaweb.net
DATED this 3rd day of December 2012.
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David J. Smethers
SMETHERS LAW OFFICE
l 000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, ID 83705
Telephone: (208) 336-114S
Facsimile: (208) 336-1263
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
SEVERSON, LARRYM.
Petitioner,
•VS-

STATE OF IDAHO,

Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-2009·1408

ORDER EXTENDING TIME
TO Fll..E REPLY BRIEF

TIDS MATTER, having come before the Court upon the Motion of Petitioner's

counsel for Extension of Time to File Reply Brief, and the Court having reviewed said
motion as well as the notes and records on file in this matter, and it appearini the State
has no objection and that good and sufficient cause exists therefore, the Court hereby
extends Petitioners Reply Brief deadline to the l 7'b day of December, 2012.

SO ORDERED this

I~of December, 2012.
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this\~ of December, 2012, I caused a true a.nd
correct copy of the foregoing ORDER to be served upon the following by the method
indicated below:
ELMORE COUNTY PROSECUTOR
190 S. 4ih E.
Mountain Home, ID 83647
[ ] United States mail
[ ] Facsimile: (208) 587-2147
~ Other:\.\~d ()2.llDQ,l\J
DAVIDJ. SMETHERS
Attorney at Law
1000 S. Roosevelt St.
Boise, ID 83705

[ ] United States mail
acsimile: (208) 336-1263
Other:
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Severson v State, CV"2009-1408

BA

APPELLANT'S REPLY MEMORANDUM

CLER

To: Honorable Lynn G. Norton
From: David J. SmetheI'$, Attorney for Appellant
Copy To: Kristina Schindele, Elmore County Prosecuting Attorney
December 17, 2012
Appellant will reply to the state's response in sequential fashion by page as listed
in respondent's MEMO.

Pue 2: The state requests this Court to make findings of fact. The: appellant will
first nrgue the merit., of the state's requests then argue how this Court should utilize the
infonnation contained in the request
Page 2. first bullet point, (hereafter "pt''): The appellant readily acknowledges
that he desired to be represented by attorneys other than Frachiseur, but this desire is of

no consequence in the determination oftbe issues in front of this Court. After appellant's
request for new counsel was denied, the record clearly shows that the appellant nttempted
to fully cooperate with his assigned counsel and was rebuffed, bullie~ and ignored
throughout the representation. Appellant furthers argues he would not sabotage his
defense to murder charges because his request for certain counsel was denied by Judge
Wetherell.
Paw; 3. l si. pt: Appellant was given yellow legal pads by Fra.chiseur, which was
Frachiscur's longstanding practice during jury trials. If a.ny pads were in fact supplied by
Clark, the is.sue in this case is the information contained on the pads, not the source of the

pads. The relevance is that these two legal pads :full of notes written by the appellant are
gone and unaccounted for. The .information on these pads was not considered by

'

.
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Fmchiseur or presented to the jury. The appellant testified truthfully and in great detail
about the infonnation on the pads. Appel1ant argues that these notes would have
definitively established that the appellant expressed his desire to testify at every tum, and
never indicated he did not want to testify.
2nd

pt: Appellant agrees that his proposed testimony would have discredited various

witnesses that testified at trial. The jury did not have this evidence to consider in

reaching its verdict.
3rd pt: Appellant agrees that his versions of the events contained great detail. Appellant

further argues that these details were accurate and would have influenced the jury's
verdict.
4th pt: Appellant was writing a note to Frachiseur during Judge Wetherell's

admonishment, later asked Fracluseur to request the Judge repeat the warnings, and the
request was ignored.
51h pt: Appellant testified he did not recnJI all of the statements made in the state's
opening comments,. and he readily acknowledges be remembers the "litany of "'incoacct"
testimony.". Appellant argues that erroneous and un•rebutted evidence that contributed
10 his conviction for

murder would be more easily recalled than neutral or favorable

information during the intervening time period after appellant's trial.
151.it pt: Appel1ant contends that his relationship with the victim was "great", and the jury
should have heard this testimony in order to judge credibility in reaching its verdict. At
trial, the state elicited damaging evidence concerning their relationship which was unrebutted except through ineffective cross examination, and the defense presented no
evidence which could and would countered the state's.
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7th pt: The victim had consulted with a divorce attorney, and the appellant would have

expla.ined the circumstances surrounding this issue, and testified about their relationship
with the attendant ups and downs that many/all maniagcs cndw-e.

Page 4:, 1st pt: The appellant acknowledged that he had doubts about their
marriage surviving, but once again, the jury should have heard his side of the story to
ascribe whatever relevance and credibility they deemed important.
2nd pt: See the response to 1st pt on page 4.
3rd pt: The state once again lists issues in this point that go to the appe11ant's motive to·
commit the crime. The state emphasizes, "Severson's belief regarding the community
property was the imponant factor." Appellant agrees, and the jury did not hear this
"belief'' from Severson with all the attendant factors present when one testi ties in front of

the trier of fact. The state argues that Frachiseur was concerned about the appellant's
ability to respond to this evidence. Frachiseur's concerns do not justify his act of
precluding the appellant from testifying.
4tl• pt: The irtnte argues that the appellant ••perjured himself'' in July of 2002. There was

no court proceeding establishing this fact or any judgment of conviction. If the state had
been allowed to place this evidence in front of the jury in the murder case, the appellant
could have countered this issue with testimony about intra-family wrangling after his
vme,s death and the jury could have decided if said testimony was credible. Once again,
this decision lies strictly with a defendant and cannot be ignored/overridden by counsel
for purported strategic purposes.
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:eage S: 15* pt The state argues that Frachiscur and Matthews 1 advised the
appellant not to take the st.and. Once again, all concerns in this point should have been
discussed with the appellant, but the testimony established said concerns were not as
Frachiseur refused to communicate with appellant.
2nd

pt: The team meetings and discussions between defense counsel and their

investigators are of no consequence as the a.ppellnnt was not present and not aware of
said discourses.
Page 6: 1st pt: The record establishes that Judge Wetherell announced the admonishment
about a defendant testifying on the record. "!'he record does not contain any proof that the
appellant heard, understood, or acknowledged said admonishment. The appellant
testified that he was writing a note to Frachiseur and did not hear or understand the
Judge's admonishment. The appellant testified that he asked for the admonishment to be
repeated by Judge Wetherell, and Frachiseur refused. The appellant's testimony
established that his understanding of his right to testify was that it was Frachiseur's

decision on whether or not he took the stand.
2nd

pt: Judge Wetherell did not ask for or obtain any/an affinnative waiver from the

appellant.
3rd pt:

The appellant was represented by counsel and could not communicate with the

Court except through counsel.
4th pt: The record, as well as the appellant's testimony, establishes that he was never
advised of his right to testify. The infonnation in State's 1 is telling. The appellant is

1
Matthews did not testify as he Is deceased, this evid,mc:e Is possibly an exception to a hearsay rule that the
Coun. could have considered had it been offered, but it was not. The appenw•s testimony was
diam.etrJc:ally the opposJte; Matthews imcouraged the appcllllllt to testify and dJd not ever advise him not to
testify.
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unwavering in his assertions that he intended to testify, so informed his attorneys. and

was shocked and caught off guard when Frachlscur rested without calling him to testify.
The state placed this affidavit into evidence, it is the appellant's sworn statement made
some seven years ago before post conviction was even a consideration. The appellant's
inability to recall one phrase in this seven year old affidavit does not establish be
understood and waived his right to testify.
5tll pt:

Appellant will stipulate that Frnchiseur's memory has faded since 2004, and the

record adduced at the hearings in this case establishes that Frachiseur's testimony was not
credible.

61.h pt: Once again, the credibility of witnesses is a large factor in this Court's
determination. The appellant's testimony and demeanor during has been commented on

at length. The only evidence this Court has that Frachiseur discussed the issue with the
defendant and the defendant declined to testify is from Frachlscur. The state through
Fracltlscur was not able to produce a single piece of evidence to establish the appellant
was aware of and waived this right. The evidence that could have established the

appellant's version of events was in fa.ct true- the appellant's notes .from five weeks of
trial- are no where to be found and lost/misplaced/dnma.ged. AppeJlant argues Frachiseur

was responsible for these materials and hnd an affirmative duty to make said materials

available for post conviction relief proceedings.
Page 7:

1st pt:

Once again, the only evidence concerning these assertions comes

from Frachiseur. The Motion to Withdraw as coW1Sel was precipitated by Frachiseur's
actions of being ineffective. Any statement from Matthews is hearsay which the court
excluded, (see argument above).
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pt: The appellant testified he did not understand his constitutlonal right to testify until

after the discussion with Sum.mer after the jury trial. The fact Summer did not discuss
appellant's right to testify at the time he represented him lends further credibility to
appellant's testimony he always intended to testify- the conversation was not necessary at
that time.
3rd

pt: Investigator Ncmcth's testimony was pure speculation and conjecture, Nemeth's

deduction that a ''no shake of the bead by appellant meant appellant understood and was
0

indicating he did not want to testify is specious at best and this Court should give it no
credence. An experienced trial attorney would prohibit a defendant from acting out in
this manner as any action while seated at the defense table could be misperceived by a
judge or jury.
.PH£ S: 1" pt: Sec above arguments.

The state argues that even.if the appellant did not freely, knowingly, and
intelligently waive his right to testify, this Court should find the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt The appellant provided abundant evidence that he was prejudiced by
Frachiseur's uninfonncd cross-examination of witness. and Frachiseur's failure to elicit
favorable and relevant evidence during the defendant•s case. The appellant testified that
when ever he brought these issues to Frachiseur's attention, he was assured that he would
be allowed to present the material when he testified.

__
L ___,~~1.._~
_ _ _:_:_

1'2.-i 7-t~

Da~
Attomey at Law

Date
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_Ada County Prosecutor;

__Boise County Prosecutor;
_Boise City Prosecutor;
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~L-h.
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMO!W

~
<-

vs.

Case No. CV-2009-1408

MEMORANDUM DECISION DISMISSING
POST CONVICTION ACTION AFTER
EVIDENTIARY HEARING

STATE OF IDAHO,
Res ondent.
Appearances:
David Smethers for Petitioner, Mr. Severson personally present throughout the hearing
Kristina Schindele for Respondent
This matter came before the Court on September 7, 2012, September 19, 2012, and
October 5, 2012 for an evidentiary hearing required by Idaho Code 19-4907(a) on whether trial
counsel was ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own
defense at trial delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraphs 7(a) and 9(a) in the
original petition.
All other allegations of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and the Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief were previously summarily dismissed by this court by way of
orders previously entered. 1
Closing arguments were presented in writing with the Petitioner filing his argument on
November 14, 2012; the Respondent's filed on December 3, 2012; and the Petitione r's Rebuttal
filed on December 18, 2012.

1

Partial Summary Dismissal of Ciaims Related to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, filed Jun. 29, 2012;
Second
Partial Summary Dismissal of Claims, filed Jul. 27, 2012.
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CEPur,W:JT

LARRY M. SEVERSON,
Petitioner,

.,r3

I.

BACKGROUND

After a seventeen-day jury trial and two days of deliberation, the Petitioner was found
guilty of two felonies, First-Degree Murder and Poisoning; the victim of both counts being the
Petitioner's wife, Mary Severson, in 2004. The Petitioner was represented by a series of counsel
between indictment and the trial 2 but was represented at trial by Elmore County Public Defender
E.R. Frachiseur and Ellison Matthews. 3 Petitioner is currently serving a sentence of life without
parole for murder and five years for poisoning food and/or medicine. Following his conviction,
Petitioner filed an appeal from his underlying sentence and conviction, which was upheld in a
May 29, 2009 opinion by the Idaho Supreme Court. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 215 P.3d
414 (S. Ct. 2009). Additional facts from the underlying criminal case are found in that decision
and incorporated herein by reference. The Idaho Supreme Court issued its Remittitur on
September 4, 2009.
The Petitioner filed a timely sworn prose Petition and Affidavit for Post-Conviction
Relief on October 13, 2009, within one year of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on the direct
appeal (hereinafter "Petition"). All claims in the Petition were summarily dismissed by previous
decisions of this court except that the Petitioner was granted an evidentiary hearing on the
ineffective assistance claim of trial counsel in paragraph 7 of the Petition which alleges more
specifically in paragraph 9(a) counsel's "failure to allow Petitioner to testify in his own behalf."4
An Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed with the assistance of
counsel on April 18, 2011 (hereinafter "amended petition"). The amended petition was verified
by Mr. Severson as true and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief as required by I.C. §
19-4902(a). The portion of the amended petition that was not summarily dismissed and
remaining for evidentiary hearing is the allegation in the First Cause of Action of ineffective
assistance of counsel: defense counsel's refusal to allow defendant to testify at the jury trial.
The Respondent's Counsel had previously filed a request for the court to take judicial
notice of "the transcripts, files, affidavits, lodged documents, exhibits and record" in the Elmore
County criminal case, CR 2002-158. Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material
by counsel on April 18, 2011 included the trial transcript with opening and closing arguments,
the Clerk's Record in the Idaho Supreme Court appeal, and the Supplemental Clerk's Record in
2

Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, pp. 12-13, fns. 3-5.
Id. p. 13, fn. 5, Severson Aff., May 9, 2012, 1I'15-6.
4
Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, filed Oct. 22, 2009, W 7(a), 9(a).
3
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that appeal. Because the G:ourt noted a difference in pagination between the hard copy of the trial
transcripts in the court's file and the transcripts included in the electronic appellate record, the
court required the parties to present portions of these judicially noticed materials they wanted
considered at the hearing as exhibits.
The following were presented for the Court's consideration at the hearing: Testimony of
the Petitioner, Scott Summer, Ed Frachisseur, and Carol (C.J.) Nemeth. One exhibit was
admitted on behalf of the Petitioner at the hearing (B) and ten exhibits were admitted on behalf
of the Respondent (1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11). Exhibits 4, 9 and 11 were portions of the
trial transcript in this case. Exhibits 7 and 8 are memoranda from counsel's files. Exhibit 10 was
a transcript from Elmore County Case No. CV-OC-02-00275 and Exhibit 6 is the Indictment
filed in that case. Exhibit 1 was Larry Severson's affidavit filed March 19, 2005 in the
underlying criminal case, Exhibit 2 was his counsel's motion to withdraw following the trial, and
Exhibit 3 is the affidvait of counsel accompanying that motion.

II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

The Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act, LC. §§ 19-4901 through 19-4911, allows
individuals convicted and/or sentenced for a crime to petition the Court for relief in the following
situations: (1) the sentence is in violation of the constitution; (2) the Court lacks jurisdiction; (3)
the sentence exceeds the maximum provided by law; (3) there is evidence of material fact, not
previously presented and heard, requiring vacation of the sentence in the interest of justice; (5)
the sentence has expired; (6) the petitioner is innocent, subject to the provisions for DNA testing
in the statute; (7) or the sentence is subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error.
LC.§ 19-4901(a).
A petition for post-conviction relief is an entirely new proceeding and is civil in nature.

It is distinct from the criminal action which led to conviction. Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490,
494, 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001); Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 456, 808 P.2d 373, 375 (1991).
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief must bear the burden
of proving the allegations upon which the petition for post-conviction relief is based by a
preponderance of the evidence. I.C.R. 57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27,995 P.2d 794, 797
(2000). However, the pleadings of a post-conviction petition differ from those of a civil action,
and that "[t]he application must contain much more than a short and plain statement of the
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claim." State v. Yakovic, 145 Idaho 437,443, 180 P.2d 476,482 (2008) (quoting Goodwin v.

State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 628-29 (Ct. App. 2002).
The test for evaluating whether a criminal defendant has received the effective assistance
of counsel is two-pronged. Related to whether counsel's performance was deficient, the
petitioner has the burden of proving (1) that his attorney's representation fell outside the wide
range of professional norms; and (2) the petitioner was prejudiced as a result of the deficient
conduct. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000); see also Martinez v. State,
125 Idaho 844,846,875 P.2d 941,943 (Ct. App. 1994) and Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d
at 629 (citingAragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988)). This objective
standard embraces a strong presumption that the petitioner's counsel was competent and diligent

(Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622,624,226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984)) and had sound trial strategy. Davis v. State, 116
Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). If a defendant succeeds in establishing
that counsel's performance was deficient, he must also prove the prejudice element by showing
that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of
the proceedings would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Roman, 125 Idaho at
649, 873 P.2d at 903. A reasonable probability is "probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome." Id. To prove that such deficiency prejudiced Petitioner's case
requires a showing of a "reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance,
the outcome of the trial would have been different." Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at
1177. The appellate courts require substantive proof of ineffective assistance of counsel rather
than mere dissatisfaction with the outcome of one's trial. Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921,924,877
P.2d 365,368 (1994).
Related to his claim that the Petitioner was denied the right to testify at his trial, recently
the Idaho Court of Appeals held that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for not
permitting a defendant to testify should not be converted to a free-standing constitutional claim.

Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho 700,706,274 P.3d 1, 7 (Ct. App. 2012). The inquiry depends
upon how the claim is pied and argued before the district court. Id.

If viewed as a question of effective assistance of counsel, pursuant to Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the burden
rests with the defendant both to identify the acts or conduct of counsel alleged to
have been deficient and to show how such deficiency was prejudicial to the
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defense. Darbin, 109 Idaho at 522, 708 P.2d at 927. However, if the failure of a
defendant to testify is considered in the context of deprivation of a fundamental
constitutional right, then pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87
S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the defendant has the burden to show he or she
was deprived of the right to testify, and the state must then convince the
reviewing court beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not contribute
to the defendant's conviction-that it was harmless error. Darbin, 109 Idaho at
522, 708 P .2d at 927.

Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 706, 274 P.3d at 7.
At an evidentiary hearing, the credibility of the witnesses, the weight given to their
testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the proceeding are all matters
solely within the province of the District Court. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P. 2d 439,
440 (Ct.App. 1988).

III.

EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING

The Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed on October 22, 2009, as
rephrased in the Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief filed by counsel on April
18, 2011, claimed that counsel's refusal to allow the Petitioner to testify was ineffective
assistance of counsel. 5 Within the Amended Verified Petition, counsel framed the allegation
only as a denial of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington." 6
The Respondent did not move for summary dismissal of these claims, conceding material
issues of fact were adequately raised by the Petitioner on the issue of whether trial counsel was
ineffective by failing or refusing to permit Mr. Severson to testify in his own defense at trial
delineated as the "First Cause of Action," paragraphs 21 through 45 in the Amended Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and paragraph 9(a) in the original petition.
At the hearing, the Petitioner presented evidence which included the testimony of Mr.
Severson; the testimony of Scott Summer, counsel before the trial for Mr. Severson; and
Petitioner's Exhibit B, the Register of Actions for the underlying criminal case.

5

Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief, filed October 22, 2009, 17(a): "State concisely all the grounds
on which you base your application for post conviction relief: ... Ineffective Assistance of Counsel." Then 19, "If
your application is based upon the failure of counsel to adequately represent you, state concisely and in detail what
counsel failed to do in representing your interest: (a) failure to allow Petitioner to testify in his own behalf.. .. " The
continuation page (labeled pg. 2) then states, " ... Petitioner did not knowingly or volantarily (sic) waive his
constitutional right to testify.... This constituted a denial of due process, and thus renders the trial fundamentaly
(sic) unfair."
6
Amended Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed April 18, 2011, First Cause of Action, ,i,r21-45.
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Mr. Severson acknowledged there were strained communications with his defense
counsel, Mr. Frachiseur, before and during the trial. On cross-examination, Mr. Severson
testified he would have preferred to have been represented by either Scott Summer or Jay Clark,
rather than his trial defense counsel, and he continued to prefer Mr. Summer's representation
even after Mr. Summer was convicted of a felony and in spite of the fact that Mr. Summer was a
potential witness in the murder case. Mr. Severson testified he was upset that Mr. Frachiseur
would not hire Mr. Summer as co-counsel.
Mr. Severson testified he told Mr. Frachiseur several times he wanted to testify at his
trial. Mr. Severson testified that at trial he requested by writing notes or speaking to Mr.
Frachiseur that witnesses' testimony be countered and that Mr. Frachiseur said that evidence
would be covered when Mr. Severson took the stand to testify. Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged
that Mr. Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. Mr.
Frachiseur testified he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to testify at least ten to
fifteen times before the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr.
Severson should not testify and that Mr. Frachiseur had provided that advice to Mr. Severson.
Mr. Frachiseur felt Mr. Severson should not testify because "exceedingly damaging" evidence
would come in during the cross examination, including making previously inadmissible evidence
under pretrial rulings admissible in cross examination or rebuttal. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was
his understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to testify and that Mr.
Severson did not complain during the trial about not testifying.
Although Mr. Severson initially testified he did not know about a defendant's right to
testify until after the trial, he later acknowledged that Judge Wetherell explained a defendant's
right to testify during the trial. Judge Wetherell explained to Mr. Severson during the trial on the
record:
Mr. Severson, one thing I will advise you that this point is that it is clearly your
right to testify; it is also your right not to testify in this proceeding. Should you
choose not to testify this court gets a standard instruction to the jury, which I am
sure your counsel advised you of, that they can draw no conclusions or inference
of guilt from the fact that you choose not to testify. It is your constitutional right
not to do so.
And that's a decision that is entirely in your hands and in consultation with your
attorneys. And there are both benefits and dangers to testifying. If the jury
decides that they like what you have to say, it could be to your benefit; if the jury
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decides that they don't like what you have to say, just like any other witness, it
could be to your detriment with regard to a finding of guilt or innocence.
Once you testify, you open yourself up clearly to cross examination from the State
with regard to those matters to which you do testify or anti-reasonable inference
that can be drawn from that testimony.
So, I will just advise you of that. You have got two competent counsel, and I am
sure you will discuss at length with them before you make that decision ....
State's Exhibit 4, pp. 3932-33.
Mr. Severson acknowledged Judge Wetherell advised him of his right to testify, but Mr.
Severson later testified he had no idea that he had the right to testify until the jury was in
deliberations. When asked during cross-examination about Judge Wetherell's admonition of his
right to testify admitted as State's Exhibit 4, 7 Mr. Severson stated that he did not hear the whole
conversation because he was busy writing notes to Mr. Frachiseur and was not paying attention.
Mr. Severson also denied that Mr. Frachiseur had advised it was not a good idea for Mr.
Severson to testify.
Mr. Severson alleged that Mr. Matthews, the co-counsel, was present when Mr. Severson
told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. 8 Mr. Severson then testified he "was in
shock" when the defense rested without him testifying. He said Mr. Frachiseur later came to the
jail and when asked, commented that Mr. Severson didn't need to tesify because the jury would
acquit. Mr. Severson testified that he did not know until after the trial that he had the right to
testify. Mr. Severson testified that Mr. Frachiseur had only explained, "He told me that the State
or the judge cannot keep me from testifying, keep me off of the stand from testifying, but it was
ultimately up to him whether I testified or not." Mr. Severson also testifed he requested that
counsel let the Defendant talk to the judge about half a dozen times. 9
On cross examination, Mr. Severson acknowledged his affidavit, State's Exhibit 1, signed
by Mr. Severson on March 18, 2005 which states, "The day prior to when the defense rested at
my own jury trial, the court and the State were both informed by my legal counsel that I was
going to testify on the record and in open court. It was at that time that I was informed of my
7

State's Ex. 4, pp. 3932-3933.
The Court sustained hearsay objections to Mr. Matthews' response. At the time the objections were sustained,
there was no evidence before the court that Mr. Matthews had passed away since the time of the trial.
9
The State's counsel objected because a represented defendant does not have a right to talk to the judge, but the
court considered the testimony to the extent that the Defendant testified the request was made.
8

DISMISSAL AFfER EVIDENTIARY HEARING

21

-7-

Constitutional right to testify."

10

The trial transcript does not reflect the Court or State's counsel

were told Mr. Severson would testify. In fact, the transcript reflects that on November 5, 2004,
Mr. Frachiseur represented to the Court when discussing future witnesses, "And of course, we
still have issue as to for determination as to the defendant here."

11

Later the same day, the

prosecutor states in the transcript," .. .I haven't heard Mr. Frachiseur deciding whether or not he
wants to call the defendant as a witness."

12

about his right to testify or to remain silent.

Then, the Court advised Mr. Severson on the record
13

However, the Court did not get Mr. Severson to

acknowledge the right or make his election whether to testify verbally on the record. After Mr.
Severson's affidavit was filed in 2005 in the underlying criminal case, counsel for Mr. Severson
moved to withdraw as appointed counsel.

14

With the motion was filed State's Exhibit 3, Mr.

Frachiseur's affidavit filed where counsel swore, "4. Your affiant and co-counsel Ellison
Matthews have discussed with the Defendant his right to testify if he desired to remain silent, on
a number of occasions. The advice of both appointed counsel has been that Defendant not
testify. 5. Defendant has agreed, on more than one occasion, with counsels' advice. Defendant
has never stated a desire to testify in this matter to Affiant [Mr. Frachiseur]. 6. The statements
in the affidavit concerning an expressed desire on the part of the Defendant to testify are
false .... "
Mr. Summer, counsel for Mr. Severson before Mr. Frachiseur's appointment, testified he
asked to withdraw from representing Mr. Severson three weeks before the original trial set
because Mr. Severson could not pay him. Mr. Summer testifed he did not discuss with Mr.
Severson before the trial that a defendant had a right to testify. Mr. Summer testified that Mr.
Severson called Mr. Summer upset after the trial. Mr. Severson said he thought he would testify
the day before the trial concluded but that Mr. Frachiseur rested the case without the Defendant's
testimony the next day.
The Respondent presented evidence that Mr. Frachiseur was the Elmore County Public
Defender at the time he represented Mr. Severson and that Mr. Frachiseur had been an attorney
for forty-one years in approximately three hundred jury trials. Mr. Frachiseur also testified this
was about the last case tried before the county contracted out public defender services. He
10

State's Ex.
State's Ex.
12
State's Ex.
13
State's Ex.
14
State's Ex.
11

l, 'If 3.
4, p. 3929.
4, p. 3931.
4, pp. 3932-3933.
2, Motion of Appointed Counsel to Withdraw.
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testified he had served as counsel on fourteen murder cases and he was death-penalty qualified.
Frachiseur testified he had talked with Mr. Severson "many times" about Mr. Severson's
right to testify at trial. He testified those conversations were frequently with Ellison Matthews,
his co-counsel, who passed away after the trial. 15 Mr. Frachiseur testified he was appointed to
represent Mr. Severson in November of 2003 and represented Mr. Severson through the trial in
October 2004 and then until March 2005. Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged it has been eight years
since he represented Mr. Severson but that he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to
testify at least ten to fifteen times.
Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson should not
testify and that Mr. Frachiseur had provided that advice to Mr. Severson. Mr. Frachiseur felt Mr.
Severson should not testify because the evidence that would come in during the cross
examination of Mr. Severson would be "exceedingly damaging" or would make admissible
evidence that had previously not been permitted before the jury under pretrial rulings. Mr.
Frachiseur then testified of his concern about evidence becoming admissible related to a business
in Colorado that had burned perhaps for insurance proceeds; the opinion of police that Mr.
Severson has falsely reported a self-inflicted gunshot wound as being shot by someone else; that
Mr. Severson had an affair during his marriage to the victim in this case; that Mr. Severson had
gotten engaged to another woman while his wife, the victim in this case, was out of state; and
"most importantly" that Mr. Frachiseur could not get a "straight answer" from his client about
what happened to the Hydroxycut pills since the evidence Mr. Frachiseur reviewed tended to
demonstrate tampering with the pills. Mr. Frachiseur later testified that Mr. Severson did not
have a consistent version of the presence of the pills in their house. Ultimately, Mr. Frachiseur
testified he thought Mr. Severson's testimony would be more damaging than helpful to his case.
Mr. Frachiseur relayed that during the trial, the judge was admitting "a lot" of l.R.E. 404(b)
evidence for the purpose of motive "to an extreme degree" and that Mr. Frachiseur did not feel
he could protect the defendant on cross examination from some "very ugly, marginally relevant
material."

15

The Plaintiff's Closing Argument, p. 6, challenges the court's ruling during the Petitioner's case in chief that
statements made by Mr. Matthews were not admissible as hearsay. At the time the court made that ruling, the
Petitioner had not established at the hearing that Mr. Matthews was no longer alive. Evidence that Mr. Matthews
was deceased was not presented until the Respondent's case-in-chief &'ld the cou.."1:'s previous ruling was never
renewed by Petitioner.
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Still, Mr. Frachiseur testified he had advised Mr. Severson of his right to testify at trial
before the trial started although he could not recall exactly when these conversations occurred
because of the passage of time. State's Exhibits 7 and 8 were admitted which were memoranda
documenting discussions among the trial team related to whether Mr. Severson would testify and
that they felt Mr. Severson had been inconsistent in his explanation of events and untruthful with
the defense team. Mr. Frachiseur testified that most of defense counsel's records from the trial,
and probably Mr. Severson's notes, were destroyed by flooding after the office closed. Mr.
Frachiseur denied that the notes had been purposefully destroyed. Mr. Frachiseur's recollection
of Judge Wetherell's admonition of the right to testify was refreshed and then Mr. Frachiseur
testified he did not recall whether he specifically discusssed with Mr. Severson at that point a
defendant's right to testify. However, Mr. Frachiseur was clear that Mr. Severson made the
decision not to testify and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's understanding that Mr. Severson agreed
with Mr. Frachiseur's advice not to testify. Still, Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged that Mr.
Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. But Mr. Frachiseur
testified it was his understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to
testify and that Mr. Severson did not complain during the trial about not testifying. Mr. Severson
testified that after the jury was placed in deliberations, he requested that Mr. Frachiseur visit him
in the jail and that during that visit, Mr. Severson asked Mr. Frachiseur to let him testify. Mr.
Severson testified that Mr. Frachiseur told Mr. Severson "no" and that Mr. Frachiseur would not
ask the judge to reopen the case. Mr. Frachiseur did not recall this conversation and stated, if it
had occurred, he would have let Mr. Severson testify. After State's Exhibits 2 and 3 were
admitted, Mr. Frachiseur testified he still did not recall Mr. Severson talking with him directly
about his disatisfaction with the trial. Mr. Frachiseur again testified that he did not keep Mr.
Severson from testifying and that Frachiseur would not have had the power to keep Mr. Severson
from testifying.
Mr. Frachiseur acknowledged on cross-examination that he does not have any notes
recording his conversations with Mr. Severson about Mr. Severson's right to testify and that
preserving any notes would be important for a murder trial although it was Mr. Frachiseur's
impression that Mr. Severson wrote a lot of notes and just because there was a note would not
mean that Mr. Severson had not later changed his mind. Mr. Frachiseur also acknowledged that
Mr. Matthews had told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to testify. At the end of Mr.
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Frachiseur's testimony, at the last meeting the trial team had before trial, they discussed with Mr.
Severson the benefits and potential problems with testifying, that Mr. Severson indicated he did
not wish to testify, that Mr. Severson did not change his mind during the trial, but that afterward,
Mr. Severson did say he wished he would have testified.

It was not Mr. Frachiseur's impression that Mr. Severson was more animated after the
defense rested and Mr. Frachiseur testified that Mr. Severson always seemed agitated. Mr.
Frachiseur testified that he thought after the presentation of evidence that Mr. Severson would be
acquitted by the jury. Mr. Frachiseur did not specifically recall being summoned to the jail to
talk with Mr. Severson while the jury was deliberating or telling Mr. Severson that it was too late
to reopen the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testifed in response to cross examination that Mr. Severson
did not request to take the stand and testify, and that if Mr. Severson would have made that
request, Mr. Frachiseur would have put Mr. Severson on the witness stand like any other witness
to testify. Mr. Frachiseur did not recall telling the State whether Mr. Severson would or would
not testify and that it was a strategic decision not to tell either way. Mr. Frachiseur denied telling
Mr. Severson that it was Mr. Frachiseur's "call" whether Mr. Severson testified. Mr. Frachiseur
testified that Mr. Severson had not stated a desire to testify at trial up until Mr. Frachiseur filed
an affidavit, State's Exhibit 3, in support of a request to withdraw as counsel. Mr. Frachiseur
also testified that although he had consulted with accountants while preparing for trial, he did not
call an accountant to the stand during the trial for tactical reasons.
The State also called Carol (CJ.) Nemeth who testified she recalled a discussion at the
Elmore County Jail with the defendant, Mr. Frachiseur, and another trial team member, Clint,
about one month before the trial began. She testifed that at that meeting, the defendant said he
did not want to testify. She also attended the trial. She testified that she could not hear what was
being said at the counsel table but that she had an unobstructed view of the table. She recalled
the judge's advice on the right to testify, then Mr. Severson leaned over and talked to Mr.
Frachiseur. She observed J\la. Severson shake his head, meaning "no," several times during this
conversation.
Mr. Severson made respresentations during his testimony of how he would have testified
if he had been allowed to testify. Mr. Severson testified he was with Mary when she purchased
one bottle of Hydroxycut; that it did not appear that Mr. Frachiseur read the notes written by Mr.
Severson; that Nancy Ellwanger called Mr. Severson and "hung around too much" after Mary's
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death, and acted like she "knew something" after Mary's death; and that Carol Diaz (Mary's
mother) called the house after Mary's death to ask about Mary's insurance policy but that he did
not know about the policy until that time. Mr. Severson then testified that he would have
testified that Mary changed the beneficiary on the policy from Mr. Severson to her mother, Carol
Diaz.
Mr. Severson would have testified that his business was doing great and "we weren't
having any money problems whatsoever" and that Mr. Frachiseur had told the Defendant he
could testify about the financial solvency of the business when the Defendant testified. Mr.
Severson testfied "Mary and I were great" although he was "skeptical about whether we should
stay together or not" because of debts and secrets Mary had kept. He testified that Mary was
unhappy and had great financial pressures because she used their money to support her son.
He testified that he would have testified in response to several witnesses' testimony
including that he would have testified that Ms. Buccholz charged car repairs at his shop which
she never paid and would have denied he ever received medication from her. He also would
have testified Theresa Malea owed him $605 for car repairs. He said it was he, not Ms.
Buccholz, that drove Mary to the airport to fly to Colorado. He testified there were two vehicles
in Mr. Severson's name, a Mitsubishi in someone else's name, and a truck in Mary's name that
was refinanced in Mary's name as her son was filing for bankruptcy. Mr. Severson testified his
ex-wife had filed for bankruptcy after their divorce but that Mr. Severson denied he was trying to
hide assets from bankruptcy proceedings, and that it was Mary's decision which car to keep. He
also testified on cross-examination that he was aware there was a potential divorce before Mary's
death and that most of his assets were in Mary's name.
He denied asking the doctor to refill Mary's prescription and stated he picked up a
prescription at WalMart at Mary's request. He also testified that when he found Mary
unresponsive, he called 911 using a pre-programmed button on their phone but that number did
not work. He testified he then called Mike (his son) and Nora on a preprogrammed number
which worked. He also testified that Mary had sleep apnea and that he "shook her violently"
"many times" to wake her up.
After being shown State's Exhibit 6, Mr. Severson aknowledged he had been indicted for
one count of perjury for lying about the location of his wife's remains before being charged for
the murder for his wife. The transcript of Mr. Severson's previous testimony was admitted as
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State's Exhibit 10 and Mr. Severson acknowledged his testimony had been false at the time he
Barclay had later found the cremains at Mr. Severson's house after
that hearing. Mr. Severson denied making a false police report in Colorado - he reiterated that
his wound in that case was not self inflicted. He also testified to an accident where Mary fell off
a ladder and could have incurred a cut on her lip but that he did not see any bruising on the
outside of her mouth.
The Respondent admitted State's Exhibit 9 which is a trial transcript of George Ellis
Porter Ill's testimony, the quality control manager for HVL Incorporated, the company that
made Hydroxycut in 2002. He testified about the manufacturing and quality control process for
Hydroxycut pills. He testified that he had identified the lot number of the bottles of Hydroxycut
that Mary Severson had and the only two bottles from the entire lot that had complaints about
tampering were the two bottles at issue in this trial. 16 He testified that based on his experience
and familiarity with the manufacturing process, that it would not be possible that someone could
dump a "can of Drano" into the mixture and have it make it all the way through the
manufacturing and quality control process undetected. 17 He also testified it was improbable that
someone put several pills filled with Drano into this process to produce those two bottles because
the pills would be mixed evenly with pills that had not been tampered with before filling the
bottles 18 or that the Drano would be diluted in each pill. 19 Finally, he testified on crossexamination that he was aware the company was working with the FBI on "counterfeiting
problem with Hydroxycut"20 but later testified that had nothing to do with placing "an adulterant
or something like Drano into a product. " 21
Additionally, the State admitted State's Exhibit 11 which including portions of the trial
transcript including testimony of Steven Bock, 22 Rebecca Deppen, 23 Leann Watkins, 24 Tracy

16

State's Ex.
State's Ex.
is Id.
19
State's Ex.
20
State's Ex.
21
State's Ex.
22
State's Ex.
2952-2955.
23
State's Ex.
24
State's Ex.
17

10, pp. 2205-2207.
10, p. 2207.
10, p. 2219-2220.
10, p. 2213.
10, p. 2219.
11, pp. 2836-2839, 2848-2851, 2868-2883, 2888-2899, 2908-2911, cross examination 2936-2947,
11, pp. 3474-3488.
11, pp. 3525-3526, 353-3538, 3559-3562.
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Besler, 25 Rob Crayne,

26

and Felicia D. Gartung. 27 That testimony is addressed below, along with

Severson's response.
Steven Bock testified he was a loan officer for Trinity Home Mortgage (Tr. 2836) when
the Seversons came to borrow money for a residence on Poppy (Tr. 2848). He took a loan
application from Mary Severson (Tr. 2849). His recollection was that Mary used a manufactured
home valued around $10,000 as an asset toward obtainng this loan (Tr. 2850). Mary was the
only applicant for the loan (Tr. 2851). In fall of 2001 or early winter of 2002, Mary approached
Mr. Bock again about refinancing the house to take her equity out of the house and about buying
the building on American Legion Boulevard where Auto Works, the Severson's auto shop, had
previously been located (Tr. 2874). He stated he could not find any lenders for this because of a
bankruptcy, even if Mary borrowed the money solely on her own (Tr. 2875). Mr. Bock testified
about four loan applications Mary submitted (Tr. 2876): one for the house on Poppy (Id.), a
home equity line or second mortgage for both the Petitioner and Mary which did not work out
(Tr. 2876-2878), and a loan just for Mary for the home at 4375 Poppy Avenue (Tr. 2878)
admitted over defense objection. Mr. Bock testified there was "some problem" with Mary's
credit report during these transactions (Tr. 2888). He was also not able to use any credit report
on the Petitioner for loans because of a bankruptcy he had and his credit score (Tr. 2888-89).
Mr. Bock testified he had an account statement from First Security Bank on Mary Severson used
in connection with the refinance that he used "to make sure that what they are claiming is true
that they have money and what is in their bank account" (Tr. 2891). He also testified to a First
Security Bank account statement for Mary L. Severson doing business as Auto Works (Tr. 289293), Auto Works profit and loss statements which Mr. Bock verified (Tr. 2894-95), and a couple
of W-2s from Grant Peterson showing Mary's income (Tr. 2896) submitted in an attempt to
purchase the Auto Works business (Tr. 2892-93). Mr. Bock testified later that Mr. Severson told
him Mary was dying of cancer and was taking some type of diet pills (Tr. 2909-10). Mr.
Severson also told Mr. Bock, "he did not believe that it was cancer. He thought it was from her
taking too many pills to get -to lose weight." (Tr. 2911). On cross-examination, Mr. Bock
testified that Mary's assets increased with each successive loan application (Tr. 2938). Mr. Bock
was then questioned by counsel, "by what means were you able to substantiate the increased
25

State's Ex. 11, pp. 3567-3570, 3579-3594.
State's Ex. l l, pp. 3890-3901, 3906-3913, 3918-3921.
27
State's Ex. 11, pp. 3690-3701.

26
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assets; that's my question? Does this involve listing some of Larry's assets as Mary's assets?" to
Mr. Bock answered,

was whatever they had under - whatever she said that was there

under like Auto Works or whatever ...." (Tr. 2939). Then Mr. Frachiseur clarified he was aksing
about the "total assets" of each of the forms, that was $325,500 for Exhibit 1-4, $309,000 for
Exhibit 1-5, and $515,500 for Exhibit 1-6 (Id.). When asked for an explanation of the increase,
Mr. Bock testified
People acquire different things, net worth of the business increases. You take
what they say it is worth and then you have to go and verify it. Like if they say
their business is worth this much, then you have to go through the procedure of
looking at their invoices and their statements that they give to their accountant,
things like that, to verify what they put on here is true.
(Tr. 2940). Then related to the profit and loss statements of the business, Mr. Frachiseur cross
examined Mr. Bock, "And you then verified the figures in these documents by examining the
acutal invoices?" to which Mr. Bock answered, "Yes." (Tr. 2941 ). Related to the Poppy Street
loan, Mr. Bock testified he received the figures on those documents from Mary (Tr. 2945-46).
Mr. Bock also testified that Mr. Severson told Mr. Bock within two or three months that he had a
young lady as a girlfriend (Tr. 2952).
Mr. Severson testified that if he would have testified at trial, he would have stated his
business was doing great and "we weren't having any money problems whatsoever" and that Mr.
Frachiseur had told the Defendant he could testify about the financial solvency of the business
when the Defendant testified. Mr. Severson said he would have testified that his business, Auto
Works, was netting $12,000 to $15,000 per month. Mr. Severson also would have testified the
house on Poppy Street was in Mary's name, that he knew she could not afford to buy the house,
and that Mary's income was $12,000 instead of the $97,000 he saw on the loan paperwork.
The State presented the transcript of Rebecca Deppen's testimony. She was a home
health registered nurse and had met Larry and Mary Severson when they both worked for Grant
Peterson Auto Group with her husband (Tr. 3475-76). Her husband's vehicle broke down on
February 14, 2002, the day before Mary died, so she took the vehicle to Auto Works and saw
Larry Severson there (Tr. 3479). In the office Larry showed her an endoscopy photo performed
on Mary (Tr. 3480) and told her Mary had been ill for two or three weeks since beginning taking
some diet pills she had purchased at GNC (Tr. 3483). She explained several symptoms Mr.
Severson had relayed and then showed her some capsules (Id.) in two containers; one was
opened and the other was unopened (Tr. 3484). She saw the capsules in the open container and
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there were "two different kinds" of different colors, some dark green and some light (Id.). She
described the contents, "But the contents that could be seen through the capsule, some

it was

dark green; some of it was a pale turquoise color." (Id.). She testified she
took two of the capsules and a piece of paper and I opened I took two capsules,
each of a different color, and opened them both and dumped the contents on to a
piece of paper.
Q. All right. What happened?

A. The dark green ground grassy looking stuff appeared to do nothing. It was appeared normal like a diet pill would like. The other one contained a mixture of
light turquoise crystals, white crystals, and little shavings of what appeared to be
metal.
Q. What happened to the paper, to your observations, if you remember?

A. The paper immediately melted. All parts of the paper that had this substance
sitting on it melted, just melted away.
(Tr. 3485). She testifed Mr. Severson said Mary had gone to the hospital and then returned
home, which did not make sense to Ms. Deppen since Mr. Severson had said Mary was
vomitting blood (Tr. 3486). She testified that Mr. Severson had told her Mary's skin was turning
yellow (Id.) and that, based upon her training and experience, she suspected something was
"going on" with Mary's liver and advised Mr. Severson to take her to a doctor (Tr. 3487). She
said she learned of Mary's death the next day (Id.).
Mr. Severson testified to a conversation with Becky Deppen, showing Ms. Deppen diet
pills, showing her how the pills could be taken apart, and admitted the pills were thrown in the
trash by Ms. Deppen. But he testified that if he had been allowed to testify, he would have
denied that he told Ms. Deppen that Mary was dying.
The State also introduced the trial transcript of Leann Watkins'. Leann Watkins testified
she is Jennifer Watkins' mother (Tr. 3526) and that Jennifer was 21 years old in 2001 (Tr. 353536). She testified that Mr. Severson had always told her he was divorced (Tr. 3531). In
conversations with Mr. Severson, he told her that Jennifer made him feel "like he was young and
alive" and that he was going to marry her daughter (Tr. 3532). In January 2002, Mr. Severson
said he was frustrated because Jennifer had ended the relationship and there was another man at
Jennifer's house (Tr. 3533-34). Shortly after that conversation, Mr. Severson called and relayed
that "his wife was very ill. That she was dying. And that her pills were tainted and the FDA was
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involved ... " and "that if she [Jennifer] would just have been patient, things would have worked
out

them."

3535).

Mr. Severson testified that if he had testified at trial, he would have denied telling Leann
Watkins that he was divorced or that Mary was dying, but admitted telling her he was
contemplating a divorce. He would also have testified that Jennifer Watkins owed him $1,100
from a loan.
The State also presented the trial transcript of Jennifer Watkins' testimony. She testified
that Mr. Severson told her on multiple occassions, including in October, that he had divorce
papers and that she wanted to see them (Tr. 3559). She testified that in October, he called his
attorney asking him to send the papers, he got mail in an envelope from an attorney so she
opened them, and "they were bankruptcy papers." (Id.). He told her he had divorce papers a few
times, including in January (Id.). She said the second time in January he said that Mary was
dying and that she was so sick he sold her car, that she couldn't drive it anymore, and that she
couldn't leave her house (Tr. 3560).
During his testimony, Mr. Severson acknowledged he had a "romantic relationship" and
had sex once with Jennifer Watkins but stated that if he would have testified, he would have
denied telling her he was divorced. He also said he would have testified that Jennifer Watkins
owed him $1,100 from a loan and that he would have denied writing letters or buying flowers for
her after their relationship ended.
The State offered into evidence the trial transcript of Tracy Besler's testimony. Ms.
Besler testified she previously worked in Mountain Home (Tr. 3567-69). She testified she knew
Mr. Severson and Mary (Tr. 3570), and also Mike, Larry's son, and Nora, his fiancee (Tr. 3579).
She recalled a conversation with the Defendant before Mary's death "vaguely" that Mary had an
ulcer or something wrong with her stomach, "Something was eating away at her stomach." (Tr.
3582). Mr. Severson told her she shouldn't go to Desert Sage Health Center because "they don't
help you. That his wife was dying and that they weren't helping her." (Tr. 3583). Mr. Severson
told her Mary was taking "a lot" of Hydroxycut diet pills (Tr. 3584) and that Ms. Besler had
taken Hydroxycut during a period of time while working out at the same gym where the
Defendant worked out (Tr. 3584-85). She testified the Defendant did not go to the gym for about
a month or two after Mary died (Tr. 3586). She testifed after Mr. Severson returned to the gym
after his wife's death, around May or June of 2002, they dated three or four months (Tr. 3586-
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88). On one of these dates, the Defendant had a bottle of Hydroxycut pills that she had placed on
counter (Tr. 3589-90). She saw Mr. Severson pulling apart the Hydroxycut pills and putting
the contents in the sink and told her "That you could

these will kill you and that you could fill

these up." (Tr. 3590). "He said I shouldn't take them because they will kill me." (Tr. 3591).
Mr. Severson testified that he would have testified in response that what he actually said
was that he thought the pills had contributed to Mary's death.
The State offered the trial transcript of Red (Bernard) Crayne's testimony. Mr. Crayne
testified he frequented Auto Works for morning coffee with Larry Severson (Tr. 3893-94). On
one occasion in early January 2002, he saw some capsules sitting on the Defendant's desk and
that he observed the Defendant spitting up blood for ten or fifteen minutes (Tr. 3895). He said
the Defendant's stomach was distended and he observed the Defendant cough up blood four or
five times (Tr. 3895-96). Mr. Crayne looked at the pills on the Defendant's desk and saw two
different kinds of capsules in the bottle (Tr. 3896); the half full bottle had a mixture of white and
green capsules (Tr. 3913). Mr. Crayne testified he asked Mr. Severson what was wrong and Mr.
Severson replied, "I took one of Mary's diet pills and they are killing me." (Tr. 3906). Mr.
Crayne testified this took place around the 151h of January, 2002, and that Mr. Severson had
mentioned his wife was sick and having trouble keeping food down (Tr. 3908). But when asked
about his statement to Detective Barclay, Mr. Crayne acknowledged he had previously told the
Detective that Mr. Severson said that Mary was taking the same pills but not having any
problems (Tr. 3910) then, a couple of days later, that Mr. Severson had mentioned Mary was
having problems with her stomach (Tr. 3911). Mr. Crayne testified that at the end of January,
first part of February, he then took the bottle to a pharmacist for analysis (Tr. 3898-99).
The State also offered the transcript for Felicia Gartung, a waitress at Smoky Mountain
Pizza in Mountain Home, called by the defense (Tr. 3693). She recalled serving Larry and Mary
Severson at dinner at the restaurant on February 14, 2002 (Tr. 3693-94). She testified they were
going to order an appetizer and that Mary said, "what about cheese sticks" and the Defendant
said, "you can't have those." (Tr. 3695). She said Mary was "like, well, okay, but it would be
soft" and the Defendant said, "you can't have cheese sticks." (Tr. 3695-96). She recalled Mary
"just put her hand to her mouth and said it would be soft." (Tr. 3696). The couple did not seem
to argue (Tr. 3697) and she did not recall anything unusual. On cross-examination, she testified
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that Mary did not seem to have trouble eating that night and did not seem to be in pain (Tr.
She testified she did not observe any bruising around Mary's mouth (Tr. 3701).
Mr. Severson testified he would have testified that Mary had shown Felicia her cut lip
which is contrary to this witness' testimony.
The Petitioner did not introduce the verified applications or affidavit of Severson in
support of that application into evidence at the hearing, and therefore, these items do not
constitute evidence considered by this Court. Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933, 120 P.3d 751
(Ct. App. 2005); Willie v. State, 149 Idaho 647, 239 P.3d 445 (Ct. App. 2010).

IV.

ANALYSIS OF POST CONVICTION CLAIMS AFTER EVIDENTIARY

HEARING
The petition only alleged ineffective assistance by counsel's failure to allow Petitioner to
testify on his own behalf. Within the Amended Verified Petition, counsel again framed the
allegation only as a denial of effective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington.
However, both the Petitioner and the State argued after the evidentiary hearing these allegations
both under the standards for ineffective assistance of counsel and as a constitutional claim.
Therefore, this court will analyze Mr. Severson's claims under both standards pursuant to

Rossignol v. State, 152 Idaho at 706,274 P.3d at 7.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, "A defendant in a criminal proceeding has the right
to testify in his own behalf. Although a defendant can and should consult with counsel about the
risks and benefits of testifying, the ultimate decision of whether to do so must be left to the
defendant." DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,200 P.3d 1148 (2009).
Under the first element of both ineffective assistance of counsel by prohibiting a
defendant from testifying under Strickland v. Washington and also that prohibition as a
deprivation of a fundamental right pursuant to Chapman v. California, the burden rests with the
defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he was prohibited by counsel from
testifying at trial. The Plaintiffs closing argument skips this threshold element and begins
simply by arguing the State's burden under the harmless error standard. However, in both
analyses, the Plaintiff must first bear the burden to show counsel prohibited his testimony at trial.
Although the Petitioner testified that he never told Mr. Frachiseur that he did not want to
testify, his testimony is directly contradicted by the testimony of Mr. Frachiseur. Mr. Frachiseur
acknowledged that Mr. Severson may have told Mr. Frachiseur that Mr. Severson wanted to
testify but that Mr. Severson would change his mind during the representation. Mr. Frachiseur
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also testified he discussed with Mr. Severson a defendant's right to testify at least ten to fifteen
before the trial. Mr. Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson
should not testify, that this advice was provided to Mr. Severson, and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's
understanding that Mr. Severson had taken his advice and did not want to testify. Although Mr.
Severson initially testified in this proceeding that he did not know he had the right to testify at
trial until after the trial had concluded, he later acknowledged the Court had advised him that he
had the right to testify or to remain silent at the trial. Additionally, in Mr. Severson's 2005
affidavit, he acknowledged the Court advised him during the trial that he had the right to testify.
So, whether Mr. Severson was aware of whether he had the right to testify is a credibility issue
for this Court. Pursuant to Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho at 73, the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the
proceeding are all matters solely within the province of the District Court.
In the trial transcript, the Court advised Mr. Severson directly, "I will advise you that this
point is that it is clearly your right to testify; it is also your right not to testify in this
proceeding.... And that's a decision that is entirely in your hands and in consultation with your
attorneys." Although Mr. Severson testified at this hearing that he was not listening to the
court's admonition because he was writing notes to his counsel, this statement is simply not
credible and not afforded weight by this court. Although the Petitioner argues there was no
acknowledgement on the record by Mr. Severson so he must not have been paying attention, the
State's argument that the judge would have stopped the admonition on the record if the judge felt
he was being disregarded or ignored by a defendant is reasonable. In 2005, Mr. Severson signed
an affidavit acknowledging the Court informed him of his right to testify on this day ... the day
before the defense rested. To now claim that he never knew of the right to testify at trial is not
credible. This Court finds the Defendant knew he had the right to testify or to not testify before
the defense rested.
Next at issue is whether Mr. Frachiseur then prohibited the Defendant from testifying
contrary to the Defendant's desire. There was no evidence presented in this hearing that Mr.
Matthews prohibited Mr. Severson from testifying at trial and the First Cause of Action was not
pied to implicate Mr. Matthews. 28 The only evidence offered by Mr. Severson was his own

28

An1ended petition, ,i 21.
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testimony that Mr. Frachiseur had incorrectly advised that it was Mr. Frachiseur's sole decision
Mr. Severson would testify, and that Mr. Severson requested to Mr. Frachiseur to testify
that Mr. Frachiseur prohibited the testimony without presenting Mr. Severson as a witness.
This, too, is an issue of credibility for the Court.
The Court observed hours of testimony from both Mr. Severson and Mr. Frachieseur
from the witness stand in a small courtroom. The demeanor of both witnesses was sure, without
distracting mannerisms, and confident in the courtroom. Mr. Frachiseur testified that he did not
have the ability to keep a defendant from testifying and that, if Mr. Severson, had requested to
testify, that Mr. Frachiseur would have been required to allow Mr. Severson to testify. Mr.
Frachsieur testifed he did not have a recollection that Mr. Severson told him he wanted to testify
at the time the State rested but before the case was submitted to the jury. While Mr. Frachiseur
no longer had notes directly addressing Mr. Severson's requests to testify or specifically noting
Mr. Severson declining to testify, C.J. Nemeth provided testimony that Mr. Severson
equivocated back and forth about testifying in pretrial conferences she attended with the
Defendant. She testified that during the last meeting she attended right before trial commenced
where Mr. Severson stated he would not testify. Additionally after the court's admonition of the
right to testify, she observed Mr. Severson shaking his head "no" while talking with Mr.
Frachiseur. While she could not hear the discussion between the two, the inference of this court
is that Mr. Severson discussed his right to testify with counsel at that point in the trial and
indicated he did not wish to testify. Although the Petitioner alleges he told Mr. Frachiseur at the
jail while the jury was deliberating that he wanted to testify, Mr. Frachiseur did not recall that.
Again, in determining the credibility of witnesses, this Court finds that Mr. Frachiseur and Ms.
Nemeth are credible and reliable witnesses with no motive to lie. While eight years have passed
since Mr. Frachiseur's representation of Mr. Severson, Mr. Frachiseur's recollection is still
reliable and credible before this court. While the Petitioner argues Mr. Frachiseur's testimony
was vague and equivocal, this Court found some of the statements very early in the hearing to be
equivocal but that Mr. Frachiseur's recollection became more detailed and reliable early on in
the testimony as he began remembering long-ago events. The Court does not find Mr.
Severson's testimony more reliable that Mr. Frachiseur just because Mr. Severson could testify
in a more detailed manner. Mr. Frachiseur relayed to this Court the same testimony from his
affidavit in 2005 that stated that Mr. Severson had not made a request to testify and that any
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statement to the contrary was false. Mr. Frachiseur also testified credibly that Mr. Severson did
not ask to testify before

defense rested. When questioned about Mr. Severson's testimony

that whether Mr. Severson would testify at trial was "his call," Mr. Frachiseur unequivocally
answered, "I know that I did not tell him that."
In weighing credibility, the Court considered Mr. Severson's false statement to a judge
about the location of his wife's remains. He admitted during this hearing that he lied under oath
to a judge during a hearing that preceded the murder case. Additionally, the court weighed the
fact that the Defendant is sentenced to life in prison on this case and has great motivation to
misrepresent facts in hope of getting a new trial and a new opportunity to prove his innocence.
Finaily, the Court considered the evidence offered at this hearing of the trial proceedings and the
number of discrepancies Mr. Severson's testimony had with so many of the State's witnesses.
Two unrelated witnesses saw Mr. Severson with the Hydroxycut bottles in the weeks leading up
to Mary's death and both Ms. Deppen and Mr. Crayne offered almost identical descriptions of
the bottles and pills-and Mr. Severson did not challenge either of those witnesses testimony
that he had a half-filled bottle of Hydroxycut with two different kinds of capsules immediately
preceding Mary's death. Mr. Severson relayed Mary's illness and its proposed cause by diet
pills to so many witnesses who testified at trial, yet Mr. Severson denied at this hearing telling a
couple of those witnesses that Mary was dying and denied telling a couple of witnesses that he
was divorced.
Mr. Frachiseur was clear that his advice to Mr. Severson had been not to testify. Mr.
Frachiseur testified it was his professional opinion that Mr. Severson should not testify because
the evidence that would come in during the cross examination of Mr. Severson would be
"exceedingly damaging" or would make admissible evidence that had previously not been
permitted before the jury under pretrial rulings. This assertion was examined in light of the
Court's pretrial ruling that Mary Severson made statements before her death (that she believed
her husband was trying to kill her) but that those statements were inadmissible unless the defense
"opens the door" regarding Mary Severson' s state of mind.

29

Mr. Severson testified in this

hearing about Mary's unhappiness, depression, and financial difficulties. Mr. Frachiseur
testified of his concern about evidence becoming admissible related to a business in Colorado
that had burned perhaps for insurance proceeds; the opinion of police that Mr. Severson has
29
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falsely reported a self-inflicted gunshot wound as being shot by someone else; that Mr. Severson
had an

during

marriage to the victim

case; that Mr. Severson had gotten engaged

to another woman while his wife, the victim in this case, was out of state; and "most
importantly" that Mr. Frachiseur could not get a "straight answer" from his client about what
happened to the Hydroxycut pills and Mr. Frachiseur' s investigation demonstrated tampering
with the pills, especially since Mr. Severson never presented a consistent version of the presence
of the pills. Mr. Severson denied at this hearing ever being told that he should not testify.
However, State's Exhibits 7 and 8 documented discussions among the trial team related to the
advice that Mr. Severson should not testify. Mr. Frachiseur was clear that Mr. Severson made
the decision not to testify and that it was Mr. Frachiseur's understanding that Mr. Severson
agreed with Mr. Frachiseur's advice not to testify. As in Hoffman v. State, circumstances in this
case also show that Mr. Severson acquiesced during the trial to counsel's advice not to testify.
116 Idaho 689, 690, 778 P.2d 811, 812 (Ct. App. 1989). Based upon the substantial and
competent evidence presented at this hearing, this Court finds Mr. Severson was aware of his
ultimate right to decide whether or not he would testify because of the advisement of the Court,
that Mr. Severson then did not testify before the close of this trial, and this choice was made
knowingly, freely and voluntarily by Mr. Severson. Mr. Severson has not met his burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he requested to Mr. Frachiseur that he be
allowed to testify while the jury was deliberating.
Although this Court would have preferred to have the notes of counsel and the Petitioner
made at trial produced for inspection at this hearing, the absence of notes is not dispositive. The
explanation of the unavailability of the notes is reasonable. It is irrelevant to the court whether
the yellow pads came from Mr. Frachiseur, Mr. Clark, or anywhere else. This Cout believes Mr.
Severson that he made lots of notes throughout the trial and continually tried to draw Mr.
Frachiseur's attention to the notes. However, Mr. Frachiseur's representation that Mr. Severson
routine use of the notes and knocking on the table to draw attention to the notes during the trial
was distracting while he was trying the case. While the notes may have shed some additional
light on the issues at hand, the absence of notes does not make Mr. Frachiseur's testimony less
credible or less reliable, nor does it make Mr. Severson's testimony more credible or more
reliable. The court does not draw an inference for either party because of the absence of notes.

DISMISSAL AFTER EVIDENTIARY HEARING

- 23 -

After a thorough examination of all of the evidence presented at the hearing, after
detennining the credibility of the witnesses and weighing the evidence presented, this Court
finds that the Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the
evidence that Mr. Frachiseur prohibited Mr. Severson from testifying in his own behalf.

A. Ineffective Assistance purusant to Strickland v. Washington by
Prohibiting Testimony
The burden rests with the defendant to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that trial
counsel prohibited him from testifying at trial, that the acts of counsel were deficient, and to
show how the deficiency was prejudicial to the defendant. Id. Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). The first requirement is that the Defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he "was precluded from testifying by lead counsel
Frachiseur"30 and the Defendant has failed to meet this burden. The Defendant has not shown
the Petitioner was prohibited from testifying by a probability sufficient to undermine this Court's
confidence in the outcome of the trial as required by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 694.
Therefore, this Court is not required to address whether counsel's advice not to testify was based
on strategic and tactical decisions related to Counsel's investigation and Counsel's assessment of
the Defendant's case.

B. Defendant was Prohibited from Testifying Argued as a Deprivation of a
Fundamental Constitutional Right Pursuant to Chapman v. California
Again, even for a constitutional claim, the burden still rests with defendant to show he
was deprived of the right to testify by Mr. Frachiseur. If the defendant meets this burden, then
the state must show "harmless error" or beyond a reasonable doubt that the deprivation did not
contribute to the defendant's conviction pursuant to Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18.
However, as stated in the analysis above, the Defendant has not shown by a probability sufficient
to undermine this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial that the Petitioner was
prohibited from testifying at trial by Mr. Frachiseur. Therefore, the burden has not shifted to the
State to show that any error by counsel, if any, was harmless error.

30

Amended Petition, First Cause of Action, ,r,r21-45.
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V. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is DENIED in all
aspects.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this 21st day of January, 2013.

Lynn G. Norton
District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELMORE
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Responden t,
vs.

Supreme Court
Case No. 40769

LARRY SEVERSON,
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
EXHIBITS
Defendant/Appellan t.

-----------------

)
)

I, Barbara Steele, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Elmore, do hereby certify:
That the following is a list of exhibits which were offered
or admitted into evidence during the Preliminary Hearing in this
case:
NONE

IN

WITNESS

WHEREOF,

I

have

affixed the seal of the said Court this

hereunto

set

my

hand

day of April, 2013.

BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court
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and

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

LARRY SEVERSON,
- Petitioner-Appellant,

AMENDED ORDER GRANTING THE
MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO
TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE

V.

STATE OF IDAHO,

Supreme Court Docket No. 40769-2013
Elmore County No. 2009-1408

Respondent.

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD AND TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE was filed by
counsel for Appellant on January 7, 2014, requesting that this Court augment the record with
documents and take judicial notice of the record, transcripts and exhibits in Appellant's prior appeal,
State v. Severson, Supreme Court Docket No. 32128. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Appellant's MOTION TO AUGMENT THE RECORD be,
and hereby is, GRANTED in part, and the augmentation record shall include the documents listed
below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:

1. Petitioner's Request that the Court Take Judicial Notice, file-stamped April 18, 2011;
2. Filing and Notice of Filing of Judicially Noticed Material, file-stamped April 18,201 l;
3. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Objection, Motion to Enlarge, Requests for Extension
and Scheduling Conference, file-stamped February 8, 2012;
4. Motion to Take Judicial Notice of All Exhibits Introduced in the Underlying Criminal
Case, file-stamped February 13, 2012;
5. Brief in Support of the State's Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal, file-stamped
February 13, 2012;
6. Motion for Order Granting Partial Summary Dismissal, file-stamped February 13, 2012;
7. Brief in support of the State's Second Motion for Partial Summary Dismissal,
file-stamped June 8, 2012;
8. Motion to Take Additional Judicial Notice, with attachment, file-stamped September 10,
2012;and
9. Affidavit of Larry M. Stevens, file-stamped May 9, 2012.
IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the Court shall take judicial notice of the Clerk's
Record Reporter's Transcripts and Exhibits in Supreme Court Docket No. 32128, State v. Severson,
Elmore County case number 2002-158.
AMENDED ORDER GRANTING THE MOTION TO AUGMENT AND TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE Docket No. 40769-2013

IT FURTHER IS ORDERED that the District Court Clerk shall submit the Exhibits from
Elmore County case number 2002-158, State v. Severson, to this Court on or before fourteen (14)
days of the date of this Order, as they were returned to the district court after the remittitur was filed in
Supreme Court Docket No. 32128.
DATED this

J3!

day of January, 2014.

For the Supreme Court

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk

cc: Counsel of Record
District Court Clerk
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correct
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Appellate Rule 28.
I
the
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above
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see

Clerk's
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Certificate

of
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will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along with
the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record.
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the seal of the said Court this

day of April, 2013.
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Clerk of the District Court
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one copy of the REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and
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the seal of the said Court this

day of April, 2013.
BARBARA STEELE
Clerk of the District Court

CERTIFICAT E OF SERVICE

